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Abstract
Since gaining independence from Britain in 1962, Uganda has been beset by conflicts,
the worst of which took place between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance
Army in northern Uganda (1988-2006), causing a massive humanitarian crisis. The central
argument of the thesis is that the government’s programmes in response would have been more
successful if they had been people-centred, directly responsive to the suffering of the people,
rather than centralised in the hands of a small Kampala-based elite, which controlled access to
funding and political power, without transparency or accountability. This research uses human
security as an umbrella concept to examine the interventions undertaken by actors during and
after the violence. While the specific concept was not applied in northern Uganda, its core
characteristic, people-centred policy making, was used, particularly by (I)NGOs. I use it here
as a test against which the government’s actions in the conflict through which northern Uganda
suffered, can be analysed and understood. The research focuses on the physical, emotional,
psychological, structural and cultural violence committed by both the LRA and government
forces during the conflict and the resulting catastrophic consequences for the people of northern
Uganda. By examining the conflict in northern Uganda, the thesis contributes to a broader
discussion on how a human security approach can be applied in relation to the problems people
face during and after conflicts.
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Chapter One
Introduction
The LRA fighters began a killing spree. They killed women and children
who failed to walk with them due to fatigue. Young children who were born
in the bush whenever they started to cry was killed immediately. One boy
from my village failed to walk and was killed right before our very eyes.
Other people the rebels came across especially the elderly and the disabled
were also killed.
(survivor account, Amuria camp 2005)

Since Independence in October 1962 from the disruption of the colonial power (the
United Kingdom), Uganda has experienced violent political conflicts in one region after the
other. This has led to widespread human suffering. Uganda is a landlocked East African
country which shares its borders with Kenya to the east, South Sudan in the north, Tanzania
and Rwanda to the south, and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. The country has
experienced many problems, ranging from widespread poverty, increasing urbanization,
gender inequality, a lack of unified nationalism, weak institutional capacities, political
instability, internal threats emanating from poor leadership, to intractable violent ethnic
conflicts and political fragmentation, all of which still pose a fundamental problem to the
wellbeing and security of Ugandans.
The most enduring conflict suffered by Ugandans is that between the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda, which started in 1988, and did not end until the
Juba peace talks began in 2006. This thesis has developed from my own experience as a senior
aid worker in northern Uganda for the Catholic-based Caritas Uganda from 2001 to 2010. The
intense suffering, I witnessed in the Internally displaced people (IDP) camps both in towns and
in the bush, as well as in UN-based mediation secretariat assembly areas, led me to this research.
I worked in around 60 of nearly 100 such camps, from the very small in Soroti camp (Teso
region) (260 -270 people in two acres) to the largest Pabbo (Acholi in Amuru District) which
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crammed nearly 70,000 people into approximately seven acres. The camps were overcrowded
and, at times chaotic, especially when the monthly food delivery from World Food Programme
was due. Residents also had to queue for water pumped from bore holes, and cooking was done
over three stone fires on the ground inside the individual huts (constructed of mud walls and
woven grass roofs). Inevitably, fires often occurred, sometimes with devastating results,
including the destruction of whole camps.
Within these contexts, and in order to record and analyse the impacts of the LRA
conflict within the context of the human security approach, I am reflexively positioning
ethnographic experiences on the ground within the broader social research literature. In doing
so, I unpack the reasons behind the emergence of the LRA, the connections between the social,
political and economic, and the local, national, regional and international peace building and
conflict resolution in the region.
The central argument of the thesis is that the government’s programmes would have
stood more chance of success if they had been people-centred, and so directly responsive to the
suffering of the people, rather than centralised in the hands of a small Kampala-based elite,
which controlled access to funding and therefore to political power at every level, without
transparency or accountability. To build the capabilities of stakeholders at the grassroots level
and reduce the opportunities for corruption and mismanagement would have represented a
people-centred programme such as that offered by the human security approach, which offers
possibilities for exploring how insecurities in communities might cause physical conflict. The
concept came to prominence after being used in the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP,
1994), and its feasibility as a strategy to alleviate suffering has been debated by scholars, policy
makers, humanitarian agencies, and human rights and peace activists (Christie, 2010).
While the specific concept of the human security principle was not applied in northern
Uganda, Numbers of what came to be its core characteristic such as people centred policy
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making, were consciously used in post conflict northern Uganda. I use it here as a reflective
mirror, as a test against which the government’s actions in the conflict through which northern
Uganda suffered, can be analysed and understood. In doing so, I offer an analysis of the
approach itself.
Principles aligned with human security had varying degrees of relevance to the postconflict peace-building phase as applied by international non-government organisations
(INGOs) and local NGOs in northern Uganda. Both its limited success during the conflict and
its applicability were evident, for example, in the setting up of health and educational services,
the provision of temporary housing facilities and the construction of boreholes in IDP camps.
As the government lacked the capacity to handle the situation unilaterally, these initiatives
suggest that the human security/people centred approach as used by INGOs and local NGOs in
northern Uganda was an important corrective to state security approaches.

Research inspiration
I am a Ugandan, born in the 1970s during the economic hardships of Idi Amin’s regime.
Before beginning my PhD studies in Australia, I lived and worked in Uganda all my life, except
for two years (1995-97 when I went to the United Kingdom to pursue a Master’s degree in
Development Studies at the University of East Anglia, Norwich. From 2001–2010 I was
Research and Advocacy Coordinator for Caritas Uganda in the northern town of Gulu,
immersed in the humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict in northern Uganda. The turmoil
resulted in widespread poverty which led to many local and international organizations offering
relief and development assistance.
A large part of my role with Caritas Gulu was involved with identifying threats
affecting people in their communities, referring identified issues to relevant authorities, and
carrying out workshops and community meetings aimed at sensitising people as to how to
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identify advocacy issues and then advocate for themselves. The field visits I undertook with
Caritas Gulu staff, people’s testimonies and personal observations, my involvement in the Juba
peace process and my direct contact with the Lord’s Resistance Army fighters over a long
period of time (2006-2009) during this process, ensured my ongoing interest in this region and
its people, and so in this research. Although it is difficult to acknowledge, I still have
nightmares caused by the trauma of the difficulties and the harrowing stories I was confronted
with when working with Caritas in northern Uganda and South Sudan during this period.
Caritas Uganda is the humanitarian arm of the Catholic Church in Uganda. It was
founded in 1970 by the Uganda Episcopal Conference (UEC) as their main development
agency. Its emphasis is on the provision of social services to vulnerable people, advocacy and
development, provision of relief and emergency aid in disaster hit areas, promotion of good
governance and peace building. The Caritas Uganda structure involves the 19 diocesan Caritas
offices working in partnership under the UEC. I worked on a peace building programme in
conjunction with Caritas Gulu, which operated in one of the dioceses of the UEC that was
affected by the conflict. Caritas Gulu had branches in the districts of Gulu, Pader and Kitgum
(www.caritasgulu.org).
Caritas’s work during the conflict was impartial and both the LRA and the government
of Uganda had confidence in Caritas’s humanitarian work. It is because of this faith that during
the Juba peace process Caritas was entrusted by the United Nations-based Mediation
Secretariat, the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the LRA to advise on and provide any
humanitarian assistance needed by the assembled LRA combatants. I was fortunate to be
appointed the Caritas Liaison Officer at these talks.
During the Juba peace talks, observing them from close inside, I began to realize that it
was the multiple causes of the northern Uganda conflict that might in themselves have enabled
the conflict to persist for almost twenty years. The structural, psychological, emotional,

5
physical, and cultural violence committed by both the rebels and government forces during the
conflict were signs that fundamental issues in post-colonial Uganda needed to be addressed if
lasting peace and stability were to be accomplished in northern Uganda. As a result, there was
a need for scholarly study to be undertaken in order to understand the conflict.
This research uses human security as an umbrella concept to examine the interventions
undertaken by different actors during and after the conflict. While there have been various
research studies and publications related to the northern Uganda conflict, there has been no
investigative research and documentation relating the northern Uganda conflict from a human
security perspective. This research is intended to fill that gap. The human security approach,
as explored further in chapter two, is used to refer to those insecurities and threats to the
individuals and communities which prevented comprehensive, multi-sectoral and collaborative
designs from being developed to alleviate the misery of the people in northern Uganda.
The concept of human security emerged from the formulation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (together with the Genocide Convention). It was then
promoted in the UN Development Report 1994. Advocates of the concept (Debiel & Werthes,
2006), argue that since there were no more large-scale international threats faced by the world
because of the ending of the cold war, emphasis should be placed on how to protect individuals
from the emerging civil and ethnically-based conflicts which were causing humanitarian crises
around the world.
The conflict in northern Uganda, discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, is an
example of the new human security threat to which Debiel and Werthers (2006) referred. The
extent to which the conflict destroyed the infrastructure, targeted innocent civilians, especially
young boys and girls, increased poverty and violated extensively people’s human rights, cannot
be overstated. As Human Rights Watch (2005) referred to the people of northern Uganda, as
“isolated, ignored, unprotected, uprooted and forgotten” (2005).
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In subsequent chapters this thesis, for the first time, applies the concept of human
security to the northern Uganda conflict as a means of analysing it in detail. In doing so the
human security approach is positioned within the wider context of global neo-liberalism as it
became a political force during the late 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, while recognising the
impacts of neo-liberalism and its intertwined economic, political and military effects, this thesis
is focused on a detailed ethnographic and historical analysis of events, policies and significant
actors on the ground in northern Uganda in the two decades between 1986 and 2006.
Further, this research contributes to understanding the practicability of the human
security concept in a conflict situation and to the literature on the extent to which human
insecurity causes/prolongs civil wars (Fouinat, 2004; McCandless & Karbo, 2011). It also
potentially contributes to the development of policies which can enhance people’s security in
any conflict situation.
The research has been directed by the following questions:
What impact did key stakeholders’ different perspectives on approaches consonant with
human security principles have in the northern Ugandan conflict; and
How did those differences contribute to the ineffective implementation of those
approaches in the period 1988-2016?
The research questions generate two hypotheses:
1. The failure to address the politically-based ethnic and socio-economic divisions was a
major contribution to the longevity of the conflict in northern Uganda; and
2. The shifting and multiple meanings of security and human security principles and the ways
that concepts such as empowerment and people centred policies contributed to the socioeconomic reconstruction of northern Uganda.
By examining the conflict in detail, this research seeks to contribute to a broader
discussion on how a human security approach can be applied in relation to opposing political
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and non-political actors in a conflict situation. It entails a consideration of how the main
elements of a human security approach as an umbrella concept to throw light on the causes of
conflict and provide an insight into the issue of conflict resolution: empowerment, effective
multilateralism, state ownership of security matters, long-term development, intelligence
gathering, civilian and military coordination, state building, sustainable development, gender
equality, good governance, human rights, all focused through a people-centred approach
(Gasper, 2005). For example, while a range of interventions have been suggested or applied to
reduce human insecurities in Uganda and northern Uganda in particular, most policy makers
and scholars have not paid attention to the possibilities of the human security approach in
dealing with the human insecurities which have ravaged Uganda since independence. In
addition, it is argued that approaches by various regimes since Uganda attained its
Independence, tended to marginalise the rights of many Ugandans. Using northern Uganda as
a case study then, this research


identifies the causes of the civil conflict,



evaluates the potential of human security to achieve its goals of promoting contextspecific, people-centered, comprehensive, and prevention-oriented measures that seek
to reduce the likelihood of conflicts,



explores the interrelated factors which influenced human security, such as political,
economic and social inequalities, and analyses how such factors affected the
relationship between peace, development and human rights, and



uses northern Uganda as a case study and demonstrates what the human security issues
were and what could have been done differently.
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Structure of the thesis
The thesis is ordered into eight chapters. This first chapter introduces the thesis and
explains the methodology used. It focuses on the genesis of the research and the reasons behind
the researcher’s motives for doing the research. It draws attention to the lack of human security
in northern Uganda during the conflict period and provides a brief introduction to what
constitutes a human security agenda.
Chapter two focuses on the concept of human security. It discusses a range of
definitions and arguments for and against the concept. It also discusses details about the
emergence of the term and its relevance to the analysis of the situation in northern Uganda.
Chapter three discusses the numerous civil conflicts in Uganda since attaining
independence. It argues that the colonial legacy left by the British and the failure by subsequent
leaders to address those ethnically based socio-economic divisions following independence
contributed to the country’s political instabilities and the emergence of the LRA in northern
Uganda.
Chapter four concentrates on the politically-based ethnic and socio-economic divisions
which were a major contribution to the longevity of the conflict in northern Uganda. It analyses
the emergence of different rebel groups, discusses their rise and their effects on the security of
the people of that region.
Chapter five details the consequences of the conflict in northern Uganda. It argues that,
because following Independence there was a lack of appropriate governmental responses to
address the ethnically-based socio-economic disadvantages of the northerners, their
humanitarian situation worsened. This led them to demonstrate their dissatisfaction by taking
up arms to fight the government. In the process, it resulted in both the LRA and the Uganda
People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) committing atrocities which led to catastrophic consequences
for the people of that region.
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Chapter six analyses the peace initiatives aimed at ending the conflict and the
contribution of international, regional, national and local bodies in that process. It argues that
international interventions like that of the ICC, which emphasized revengeful justice, were
unsuccessful in stopping the conflict. Rather, they undermined regional, national and local
efforts to end the conflict peacefully, which directly affected the security of the people.
Chapter seven discusses the relevance of the human security approach and the ways
that concepts such as empowerment and people centred policies contributed to the socioeconomic reconstruction of northern Uganda. It argues that if INGOs had not withdrawn their
support in the preliminary stages of the recovery process, local organizations and the Ugandan
government would have been better able to undertake more people-centred recovery initiatives.
Chapter eight summarizes the findings and states that the causes of the northern Uganda
conflict were produced by factors associated with politically-based ethnic and socio-economic
divisions. It further shows that the lack of consensus on the meaning of the human security
concept by different actors, and its application as a form of analysis of the northern Uganda
conflict, were hampered by influential political and non-political actors who were opposed to
and frequently sought to impede its successful application. It concludes that the socioeconomic divisions between southern and northern Uganda played a significant role during the
conflict. The conflict in northern Uganda ended in 2006. Yet, since then it has been exported
to the neighboring countries of South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and
Central African Republic (CAR) where the LRA are still abducting, killing and maiming
people. In focusing on one case study, northern Uganda, can offer a more in-depth analysis of
the difficulties of implementing elements of the human security approach. The research does
not cover current LRA operations in neighboring countries.
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Methodology
This thesis uses a qualitative multi-disciplinary approach, both historical and
ethnographic, drawing on and analysing in detail both primary and secondary sources. Primary
sources include Ugandan government official documents,

United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reports, World Bank
country indicators, Transparency International reports; and similar publications from other
corruption watch think tanks, Amnesty International and; Human Rights Watch reports,
documents and reports from NGOs which operated in northern Uganda during the conflict, and
media sources, where appropriate1. Secondary sources include peer-reviewed sources such as
journal articles, scholarly papers and monographs, and other published research, as well as
newspaper articles.
Because of my own long involvement in the region and its events, I have also been able
to draw on an additional methodological strategy, autoethnography. Autoethnography is a
method used by researchers to retroactively and selectively write about the researcher’s past
experiences (Bruner, 1995; Denzin, 1989; Freeman, 2004). The advantage of using
autoethnography in this northern Uganda case study is that I am able to draw reflexively on my
own understandings of the cultural practices, values and beliefs of the main ethnic group
affected by the conflict, the Acholi, (Maso, 2001) which I gained, despite being an outsider,
through my shared experiences, as a classic insider/outsider (Clifford & Marcus, 1986;
Rabinow, 2007), with them. Although Warren (2009) (among others) criticizes autoethnography for possibly fictionalizing aspects of lived experiences, this is not a criticism that

1

According to the Human Rights Report (January 10, 2016) the “Uganda[n] government and ruling party
officials [have been] … intimidating and threatening journalists in an effort to limit criticism of the
government”, therefore the media in Uganda may be either censored or self-censored thus limiting its ability
to print accurate and unbiased representations of relevant issues.
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can be sustained in this case: my personal experiences during the conflict can be and are
reflexively tested against and validated by written reports and other literature. In a conflict
situation like that in northern Uganda, auto-ethnography enables the researcher to provide real
life glimpses of the political – and the human - situation during the conflict (Pace, 2012). I
make no claim to absolute objectivity, but I have endeavoured to be as neutral as possible in
assessing and analysing both the literature and reflections on my own experiences, to maintain
academic integrity.
At the outset, it ought to be acknowledged that this research took place in less than ideal
conditions. First, it was undertaken outside Uganda in Perth, Western Australia, at the
University of Notre Dame, Fremantle Campus, where I have been based for five years. While
additional fieldwork in Uganda would have been ideal to gather interviews and raw data from
those affected by the conflict, for a number of personal and practical reasons, this was not
possible. In particular, conducting fieldwork on issues such as current and sensitive security
situations, including the role of the police and the army in protecting or not protecting peoples’
safety in the country, was considered to be unacceptably risky for a Ugandan researcher.
However, the research presented below is not invalidated by this limitation. Indeed, its focus
on human security provides a unique perspective that may not have been achievable in the field,
yet through directed recall and photographs and other relics of that time, the field has continued
to shape my questions and my thinking, enabling me to purposively position my roles as aid
worker/practitioner then and researcher now.
The thesis uses a qualitative single case study methodology to examine the impact on
human security of the northern Ugandan conflict. Critics of the case study argue that it is not a
reliable basis on which to draw general conclusions. However, as Creswell (2013) points out,
“[t]he study of more than one case dilutes the overall analysis; the more cases an individual
studies, the less the depth in any single case” (2013, p. 101). Moreover, a single-case study can
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often illuminate the linkages between causes and consequences more effectively than can be
done where multiple cases are used. Accordingly, this Ugandan case study will be valuable for
testing the utility of a human security approach and for how different perspectives held by key
stakeholders contributed to the ineffective implementation of people centred policies and
practices in the period 1988-2016. If the human security framework could be shown to be useful
in this way, the analysis would ideally encourage the use of the framework in the initial stages
of a conflict, rather than as a post-conflict afterthought. In addition, by delivering an in-depth
investigation of the causes and circumstances of the conflict in northern Uganda, this thesis is
well placed to contribute to potential solutions to policy makers and relevant NGOs aiming to
contribute to peace and security in other African states.
Although there is general agreement between authors that the crisis in northern Uganda
was one of the worst in modern times, these same authors have described the humanitarian
crisis between 1988 and 2006 in northern Uganda with rather different emphases. For example,
Brown (2006) has it as the most severe in the world; Dolan (2013) refers to it as a social torture;
Bernstein (2009) refers to it as social suffering; and Ssenyonjo describes it as “one of the
world’s most vicious rebel wars” (2005, p. 406). What is common to them all is a sense of the
devastation caused by the conflict.
My first encounter with its realities was when I visited Gulu Town and the surrounding
Internally Displaced People’s camps (IDPs) in 2001 while I was working with Caritas Uganda
as their Research and Advocacy Coordinator. Over a period of 20 years up to 2006, an
estimated 1.6 million people in northern Uganda were internally displaced, and others had fled
to the capital Kampala or neighbouring districts which the people deemed to be safe. The main
rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), was killing many civilians and forcibly
abducting many people a practice which is an exemplar of a type of modern-day war in which
civilians, especially young boys and girls, become the main targets. The catastrophic results of
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this conflict, which are discussed in the following chapters, have been attributed to a lack of
protection by the government and to the slow response of international institutions to mediate
between the two warring parties (Mukwana & Ridderbos, 2008). An additional complexity has
been that the government of Uganda and the LRA defined security using military means
whereas humanitarian organisations defined security using concepts which can be seen as
human security principles.
Further, because of this conflict, basic social services were scarce, many people lost
their livelihoods and many were forcibly separated from even extended family members. Both
LRA rebels and the government forces failed to pay attention to and respect people’s dignity,
leading to human rights abuses. Indeed, Nannyonjo points out that the civil and social
infrastructure was destroyed, creating a “paralysis in economic activity, and a general social
and cultural breakdown” (2005, p. 473).
Necessarily then, an examination of politically-based ethnic and social divisions, and
how they hampered the application of a people centred approach during the conflict in northern
Uganda is embedded at the heart of the thesis.

Ethnic composition of Uganda - a catalyst for conflict
Uganda is a country of great ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. In terms of
ethnicity the Bantu-speaking majority live in the western, southern and central parts of the
country and the non-Bantu speakers occupy the north-western, northern and eastern parts of
the country. These ethnic groups are further sub-divided into Central Sudanic peoples and
Nilotic. The first category comprises the large and historically centralized kingdom of Buganda,
the smaller western Ugandan kingdoms of Nkore, Bunyoro, and Toro, and the Basoga states to
the east of Buganda. The peoples in the second grouping comprise the Madi, Jie, Iteso,
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Karamojong, Alur, Acholi, Langi, and Lugbara in the north and a number of other smaller
societies in the eastern part of the country (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2005).
According to the latest National Bureau of Statistics report (2014), the population of
Uganda was estimated to be 34,634,650 million. For the purposes of this thesis, the ethnic
groups of particular concern are the Baganda 16.5%, Banyankore 9.6%, Iteso 7.0%, Langi
6.3% and Acholi 4.4% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014)(Uganda Bureau of Statistics,
2014)(Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014)(Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014)(Uganda Bureau
of Statistics, 2014). There are also a number of religions practiced in the country, of which
those of significance of the thesis are: Roman Catholic 39.3% and Anglicans 32.0%. English,
which is the official national language, is used in schools, courts of law and by national
newspapers and some radio broadcasters. Ganda or Luganda is the most widely used language
and is preferred for native language publications and taught in schools. Other languages are
Nilo-Saharan languages and Swahili. The literacy rate is 72.2% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics,
2014).
In regional terms, Uganda can be divided into North, West, East and South, with each
region having specific ethnic groupings. Lango and Acholi are the two northern sub-regions
greatly affected by the armed conflict between the Government of Uganda and the LRA. People
from these two regions are almost entirely ethnic Acholi and Langi and are at the center of this
research. The two regions before the conflict comprised almost 3.63 million people.
The pre-colonial history of the Acholi depicts them as being fighters involved in battles
with their southern (Langi), eastern (Karamojong), and western (Madi) neighbors, as well as
there being regular conflict between the Acholi clans themselves. Although not particularly
mentioning the Acholi and Langi, Kisseka-Ntale (2007) argues that such a condition was not
unusual for pre-colonial ethnic groups in Africa, living independently but often in conflict with
their neighboring communities.
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As with other ethnic groups in Uganda, the Acholi and Langi are patriarchal societies
where men traditionally dictate the life and activities of the community including women’s’
participation in community activities (Finnström, 2001). Moreover, there are institutional and
social aspects that favor men in family matters. Men are regarded as the head of the family,
overseers of their lineage and breadwinners for their family. Due to these important culturallybased roles, decision-making authority within the family and society principally lies with men.
They also control economic resources. Although these practices are embedded in the
Acholi/Langi culture, they have more recently come to be considered by local people
themselves as problematic because of their inherent gender inequalities (Cagney, 2011).
Continuous sensitization and an understanding of the need to develop new acceptable
collaboration between men and women, for purposes of development, has helped to solve this
problem. Community-based sensitization workshops mainly conducted by NGOs such as
Caritas Gulu have helped to minimize the gap and foster gendered cooperation (Wamala, 2015).
As will be demonstrated below, men’s willingness to cooperate with women and enable gender
equality is important if the human security approach is to thrive.
It is pertinent at this point to state that Uganda’s demographic and cultural profile
indicates that many people, including traditional elders and community leaders, still think of
their ethnic identity first, and not their national identity. Indeed, according to Dicklitch:
A lack of 'unifying nationalism' undermined the creation of a
viable nation state. What emerged from this pot-pourri of ethnic rivalry
and conflicting nationalism was a 'fictitious state' which satisfied only
the basic requirements of statehood – international recognition of
territorial sovereignty - but lacked the most vital ingredient - internal
legitimacy (1995, p. 106).
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Okuku explains this lack of national identity further by noting that “… ethnicity has
been detrimental to national unity, democracy and development … The central problem was
and has been the politicization of ethnicity, that is, its use for purposes of group mobilization
in social conflict that also involves the state” (2002, p. 7). In the same way, Bøås (2004) argues
that “Uganda remains a deeply troubled and divided country in which cultural, political and
economic divisions from the pre-colonial past, exacerbated by colonial and post-colonial
projects, still have to be overcome if a Ugandan polity is to emerge” (2004, p. 285). As
Dicklitch (1995), Okuku (2002) and Bøås (2004) have all argued, the complexities of Uganda’s
ethnic divisions relate back to colonial divisions, and post-colonial rivalries. Not having a sense
of national unity, and fearing continued marginalization, many disenfranchised Ugandans,
especially those not benefitting from the so-called state, formed rebel movements. This thesis
argues that this is what occurred in northern Uganda with the emergence of the LRA. Further,
Omach (2011b) takes this explanation further, suggesting that the root causes of the northern
Uganda conflict can be traced to the lack of appropriate state and nation building and the
absence of sufficient means to integrate the various linguistic, religious , regional, ethnic and
political groupings. In northern Uganda, this led to political disagreements which resulted in a
violent struggle by people from northern Uganda aimed at controlling and capturing political
power.

Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the problem and motivation of this research. It has provided
background information on Uganda and its ethnic composition, and the country’s political
circumstances which provided the basis for future political instabilities. Further, my
justification for the methodologies used in carrying out the research is laid out. Previous studies
on the conflict in northern Uganda have not taken into account differing notions of the people
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centred/human security approach in dealing with the conflict so this research combines a
human security approach, qualitative research, a case study, and auto-ethnography, in order to
analyse the conflict situation in northern Uganda.
The main aim of this research is to examine the politically-based ethnic and socioeconomic divisions and how they contributed to the longevity of the civil conflict in northern
Uganda. It also examines the differing understandings of safety and security by key
stakeholders in the conflict. An analysis of the use of elements of what can be defined as a
human security approach in the northern Ugandan conflict will shed light on its usefulness in
an era where conflicts are no longer mainly between countries, but increasingly occurring
within countries. The next chapter discusses the emergence of the term, human security, and
provides a background to the concept and definitions by different scholars who argue for its
relevance in a conflict situation.
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Chapter Two
The Concept of ‘human security’: a review of the literature

Introduction
In this chapter I discuss the emergence, usage and theorization of the term human
security, accepting it as the development of an umbrella concept that includes a number of preexisting people centered understandings and practices. I provide a background commentary on
the concept and its varied definitions by scholars, using, so far as is possible, their own voices
to portray and explore the wide range of understandings of its relevance in a conflict situation.
In reviewing the literature concerning the human security approach, I contrast this approach
with other security models and discuss its relationship to the wider fields of development and
international relations. By examining the relevance of the human security approach and
questioning its applicability as an analytical tool in the northern Uganda conflict, the chapter
contributes to testing the second hypothesis of the thesis, which looks at the shifting and
multiple meanings of security and human security principles held by key actors in the northern
Ugandan conflict. The human security concept was developed as a policy framework to address
emerging threats to humanity. It emphasises assessing human insecurities which are
comprehensive, people-centred, context-specific and preventable: this focus on identifying and
dealing with security threats to desperate communities has led to vigorous scholarly debates
about its relevance (Christie 2010, Ewan 2007).
The former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2005) argues that historically human
security has been linked more to nation states than to the security of their people. With other
commentators, such as Liotta and Owen (2006), he suggests that the concept of human security
has for too long been construed narrowly as safety of territory from outside antagonism, or as
global security from the threat of terrorists or as safeguarding of national interests in foreign
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policy. In contrast, the new definition of human security emphasises the individual’s security
over state security (Edwards, 2016), a radical change from traditional concepts of security
which stress the prevention of wars and external threats to a nation state, to an environment in
which the legitimate concerns of a nation’s people, such as the provision of the basic needs of
adequate food, water and shelter, are addressed. Further, human security principles also
emphasise the promotion of human rights in dealing with development issues (Oberleitner,
2002). Human security then becomes a container for series of linked ideas as Gasper listed
above.
The argument is that an emphasis on human security could promote ways and ideas
relevant to tackle the changing nature of conflicts in the world today. The end of the Cold War
marked the beginning of various ethnic and religious based conflicts within countries especially
in Africa, for example in Biafra (1967-70) and Dafur (2003) and the site of this thesis, Uganda.
These new types of conflicts (Leaning & Arie, 2000) are characterised by ideas of ethnicised
human identity which promote segregation based on ethnicity and ideological thinking. Other
people’s safety and recognition within the community are not considered a priority (Leaning
& Arie, 2000). They have caused intense humanitarian crises and pose a great threat to the
stability and peace of individuals and communities. The scale at which these conflicts affect
humanity prompted human rights activists (from the 1980s onwards) to work on what were
effectively human security agendas to respond to these new realities: a core focus was the
international campaign, beginning in the 1990s, to ban landmines (Ewan, 2007) which were
causing multiple deaths to innocent civilians in a number of former and active warzones,
including that of the northern Uganda conflict. Other early international campaigns aligned
with these human security principles were the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Children (1990) (CRC, CROC, or UNCRC) and the formation of the International Criminal
Court (2002), which was aimed at punishing those who had committed crimes against humanity,

20
again directly relevant in northern Uganda. International responses to deter human threats can
also be seen in the formation of preventative laws such as international humanitarian laws,
which include the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and its five protocols; the 1997
Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines; the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. All these are aimed
at protecting peoples’ safety and security, which is so often torn away in times of conflict
(McRae & Hubert, 2001).

The emergence of the concept of ‘human security’
Here, in unpacking how scholars view its applicability, I further articulate the human
security approach, and discuss its relevance in understanding the causes of various threats to
humanity through reference particularly to the northern Uganda situation.
The first appearance of the concept of human security occurred in the 1980s when it
was linked to the emergence of narratives of human-centred development (Acharya, 2008).
However, during this period it was not given much attention. It was revived in the early 1990s
with the rise in international interventions in peace-building (Shinoda, 2004), and in the 1994
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report, which laid the conceptual
foundations for the human security approach and was the first to claim that because at times
individuals are oppressed by their governments the individual’s security should be a priority
over state security (UNDP, 1994):
… although traditional security concepts focus on security of
territory from external aggression, a human security approach focuses
on the legitimate security concerns of individuals who seek security in
their day-to-day lives which include threats of diseases, hunger,
unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and

21
environmental hazards (1994, p. 22).
The Report powerfully referred to the possibilities of adhering to human security
principles as beginning with preventing one child from dying, one disease from spreading, one
job from being lost, ethnic tension from exploding in violence (1994, p. 22). Because a number
of NGOs used the language of human security to intervene in order to reduce the humanitarian
crisis which was exploding (Branch, 2009) in northern Uganda, the Report was particularly
relevant to the region and its people.
The 2009 UNDP Report then went further, presenting a fresh method of thinking about
the incorporation of security matters into thinking and discussion about human society and its
organisation (Tsai, 2009). It defined seven components of human security: health, community,
personal, political, economic, environmental and food security, and focused specifically on
‘people-centric’ security (1994, pp. 24-33). The failure of many governments to protect their
citizens as a result of, for example, corruption, ethnic conflicts, human and arms trafficking,
poor government administrative systems and denial of the rule of law, prompted the emergence
of this human security approach. This new agenda then was proposed as a way of alleviating
the suffering of communities by dealing with threats to people’s individual humanitarian,
economic and social situations.
Innovatively, this approach emphasised individual rights and safeties which were often
ignored by national governments and the international community. The new approach worked
from the ground up, prioritizing the security of people within their communities and
humanizing security issues. This also enabled it to offer a better alternative to transnational and
cross border insecurities. In surfacing out of the need to make those in authority account for
the political, economic and social misdeeds inflicted on the people they led (Shinoda, 2004), it
became a concept that in the decade 1994-2004 influenced and changed politicians’ thinking
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on many aspects of global politics and governance (Oberleitner, 2005). Perhaps most vividly,
the international development theorist Mahbub ul Haq (1995) illustrates its emergence:
from the dread of a woman that she may be raped in a lonely
street at night, from the anguish of parents over the spread of drugs
among their children, from the choked existence of prosperous
communities in increasingly polluted cities, from the fear of
terrorism suddenly striking any life anywhere without reason (Haq,
1995).
This then was an attempt to define and deal with the diversity of humanitarian,
economic and social issues which affected people in both conflict and non-conflict zones
through the following main areas (Axworthy, 2001; Fukuda-Parr, 2003; Kaldor, 2007; Owen,
2004):


resources and environment



health and development



genocide and mass crimes



armed conflict and intervention



human rights and good governance



organized crime and criminal violence
Both direct and indirect consequences of violence, for example, the consequences of

the breakup of Yugoslavia (1991-92) and the genocide in Rwanda (1994) (Kaldor, 2007),
demonstrated unmistakably the consequences of a lack of security, as millions of people were
affected by violence stemming from terror, torture, ethnic cleansing and genocide and the lack
of access to health care and shelter. Other, often less visible, causes of deprivation (Boyd, 2014)
included extreme poverty, illiteracy, HIV infection, and forced displacement as a result of land
grabbing (Boyd, 2014). As proponents of the human security approach (Cilliers, 2004; Kaldor,
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2007; Newman, 2010; Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007) agree, people’s safety and security should
be a primary concern: “the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their
daily lives" (Dorn, 2001, p. 1). The development of the concept of a human security approach
then was a direct response by activists, scholars, NGOs and international organisations to what
was seen as a failed system of state-based security.

Defining human security
There is no collectively accepted definition of the concept of human security. Indeed,
as Abass notes, neither academics nor states have been successful in finding such a definition
(2010, p. 2), leaving it as an ongoing subject of discussion, particularly among scholars
(Fukuda-Parr & Messineo, 2012).
In an early move towards definition, Gormely (1995) suggested a two-pronged
understanding, of: “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, as well
as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life, whether in
homes, in jobs or in communities” (Gormely, 1995, p. 23). This definition effectively identifies
three aspects which are vital for human beings to thrive: first, it emphasises the central position
of people as far as security and development are concerned, and challenges orthodox
approaches which emphasized the state; secondly, it addresses people’s dignity and material
and physical concerns; and thirdly, it considers inequality and poverty as the main causes of
individual vulnerability. These are picked up by Suhrke, who points out that the Canadian and
Norwegian governments identify them as “associated with the pre-eminent progressive values
of the 1990s: human rights, international humanitarian law, and socio-economic development
based on equity” (1999, p. 266). In what has been a constant in the human security discussion,
such attempted clarity about its core elements did not however go uncontested: King and
Murray, for example, argue that “[d]espite articulated links to both the development and
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security fields, alternative definitions abound for human security, and the research and policy
agenda for human security remains unclear” (2001, p. 585).
Nonetheless, despite differences of emphasis in the literature, certain coherent elements
can be seen. Thomas and Tow, for example, also define human security by identifying three
related features: transnational fears about international norms arising from internal state
problems, and the vulnerabilities this creates; the problems arising from attempts to confront
these issues at a state and individual level; and the necessity for outside intervention, which is
the major objective of human security (2002, p. 178). Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007) however,
offer a different emphasis. They define human security in psycho-social environmental terms
in which individuals are able to live a life of safety and dignity. This is an understanding
expanded by Benedek to mean the security of people against various diverse threats to their
wellbeing (Benedek, 2008). What these all have in common is an understanding of the
connection between communities and the state, an understanding further developed by Christie
when she shows that human security appears to encourage greater opportunities for dialogue
than when security is understood simply in relation to the state (Christie, 2010) .
Alongside these, and also making an appearance early in the debate, are the ideas of
writers seeking specifically to include other significant elements, in particular the economic.
Axworthy for example, in an early definition, emphasized the interrelatedness and the mutually
reinforcing nature of human security, arguing it combined economic security and a guarantee
of fundamental human rights (Axworthy (1997), while Owen pushed this further and included
not only economics as a broad category, but also environmental, food, health, personal and
political threats (Owen, 2004).
When taking the core elements of this range of definitions into account, it is possible to
form a general, and usable, definition, in which human security can be understood as freedom
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from violence, and from fear of violence. It is about protecting every human being: its central
intention is to make sure that the rights and freedoms of all individuals are not compromised.
As a consequence, one of the notable features of human security is the incorporation of
issues which are not related to military operations. Human security, as Acharya (2001) argues,
entails a focus on governments developing strategies to improve social and economic
inequality and alleviating the traumas associated with violent conflict (2001, p. 442). Yet, in
parts of Africa (and elsewhere, globally) the politics of exclusion, the problem of failed states,
poor civil-military relations and a weak civil society pose a significant risk to the security of
the people, while, underpinning these political and governance issues, lie their consequences:
climate change, underdevelopment, famine, forced migration, poverty, drought and rising food
prices (Mentan, 2014).
This is where human security as a policy-related concept, arising from issues affecting
men, women and children within their own communities, has the capacity to change the ways
policy makers look at issues affecting various communities, particularly in relation to initiatives
which combine foreign and local security policies and actions. At another level also, it can be
credited with changing citizens’ perceptions of security matters from state-centric to
community-focused (Kaldor, 2007). Advocates of the concept contend that human security
and national security go hand in hand. Human security helps to build security from the bottom
up. Thus, a human security approach upholds the view that peace and security at national,
regional and international levels is probable when its focus is the security of the people
(Axworthy, 2001).
It is clear that in the last twenty-five years concepts of human security have become
significant and that the term is now widely used by governments, international organisations
and NGOs: it focuses on the security of individual human beings at the local level, secondly, it
fosters the integration of non-state actors, such as NGOs and INGOs which operate locally as
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fundamental pillars for the protection of human security, and thirdly, it impacts state security,
in terms of both internal and external threats (Kapuy, 2004).
As can be seen from the discussion above, there has been no agreed definition of the
term human security. Despite the lack of consensus on the definition, however, proponents of
the concept contend that its inclusiveness, broadness and its holistic nature make it relevant to
the current security threats facing the world. As the world is experiencing many insecurities,
a global response to providing security to those threatened by massive refugee flows, failed
and lawless states, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, the implementation of a human security
approach seeks to assist individuals caught in these dilemmas.

The human security agenda: from definition to practice
Broadly speaking then, human security is a people-centred approach to security that
promotes human rights and human development and integrates and strategically places the
individual into the frame. Its applicability to all individuals in different circumstances makes it
possible for it to be applied universally (Liotta & Owen, 2006).
That it is possible to be applied universally does not mean that agreement exists about
how this could or should be done. At its core though, is the formulation of the UNDP 1994
Report, discussed briefly above, which emphasises that the paramount necessity to address the
complications of insecurity is to concentrate on tackling ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom
from fear’ (UNDP, 1994, p. 24), explicit recognition that “security and development are the
two main components of human life and human dignity” (UNDP, 1994, p. 23).
Since the publication of that 1994 Human Development Report, varying initiatives and
debates have aimed at building on and broadening the ideas underpinning the concept of human
security. In attempts to find points of connection, Axworthy (1997) and King and Murry (2001),
for example, suggest that the concept recognizes the complex and interrelated security issues.
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For Collins, the debate is more subtle, since human security had drawn attention to “critical
issues, especially, intra-state political violence, that are not included in the state-centric
paradigm that presently dominates discourse” (2007, p. 91). At the same time, in pointing to
the way that two second-rank but significant countries, “Canada and Japan have proclaimed
it as the guiding principle of their foreign policies” (2007, pp. 1-2), Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy
show how human security can be incorporated at the state level. Increasingly, the broadening
of the scope of the concept and practice of security, is being analysed as being inclusive of the
core ideas of the human security approach, the state, but also the values people live by, and
making people the starting point of analysis and policy (Gómez & Gasper, 2013). In taking this
people-centred approach, it enables the identification of and focus on the connections between
the issues which directly impact upon human communities: armed conflict and interventions,
resources and environment, organised crime and criminal violence, human rights and good
governance, genocide and mass crimes, health and development.
Globally, the term is broadly connected to initiatives that aim at alleviating poverty
and resolving the causes of conflict. Advocates of the human security approach, including
Christie, see it as “representing both an important break from the previous state-centric security
calculations and an opening of our eyes to the all-too-real security issues of peoples in the south”
(2010, p. 174).
In both the literature and practice (Gasper, 2013), four elements of human security are
particularly emphasised. The first places the individual as the target. The second focuses on
how best to protect people. The third emphasises the well-being of people within their
communities; and the fourth responds to people’s needs in dealing with the source of the threats
(Gasper, 2013). These four elements are used in the subsequent chapters of this thesis as
yardsticks to understand how the concepts such as empowerment, human rights, and people
centred practices contained in a human security approach were applied or could have been
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applied in post-colonial Uganda, in particular during the northern Uganda conflict. The next
section elaborates on these four key elements of the human security agenda in order to better
understand the northern Ugandan conflict and the insecurity experienced by the people of that
region, the subject of this thesis.

The individual as the target
The first element of human security places an emphasis on the individual human as the
primary object of concern, regardless of creed, nationality, ideology, religion, race, or colour.
Marhia suggests that “[t]he universalizing aim of ‘human security’, is to lift all individual
‘human beings’ up to the level of the Human – that is, to secure the conditions for all individual
‘humans’ to realize the capabilities necessary for a ‘fully human’ life” (2013, p. 23). In a similar
way, Hadingham explains human security as “assuring the basic, inalienable rights of each
individual on the planet” (2000, p. 115). Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy widen the concept by
including “values and goals such as dignity, equity and solidarity” (2007, p. 13), and Newman
further expands its scope by noting that “Human security suggests that security policy and
security analysis, if they are to be effective and legitimate, must focus on the individual as the
referent and primary beneficiary” (2010, p. 78)
Although there is some disagreement on how threats to people could be addressed,
supporters of the human security approach wanted to find something new which could help
elevate the security of individuals to the similar level as that of the state (Ogata & Cels, 2003).
The human security approach reinforces people’s freedom so that people can earn a living the
way they want, study if they want to, have a family and feel their children are safe (Ogata &
Cels, 2003). Thus, human security has the potential, through negotiations, and the use of
peaceful means, to empower people to find ways protect themselves from threatening situations.
As Schnabel argues, “if individuals and communities feel secure and protected from the threats
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that emanate from direct and structural violence, that is, if their basic human security is
guaranteed, then human suffering on an individual level, and conflict and violence on
communal, regional and international levels, can be significantly reduced” (2008, p. 87).
At its most simplistic, the human security approach enhances people’s choices whereas
a lack of human security limits human potential, which prevents people acquiring their basic
needs. Human security “seeks to challenge attitudes and institutions that privilege so-called
‘high politics’ above individual experiences of deprivation and insecurity” (Newman (2010, p.
79) and offers the understanding that if individuals are at the centre of analysis, it is easy to
assess, plan, implement and evaluate all security related risks and plan for better peace and
development initiatives. Indeed, Khong argues that “[w]hen we securitize the individual, we
are making the security of each and every individual on the planet the object of our concern”
(2001, p. 233).

How best to protect people
The human security approach involves an attempt to understand human
security/insecurity in terms of those who experience these situations (Conteh-Morgan, 2005).
As shown above, continued threats to people’s wellbeing over the past decades were a catalyst
for the international community to devise new ways to combat these threats. Government
officials, scholars, INGOs, NGOs, and inter-governmental organisations working in conflict
situations all helped develop a concept of human security which had as one of its focuses the
issue of dealing with physical threats. As Oberleitner shows, this involves a complex approach
which involves the relationship between human security for individuals and communities and
humanitarian intervention on a large scale: it is a “humanitarian approach that understands
human security as a tool for deepening and strengthening efforts to tackle issues such as war

30
crimes or genocide and finally preparing the ground for humanitarian intervention” (2005, p.
188).
The motive behind this focus is to improve the livelihood, survival and dignity of
threatened peoples to achieve peace, development and human progress. An emphasis such as
that needs to be comprehensive, multi-sectoral and collaborative: “human security’s focus on
the security and prosperity of human beings, can address a variety of threats currently faced by
the globalizing world” (Acharya, Singhdeo, & Rajaretnam, 2011, p. x).

Well-being of individuals within their communities
Using a participatory approach to analyse issues threatening well-being is intended to
encourage people to devise local solutions to local problems. The argument, increasingly made
in the first decade of the new millennium, is that the implementation of human security
principles can lead to individuals and communities developing their capabilities for making
informed decisions acting on their own behalf and eliminating threats to their and their
community’s wellbeing (Oberleitner, 2005). It can also provide a framework for disparate
communities to discuss their own security in ways was not possible when security was
understood to relate directly to the state (Christie, 2010). Closely linked with this in addressing
the widespread nature of threats stemming from conflicts and other extreme situations, the
human security approach particularly emphasises development and human rights. The use of
these ideas in a community-based approach then, intends to create “a situation/condition free
of injury/threats to an individual's groups, or community's well-being, including freedom from
threats and/or direct attacks on physical and psychological integrity” (Conteh-Morgan, 2005,
p. 72).
An analysis of human security’s usefulness in societies today, and the discussion above,
show advocates of the concept have addressed a wide-ranging number of threats to humanity,
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like issues of the environment, pollution, homelessness and unemployment. However, they
have forgotten the diversity which exists in the world today. For example, what is referred to
as a necessity in one part of the world, could be seen as a luxury in another part of the world.
Thus, there may be contradictions if the term is applied universally.
In order to promote a meaningful human security approach, there is a need to identify
and build people’s capacity in those areas which can enhance their involvement. Empowering
individuals to plan for their own wellbeing enables their potential to be developed, which helps
them to protect themselves first, and then the community where they live (Tadjbakhsh &
Chenoy, 2007): “[e]mpowerment is of intrinsic value; as well as having instrumental value;
relevant at the individual and collective level, and can be economic, social, or political”
(Oladipo, 2009, p. 120.). Communities which are empowered are more likely to be able to
demand respect and dignity from those who threaten them.
Therefore, promoting initiatives which empower people within their communities,
rather than relying on the government to provide everything, differentiates humanitarian
activities from development work. Decision making is a key component of empowerment
necessary to promote human security. However, during the conflict in northern Uganda,
because of the insecure security situation, people lacked the freedom to make many decisions
about their lives and livelihoods.
When people feel disempowered, they are more likely to feel threatened, whether the
threats come from the environment, poverty, disease, poor leadership or ethnicity. Such threats
can impact on people negatively, particularly the most vulnerable in society. People’s lack of
empowerment in northern Uganda, meant that they felt as if they were not part of the social
and political systems in Uganda, which affected their positive involvement in those systems.

32
Dealing with sources of threats
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, scholars and policy makers such as Axworthy (1997,
2001), McRae and Hubert, (2001), DFAIT (2003), and Ogata and Cels (2003), welcomed the
human security approach because it emphasized the significance of protecting vulnerable
people and because it broadened the relevance of security. The search for comprehensive
solutions to protect those affected by conflict and other extreme conditions is at the centre of
this approach because it recognizes the relationship between peace, development and human
rights while dealing with specific threats to people in times of conflict. At its broadest, in the
work for example of Suhrke (1999, p. 271), human security is essential for human development.
He argues that without minimal stability and security in daily life, there can be no development.
Broadening that argument, a human security approach to dealing with threats to individuals
whatever the situation helps those concerned interpret the causes of the threat and can help a
analyse people’s perceptions regarding that threat. As Newman and Richmond note, “[h]uman
security provides a structure for the systematic and integrated interpretation of the relative
impact of various threats to human needs” (2001, p. 18).
Proponents of the human security approach suggest that by identifying the different
threats to people’s security, which can be internal or external, these impacts can be softened
and, potentially, prevented (Ewan, 2007). Initiatives intended to prevent such threats can help
to ease the direct and indirect costs of letting human security problems spiral out of control
(Ewan, 2007). However, such initiatives which emphasize individual rights and interests are
often ignored by the international community (Kaldor, 2007; Tsai, 2009). Yet, the issue of
security is a global concern: threats cannot be confronted only at a state level. As Cilliers
argues,

“human development contributes to human security by tackling the long-term

structural causes of conflict and by strengthening the capability of societies to deal with conflict
in a peaceful manner” (2004, p. 12). Further, in demonstrating that “peacekeeping, peace
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enforcement and peacebuilding cannot be successful without a human security perspective”,
Boer and Wilde (2008, p. 11) show that human security as a program aims at protecting
people from all forms of danger and at the same time strives to achieve peace and ensure
sustainable development for all, irrespective of their colour, race, political affiliation or religion.
The argument which runs alongside this is that human security must also be approached
from an individual and particularly, a community level. The security of individuals affects the
security of the state and vice versa. In the case of northern Uganda and as is shown in more
detail below, this was not the case: a core component of the argument of this thesis is the
capacity for the misuse of these principles by those in power of their authority to dominate
others, hence increasing human insecurities.

The contrasts between the human security approach and the state security model
The emergence of the human security approach in the 1990s brought a different
emphasis to debates and models around security studies. Before discussing the significance of
the human security approach as a security model, it is important to understand how it differs
from the other two major security models: the state security model and the critical security
model.
Before the 1980s, talking about issues of security implied the state defending its borders
(Khong, 2001). Proponents of state security (Morgenthau 1960, Waltz 1979) gave existing
institutions, especially the state, a privileged status on matters of security: issues of state
security should be seen in terms of respecting the integrity of the country’s national borders
and its institutions. However, as noted above issues of security have now been expanded to
include economic, social, political, environmental, gender and ethnic threats (Jones & Read,
2005).
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When defining state security, it is assumed that states are sovereign so “sovereignty is
defined in terms of the state's ability to control actors and activities within and across its borders
… The essence of sovereignty is the state's ability to make authoritative decisions in the final
instance, the decision to make war” Thomson (1995, p. 213). State security regards political
independence and territorial integrity as principles to be secured, which may mean that other
values like freedom of movement and freedom of speech may be deemed unnecessary by some
states.
However, in many developing countries, finding themselves reinventing governance in
a post-colonial situation, the government’s security organs fall short of addressing issues of
security in the lives of individual human beings. State approaches to security apply a top-down
approach which cannot always address issues affecting people within their communities. The
human security approach on the other hand always emphasises a bottom-up approach,
involving people with issues affecting them in their own locality: “human security is about the
security of individuals and communities rather than the security of states, and it combines both
human rights and human development” (Kaldor, 2013, p. 182).
Following on from the impacts of the shift from overt colonial sovereignty to the postcolonial situation, the end of the Cold War brought this into sharp focus: people faced different
forms of threats to their security, whether the threats emerged from local, national or
international sources. Different countries and international organisations conceptualised and
designed security according to their strategic motives and goals which resulted in greater
interdependence between state security and the safety of individual communities. As
Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy argue, in this period it was the inadequacy of the state security model
and the acceleration of globalization that brought into focus the need to broaden the concept of
security to include individuals and society (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007).
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Advocates of the human security approach argue that the post-Cold War period was
tainted by both internal and external humanitarian security threats: “[g]reater complexity,
uncertainty and unpredictability have become hallmarks of the world strategic situation in the
new century” (Kenyon & Simpson, 2013, p. 118). For policy makers and academicians, the
only way to define these threats was to have a broad definition of human security to link these
threats, leading Ewan to argue that “[n]ot only does a holistic approach draw different
specialisms together in the quest to understand better the interconnections between diverse
aspects of human security, it may also bolster co-operation between international agencies in
the fields of security, development and human rights” (2007, p. 184).
However, there is also a need to have a clear understanding of the concept and the
practical implications for people’s wellbeing. This clarity will help to explain its effectiveness
and applicability in various situations. A useful principle identified by Gómez and Gasper is
that human security “requires understanding the particular threats experienced by particular
groups of people, as well as the participation of those people in the analysis process” (2013, p.
2).
The differences between state and human security play out in specific ways in different
societies. Nuruzzaman, for example, argues that not only do many countries fail to fulfil their
security obligations, but some also put the security of their own citizens at risk (Nuruzzaman,
2006). So, in many developing countries (such as Uganda), state security is often invoked to
protect the interests of the political elite. Those in power think only about how they can
preserve themselves in power at any cost, even if it means persecuting those who oppose them.
Differences between a human security and a state security model become visible: state security
does not specify specific areas of threat, and yet for state security to be relevant, there is a need
to specify which areas and whose values are to be secured.
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In contrast to the state security model, the human security approach regards the state as
simply one of the actors within the broader security perspective, its function being as the chief
security provider. Its stability and acceptability are the key sources of safety for its citizens. In
this model, security must extend downwards from nations to individuals. Thus, the security of
individual citizens is its point of reference, not the security of territory (Suhrke, 1999, p. 269).
Conversely, in a state security model, the state extends its relations upwards to influence the
security of the international system (Liotta, 2002).
In practice, and in opposition to the human security model, state security tends to focus
on increasing military spending to protect those in power. Although Archer and Willi (2012)
do not specifically refer to Uganda, they argue that usually the implication of an increase in
military spending is the militarisation of international relations, which in the long run can bring
insecurity, a position which is directly reflected in Uganda.
Human security supporters make a number of criticisms of the state security model. For
example, Krause and William (1997) emphasise the need to move from the militarization of
state security where the state controls everything to one where individuals, groups and
communities participate in matters of their security. In many African countries, such as Uganda,
state security is always related to maintaining the status quo, in which people’s security
becomes a non-priority issue. However, it can be argued in some circumstances, and as a
division of responsibilities, that the state should focus on military threats because non-military
threats can be dealt with using a human security model. Fox (2004) makes this case in pointing
out that in some circumstances the norms and legal instruments of a country can only be
handled by state structures. In other words, traditionally, the use of state security has been the
best means of protection for most sovereign countries. Similarly, in criticising the human
security approach, Walt (1991) argues that non-military fears like poverty or environmental
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hazards would destroy the human security approach’s intellectual consistency and make it more
problematic to formulate resolutions to such problems (Walt, 1991).
The maintenance of stability and unity in any country rests on the state’s ability to
protect its citizens and/or its governmental structures. Here the distinction between state and
human security approaches becomes obvious: the state security model is intended to protect
those government allies who believe, accept and recognise a particular state’s political agendas
(Cilliers, 1999), whereas the human security approach aims at protecting all citizens.
Attempting to manage fears and eliminating forms of insecurity guarantees basic security
which is essential for people’s wellbeing: the need is to make people, not the state, the central
security concern, with the corollary however that national security does not ensure internal
peace (Bastian, 2004). This was the case during the conflict in northern Uganda when the state
did not promote the security of its people. Most of that work was left in the hands of INGOs
and NGOs while the state used its machinery not to protect its people, but to monitor them and
prevent them from exercising their rights and freedoms.
State security actions can limit people’s involvement by using brutal police and army
tactics and other stringent controls which limit people’s involvement in determining their
destiny: “state security in its narrow militarist form perpetuates violence, its blunt law is the
weapon detrimental to peace and detrimental to those who see the world as a space for all to
enjoy and co-habit equitably” (Gibson, 2011, p. 85). When summing up the difference between
human security and state security, Christie notes “that human security provides a framework
for disparate communities to talk about issues of security” and a state security model does not
(2010, p. 170).
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Critical security and human security
As Stamnes broadly defines critical security, it is a “generic term for all postpositivist/critical work that challenges the underlying assumptions of Traditional Security
Studies” and, secondly, a “subcategory of this broad group, consisting of the work of those
individuals who take their inspiration from the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical Theory”
(2004, p. 162). The Frankfurt School emphasises the ideal of people’s freedom from social and
other related legal restraints especially from the state. A less structural, more cultural, definition
is offered by Browning and McDonald who define critical security in terms of “representations
or discourses of security in defining group identity, enabling particular policy or legitimating
particular actors as security providers” (2013, p. 236), which links with the brief summing up
of critical security theory by Cox (1981) that critical security studies are reflective, recognise
the importance of change and are also concerned with the manner in which change takes place.
Proponents of critical security theory (Krause et al., 1997; Peoples & VaughanWilliams, 2014) view traditional notions of security as part of the realist security agenda. For
them, it supports the existing security systems which are managed by the influential, developed
countries at both domestic and international levels as a way of exploiting the disadvantaged.
They do not agree with a situation in which superpowers dominate the world, instead they
advocate a system which assigns equal treatment to all. According to George:
Critical theory, thus, reconnects (theoretical) knowledge to the practice of power, and
opens up a previously fore-closed debate about the way we know and create reality. It does not
posit [an] historical continuing process of historical change. It does not accord existing
institution and power relations the status of facts or givens but calls them into question by
concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of change
(1994, p. 218).
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Similarly, Browning and McDonald (2013) argue that critical theory contributes to the
security studies debate through critiquing traditional approaches. Its emphasis on the politics
of security within communities, and the emphasis on the ethical dimension of security, make it
people-centred.
These views feed into another important aspect of critical security: the way it treats the
‘dominant’ and the ‘dominated’. The theory seriously challenges the state’s domination of the
people which allows Baldwin (1995) and Williams (2012) to argue that for a restructuring of
national and global social power relations. Those in power should not use it to dominate the
majority, rather people should be treated equally.
As opposed to the state security model, critical security studies is a relatively new area,
and at times considered controversial because it aims to radically change the traditional ways
in which security has been perceived. Further, its critics suggest that it has concentrated on
criticising other concepts of security rather than on developing ideas about how threats can be
eliminated, for example, that while state security emphasises the use of the military to achieve
peace, critical security has no clear proposal (Browning & McDonald, 2013).
Yet, the arguments put forward by advocates of critical security studies, more far
reaching and forward-looking than those made by traditional security studies, encourage debate
about clearer meanings of the term human security. For example, Roberts (2005) describes the
debate as fluctuating and unstable because of the expanding meaning of the term to one in
which human agency can be seen to influence both human security and insecurity outcomes
(Roberts, 2005). Yet, it can be argued that the human security model, theoretically, can be the
most effective means of protecting vulnerable people caught up in different security threats
because, as for Liotta, the focus can be placed on the individual, rather than the state, which
he suggests “is the best guarantee for long-term stability, prosperity, and security” (Liotta, 2002,
p. 474).

So, while state security mainly addresses specific threats to the country like
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sovereignty and territorial integrity, human security addresses all threats related to vulnerability
and other extreme circumstances, for example, during conflict.
From a social perspective then, human security aims to focus on anything which
impacts negatively on the people, such as wars, post-conflict situations, financial crises, or
unfavourable development models. The intention is to maintain the dignity of all affected.
Yet, a dynamic conceptualisation of human security is also demanded, because people’s
needs differ from each other, as do the needs of communities. The human security approach
brings together the differing security concerns faced by people under threat, which has helped
to widen people’s understanding of what constitutes a threat and subsequently enables more
appropriate policy initiation, implementation and change, which have helped to improve the
security concerns of people/communities specifically in developing countries (Axworthy,
2001).
Yet, through its different phases and understandings of its usefulness, Christou and
Breslin argue that the human security approach now “has evolved, to the extent that it has
become a clearly articulated concept both in academic terms and as a guide to concrete political
action for policy-makers” (2015, p. 1). Therefore, the term is relevant in identifying various
human security threats where appropriate actions can be taken to avert those threats.
Human security prioritizes living with prosperity, freedom and dignity, universal
human values which should be accorded to every citizen and which are necessary for a free
and just society: as King and Murray suggest, “it is universal, its components are
interdependent, it is best ensured through prevention, and it is people-centred” (2001, p. 589).
Although it might be deemed to be too broad to be useful, advocates for the human security
approach contend that this breadth is what gives the approach its strength. Indeed, Nuruzzaman
argues that “broadening the concept of human security points to some analytical difficulties,
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but inclusion of all categories of threats and vulnerabilities is necessary if comprehensive
security for the individual human being in different societies is to be achieved” (2006, p. 292).
This section has introduced and defined the critical security approach and contrasted it
with the human security approach. Critical security criticises a state-centric model as the
primary referent to security. It argues that state security’s oversight on vital areas that matter
to the security of humans needs to be addressed. Like human security, it emphasises individual
human beings as the targets of security, with the state being the protector of the people
emphasises widening the notion of security to include aspects like the economic, the
environmental and social justice.
However, the human security approach broadens the approach to include other threats
to people like the effects of political and economic conflicts, environmental disasters and
poverty. Such threats compelled many third world countries to emphasize the human security
approach. As Christie (2010) argues that because human security has challenged old notions of
security, “it cannot be dismissed as being irrelevant either to policy or to the development of”
north, south relations. However, he appears to suggest the notion is not completely new “as it
is embedded in prior conceptualizations and concerns of security” (Christie, 2010).

Criticisms of the human security approach
The human security approach nonetheless is both a contentious and a multidimensional
concept. Its critics (Hataley & Nossal, 2004; Hynek & Chandler, 2013; Paris, 2001; Prezelj,
2008) argue that it lacks certainty in its meaning and is so wide and holistic that it simply
reflects the values and priorities of whoever happens to be advocating for human security.
Critics have also raised concerns about its relevance in areas such as global governance and
peacekeeping. Paris, for example, argues that “human security tend[s] to be extraordinarily
expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-
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being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing
policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied” (2001, p. 88).
Similarly, Krause suggests that the term human security loses its real descriptive power
by bundling together individual insults to dignity with serious issues such as genocide (Krause,
2004), and Chandler argues there is too much exaggeration in it, that its holistic approach is
too ambitious and not practical for policy making. He finds “it difficult to grasp, asking first,
why the discourse of human security has become so dominant in international policy circles,
and, second, why it has had so little impact on policy outcomes,” (Chandler, 2008, p.
428). Already in the early 1990s, Ayoob (1991) was making the devastating argument that
although an all-encompassing approach makes human security flexible, it also puts an end to
its convenience as an analytical tool.
When it comes to issues around the position and dignity of women, the norm in both
state practice and the implementation by non-state actors of human security principles in
northern Uganda has not been encouraging. Hudson (2005) though specifically not referring
to Uganda situation, he argues that states sometimes use their structures to promote the dignity
and protection of their male citizens, and draws attention to the way they tend to overlook the
dignity and protection of women, he also critiques human security for the same problems
(Hudson, 2005).
In some developed countries it is suggested that leaders are using the concept for their
own ends to fulfil their own ambitions and to strengthen themselves in the international state
system (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007). For example, because of the threat of extreme terrorist
organizations, many developed countries are linking development assistance to fighting
terrorism (Duffield, 2006).
Critics of the human security approach argue that developed and developing countries
are often talking at cross purposes when it comes to individual country’s security needs. Most
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of the decisions, it is suggested, favour the donors. Owens and Arneil (1999) argue that the
concept is being used to advance neo-colonialist tendencies toward the developing world, so
that, for example, developed countries mainly collaborate with countries where they have
security or commercial interests or colonial ties. These distinctions between developed and
developing states lead McCormack (2008) to suggest that the human security approach both
reveals and perpetuates the power imbalances between them, that developing countries lack the
capacity to hold developed countries to account in the same ways they are themselves are held
to account by those developed countries.
As discussed above, the concept of human security is seen by some as an innovative
way of addressing a multitude of security threats from a new perspective. It represents an
innovative approach to how people should be protected from different threats. From the
advocates’ viewpoint, the individual is the starting point, not the state. However, the state
should be seen as a protector of its citizens. Fukuda–Parr and Messineo argue therefore, that
“the framers of the 1945 United Nations’ Charter were motivated by the need for nations to act
collectively to protect the freedom and dignity of individuals and recognized the tension
between the individual and the state, and required states to respect human dignity and
fundamental freedoms as human rights” (2012, p. 4).
Critics of the human security approach such as Johns (2014) point out that the concept
is unclear because it pools many critical things together making the concept difficult to
implement and meaningless to relate to the security concerns of the individual. Upreti,
Bhattarai and Wagle (2013) suggest though that although it is hard to disregard a concept
designed to help marginalised people, the state cannot reach each and every individual within
its boundaries, which was certainly the case in northern Uganda conflict. Similarly, critics such
as Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru (2004) note that all issues affecting people cannot be treated
in the same way when it comes to prioritizing. For example, the threat of terrorism cannot be
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treated in the same way as environmental degradation. States will deal with these threats
according to their priorities.
In general, those who criticise the concept including postmodernists, critical theorists
and feminist advocates, contend that the concept has been highjacked by some dominant groups
within the society, who interpret it in a way which suits their agendas. According to Sheehan
(2005), such interpretations could lead to unjust political decisions which could also threaten
the economic order. As discussed in this research, using northern Uganda as a case in point,
different interpretations of human security led to more suffering specifically those who did not
have access to power.

Relevance of a human security approach
The extent to which people have ownership of projects affects the way they look at their
well-being and their security. In 2004, while working with Caritas Uganda as a Research and
Advocacy worker, I conducted one of a number of community sensitisation workshops on the
techniques of community advocacy at Opit IDP camp. During the day-long workshop, and
through the responses of the participants (eighty or ninety in number, as always more women
than men), an understanding that had been growing for me through a series of such workshops
in this and other IDP camps became very clear to me: that the type of empowerment that the
human security approach offers was beginning to operate in these camps. Instead of always
relying on me or other aid workers to articulate their concerns, workshop participants were
beginning to own the process of writing their concerns and taking them to the relevant
authorities such as Sub County or District local government structures.

That was

empowerment in action. For me, there was a realization that improving the level of engagement
between the concerned people and the government with the aim of improving the levels of
human security could prevent possible violent conflicts, improve peace-building processes and
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could be an avenue to press for democratic reforms. I also saw that owning the process of
conflict resolution could lead to greater stability, predictability, and continuity in the affected
people’s daily lives.
The human security approach provides policy makers and academic interested in peacebuilding and conflict resolution with a people-centred approach aimed at making social and
structural change. Conteh-Morgan argues that “to guarantee human security at the personal,
institutional, and structural-cultural levels, power relations and relations of power should be
underscored within a socio-cultural context” (2005, p. 71). He added that peace-building using
a human security approach would mean the transformation of an adversarial system to one that
promotes equality and strives to correct historical grievances (Conteh-Morgan, 2005). What
this has made possible in practice, internationally, is that human security has been used by the
European Union in the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict in 2006 to promote its
relationship with the African continent (Martin, 2007).
The human security approach addresses issues, both military and non-military, which
bring human insecurity into communities, and brings a new perspective by which innovative
ways can be developed to identify all threats to human life. Thomas and Tow, for example,
suggest that “human security has been developed as an idea that can be contrasted with national
security and that can direct attention to an emerging and wider spectrum of security issues”
(2002, p. 178). The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, also emphasized the role of the
human security approach. He recommended that the global community adopt a people-centred
approach to security, and declared that “The basis of such a system must be a new commitment
to preventing latent threats from becoming imminent and imminent threats from becoming
actual, as well as an agreement on when and how force should be used if preventive strategies
fail” (2005, p. 66).
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The human security approach makes no distinction between the security of men and
women, which has contributed to an increasing awareness of women’s lack of security in
conditions of armed conflict, in transitions from conflict to rehabilitation and in humanitarian
emergencies and development programmes. There is also increasing attentiveness to the
necessity to pay greater consideration to the physical welfare of women in armed conflicts, as
well as to their safety and the advancement of their economic and social rights during
humanitarian emergencies. In post conflict situations too, special attention needs to be given
to the security needs of girls and women, to concrete policies aimed at improving their situation,
since they are often the victims of social dislocation and violence (Chenoy, 2005; McKay,
2004b). Indeed, the possibilities for achieving gender equality are enhanced because human
security contains, as a foundational principle, the desirability of human equality.
Ewan argues that “while scholars try to resolve the question of where the conceptual
parameters of human security should be fixed, Western policy practices increasingly reflect the
‘merging of security and development’ that human security represents” (2007, p. 187): in
practical terms, the concept of human security can offer comprehensive security as it combines
political stability, economic development and caters for environmental degradation.
This extends to its focus on individual human rights. As Kaldor (2013) observes, human
development and human rights are core aspects of the paradigm. Going a step further, human
security initiatives emphasize people’s involvement in matters which affect them a process
which makes those involved feel included in the community through ownership of the
processes. Creating a sense and space of ownership is intended to bring out the best results
(Andersen, 2006). It encourages self-reliance and discourages dependency, although, Anderson
also makes the point that too little attention is paid to how ownership should be achieved.
Although O’Brien and Leichenko do not refer specifically to the northern Uganda
situation, their position is that where human security principles are in place, “individuals and
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communities have the options necessary to end, mitigate, or adapt to threats to their human,
social, and environmental rights, and the capacity and freedom to exercise these options”
(O’Brien & Leichenko, 2007). In the northern Uganda conflict, community engagement,
meaningful dialogue and consultation between affected communities and the government
security forces/army had been absent, at least until the time of the Juba peace talks (2006-2009).
Therefore, there had been no ownership of decisions, which contributed to the people feeling
a lack of security.
The people did not participate in decisions about their well-being due to the top-down
approach used by the government of Uganda. Because the government’s primary concern was
fighting the LRA, there were no avenues to generate people-centred policies. I continually
observed that this lack of opportunity to participate in community decision-making left many
people feeling stressed and depressed due to uncertainty about what the future held for them.
For example, in 2003 while visiting one of the biggest camps Pabbo, in Amuru District, to
conduct community meetings (on behalf of Caritas), one of the participants talked about the
unfamiliar environment that camp inhabitants had to experience, such as overcrowding and a
lack of freedom to do what they wanted to do. She told me that the presence of armed personnel
everywhere, dressed in camouflage military uniforms, stressed her very much.
The observations I made while meeting people affected by the war are supported by
research conducted in northern Uganda by Mugisha, Muyinda, Malamba, and Kinyanda. They
found that “[s]tudies of psychiatric disorder undertaken in this region during the conflict
reported rates of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) of between 31% and 67%” (2015, p. 2).
Similarly, Amone-P’Olak, Garnefski, and Kraaij found that “many social, psychological,
health and physiological disturbances have been shown to be related to the war experiences of
adolescents, such as PTSD or PTSD-like complaints” (2007, p. 656).
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In a conflict environment, bringing people together and allowing them to devise ways
to use the events in their favour empowers them. The security of the people can be seriously
weakened when issues of concern to their security are poorly managed and co-ordinated and
are not in line with what they expect to be put in place. Nathan (2007) points out that,
particularly in Africa, the lack of local input to, and ownership of, the reform agenda has been
an ongoing problem (Nathan, 2007).
Effectively, what at least part of the literature is suggesting is that the human security
approach has seldom been used to improve people’s basic security needs in situations of intrastate conflicts, civil wars, and guerrilla wars, and that although it has been applied in
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, its potential for systematic threat assessment (and the impact
assessment of those threats) remains under-utilized (Imboden, 2012). Nonetheless, as discussed
in subsequent chapters, and based on both an analysis of the more specific literature on the
northern Ugandan conflict, and on my own extensive experience in the field, I argue that the
human security approach when implemented, to some extent improved the lives of men,
women and children in northern Uganda during the conflict.
From that, and from the wider review of the literature presented here, I suggest that
despite its critics, the human security approach can be seen as having potential as a way to deal
with particular threats such as increasing poverty, ethnic violence, human trafficking, effects
of climate change, chronic diseases like AIDS, and the increasing incidents of terrorism which
all have negative consequences for humanity. The relationship between local and global
interests in generating a more secure world is one of the guiding principles of the human
security approach. Indeed, according to Axworthy, we are no longer
limited to discussions of states' rights and national sovereignty.
Protecting civilians, addressing the plight of war-affected children and
[curtailing] the threat of terrorism and drugs, managing open borders,
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and combating infectious diseases are now part of a dialogue (2001, p.
19).
But, despite Axworthy’s recognition of human security issues being part of the dialogue,
there is still the need for a concerted local, national and international effort to prevent such
threats from happening so that they can be controlled before they cause a significant
humanitarian crisis.

The relationship between human security and development.
This research is not about human development as such, though of course human
security and human development are related. In northern Uganda, the socio-economic and
political conditions of the people on the ground contributed much to the conflict, yet to achieve
human development, human security must be in place, and vice versa. As Klingebiel et al
(2006) state, the presence of security is a precondition for any successful development and that
successful development policies depend on a secure situation in a country. However, the threats
and the level of success differ from country to country.
Jolly and Ray usefully contrast human development and human security by arguing
that human development is “the process of increasing levels of human development while
human security focuses on avoiding the downside risks of falling below some level of human
development already achieved” (2007, p. 459). Hence the concept of human security has
attracted attention specifically because of its relevance to people’s well-being and global
development in general (Christie, 2010; Cilliers, 2004; Gómez & Gasper, 2013; Kaldor, 2013).
Anything concerning development in any country has a bearing on the human security of the
people concerned. The application of a human security approach in developmental activities
can assist long-term development if people are involved in the planning of the activities which
are crucial to their wellbeing. Thus, for citizens to own the process helps forge a sense of
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responsibility to sustain what has been initiated. Klingebiel et al., (2006) make a connection
between sustainable development and human security by describing sustainable development
as focussing on institutions which make regulations

in order to maintain community

equilibrium (Klingebiel et al., 2006).
At another level, the human security approach has a bearing on development where
improvements in income, health and education can lead to overall development of the people
and the country as a whole. Human security approaches and development, when linked, provide
a basis for international aid agencies to coordinate interventions even in an insecure
environment. In such situations, they can complement humanitarian efforts especially when
specific states have failed to provide assistance to their citizens. Further, the connection
between them has brought countries together to compromise on contentious issues which affect
humanity. As King and Murray note:
UNDP’s main goal was to use human security as the organizing concept for the
1995 Copenhagen UN Conference on Social Development. While it was not
used as the basis for the social summit, human security as proposed by UNDP
has continued as an organizing concept in the development economics, public
health, and the security communities (2001, p. 589).
Therefore, people’s well-being, as an element of human security, provides a basis in
theory for any development initiatives to thrive. The absence of human security affects
economic growth, fuels poverty and retards development in general.
One argument for the relevance of the human security approach in relation to
development in Africa, is that “only by formulating and executing policies that explicitly
address the mutuality of developmental security challenges will the human potential of Africa
be released” (Porto, Poku, & Renwick, 2007, p. 1156). Martin and Owen, however, take the
somewhat contrasting position that “whereas development is focused on achieving equitable
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growth and sustainability, human security goes further to address the conditions that menace
survival, the continuation of daily life and the dignity of human beings” (2010, p. 214). This
perspective points to the importance of maintaining a connection between development and
human security activities. However, in northern Uganda during the conflict there was no
attempt to formulate policies intended for development due to the security situation thus,
offering evidence for this research’s argument of the usefulness, but the limited usefulness, of
the human security approach during the conflict in northern Uganda.

Human security and international relations
MacFarlane and Khong (MacFarlane, Khong, & ebrary, 2006) suggest that human
security not only places individuals at the centre of “international security through the merging
of the previously independent issues of development and security, but also makes the security
of “those over there” an international matter and inextricably linked to “us over here” (2006, p.
230). They identify four areas emphasised in international relations which are also related to
human security. First, any security undertaking should be in the people’s best interests and
protect their security concerns but not necessarily those of the state. Second, the human security
approach addresses the complicated and related issues which emerged from the post-Cold War
period. Third, human security has been incorporated into foreign policy security agendas of
some developed countries so that the level of awareness of human security has increased.
Finally, the concept draws attention to security issues which need attention from various
stakeholders to address issues related to insecurity.
A further significant reason for a worldwide approach to human security is that, if issues
negatively affecting people are identified, the attention of developed countries may be attracted,
in the form of humanitarian assistance, as was the case in northern Uganda. According to the
report by the European Commission Directorate – General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO),
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“since 2000, ECHO has channelled more than EUR 63 million into northern Uganda and is a
main donor in the country for humanitarian assistance” (2007, p. 4). The contribution of
international aid and development support was recognised as being of crucial importance to
enhancing human security by McRae and Hubert (2001), although they were not specifically
referring to northern Uganda.
The combined issues of human security and human rights have gained prominence in
the vocabulary of international relations and international law. Together they provide a
framework for mutual understanding and cooperation between countries. Also, together they
provide a basic understanding of what individuals and communities need to feel safe and secure.
A Report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) notes
that throughout the world there is an increased awareness of the need for international
institutions to safeguard human rights and human dignity (2001, p. 6). However, in the case
of northern Uganda, during the conflict the international responses to the conflict were
inappropriate (Quaranto, 2006). Due to the unsafe security situation, it was very difficult to
provide large sections of the population with basic needs which made it difficult to apply the
human security approach.

Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed and discussed the emergence and varying definitions of
human security in the academic literature. It has argued that a human security approach can be
used to identify the diverse needs of people and has identified and stated arguments in support
of, and critical of, the concept. It has made the point that the human security concept needs to
be discussed and its principles applied with attention to development needs.
A human security approach emphasises protecting and empowering people using a
people-centred approach, focussing on those issues which impact negatively on people, such
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as poverty, poor food security, lawlessness, climate change, violations of human rights, conflict,
gender inequality, problems relating to the youth and environmental issues, and so shares the
core principles of human development agendas, of referring, protecting, emphasizing and
responding to people’s needs and well-being. It is an approach that, as Oberleitner wrote in
2005, already had begun “to influence, change, and challenge global politics, institutions, and
governance” (2005, p. 185).
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Chapter Three
The causes of civil wars in post-colonial Uganda
Introduction
This chapter examines the numerous civil conflicts which have occurred in Uganda
since it attained Independence. It discusses how the political, social and economic situation in
Uganda during the colonial and post-colonial periods provided a foundation for the country’s
future political instabilities, and it contributes to answering the research question by exploring
the extent to which successive post-colonial governments failed to address the politically-based
ethnic and socio-economic divisions, and how this led to political leaders failing to manage the
human security of many Ugandans and, in particular, the human security of particular ethnic
groups in the north of the country. The chapter argues that the causes of civil wars in postcolonial Uganda can be attributed to the lack of a spirit of nationalism manifested by a lack of
a sense of being Ugandan. Most ethnic groups focused only on their own advantage and the
establishment of political parties based on religious affiliation exacerbated the situation. When
Uganda attained Independence in 1962, deep-rooted divisions based on ethnicity, economic
privilege, class and religion differences (Rohner, Thoenig, & Zilibotti, 2013): this situation
provided a fertile ground for the ensuing civil conflicts particularly in northern Uganda.
As I show here, many of Uganda’s problems, such as ethnic divisions and a lack of
national unity, date from the colonial era (1894-1962) (Munene, 2015), and, as indicated below,
have resulted in the country’s leaders prioritizing the security of their own regimes over the
security of their people. In a mixture of democracy, dictatorship and anarchy, human security
has taken a back seat, resulting in social, political and economic crisis.
Uganda’s experience can be understood as paralleling that of many other countries in
Africa which have experienced post-colonial political instabilities, directly traceable to
disruptive colonial experiences. By consciously redefining traditional social structures, eroding
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the distinctions of class and morality, intent on instilling a sense of inferiority, the colonial elite
replicated themselves, passing on to their local successors understandings, traditions and
practices, steeped in a heritage of colonial corruption (Ejiogu & Mosley, 2017, p. 9). In the
case of Uganda as elsewhere in Africa, Senu and Daranijoh persuasively argue that:
western foreign policy has been characterized by an
implicit protection of its own values and self‐interests that
ostensibly claim to support African economic and political
development,

but

in

practice

encourage

financial

mismanagement and poor governance to the point where Africa's
leaders are bound up with a political culture from which they
cannot be liberated, almost creating a perpetual cycle of tragedy
and policy (Senu & Daranijoh, 2018, p. 1008).
Since Independence, political volatility, has produced human rights abuses, nepotism,
a lack of democracy, regional inequalities, ethnic-based conflicts and religious sectarianism
(Oola, 2008). Uganda has not had even one nonviolent transfer of power: a series of military
coups has been followed by civil wars. Rather, military means have been used to acquire and
hold on to power: “leaving deep scars of distrust and anger between the different regional and
ethnic groups, particularly between the northern and southern/central parts of the country”
(Okumu-Alya, 2009, p. 1). The history of military coups and the heavy reliance on the military
to protect the regimes of Obote I (1966-1971), Amin (1971-1979), Obote II (1980-1985) and,
currently, Museveni (1986 to date), are closely associated with the domination of different
ethnic groups. These ethnic-based divisions were created by the colonialists as a means of
asserting their authority over the colony. The main divide has been the ethnic segregation
between people from northern Uganda and those from the south. Significantly, this divide has
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contributed to a series of chaotic situations in which various leaders seized power, ruled the
country for short periods of time, and then were overthrown.
The legacies of colonialism, particularly the issues related to ethnic divisions, did
not allow a sense of national identity. Past abuses have not been acknowledged or remedied,
nor has there been an attempt, as in other post-colonial countries, to promote a national
reconciliation process (Oola, 2008).

Colonial period British Protectorate (1894 – 1962)
In order to understand the origins of Uganda’s current problems, it is necessary to
examine its colonial history. Uganda was a British protectorate from 1894 to 1962. Like many
other African countries, Uganda had long been divided along linguistic, religious and ethnic
lines, which offered the British colonial administrators the means to control the territory: they
applied a ‘divide and rule’ strategy which exacerbated and played on these divisions:
The British divided their Uganda Protectorate into two, namely
labour and production zones. The division was based on presumed
natural qualities of the people of northern Uganda and those of the
south. The people of the north were regarded to be strong, muscular
and hardworking while the southern peoples were perceived as weak,
lazy but intellectually superior (Amone, 2014a, p. 72).
At the time of British occupation of what is now Uganda, the several kingdoms (see fig
1 below) were at different levels of political development, some with a centralized system of
governance, others decentralized. During this period, some embraced the colonialists with open
arms and others resisted. Those who embraced the colonialists, predominantly the Bantu
speaking people in the central and western parts of modern Uganda, especially the Baganda,
were rewarded with incentives (Gartrell, 1983). The arbitrary boundaries designated at the
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Berlin Conference of 1884-85 brought the Buganda Kingdom together with smaller kingdoms
to make what is now modern Uganda. Since the Buganda Kingdom was more powerful than
the other kingdoms, it was given a special position by the colonialists, which led to it being
given a preferential status (Diaz, 2005).
This preferential treatment by the colonialists towards Buganda, indicates that the
British colonialists favoured the Baganda because, like the British, they were familiar with a
centralized system of governance (Mutibwa, 1992). As a result, the Baganda, Basoga and
Banyankole were encouraged to grow cash crops such as coffee, cotton and tea while those in
Acholi and Lango, located in the north, were forced to do manual labour. Okuku argues that in
dividing the economy in this way, Britain was “[b]uilding upon pre-colonial differences” (2002,
p. 13). The effect was to lead other Ugandans from the west and north of the country to come
to Buganda as migrant workers to tap its economic opportunities (Okumu-Alya, 2009).
The British used the Baganda to conquer areas which resisted colonial rule (OkumuAlya, 2009), and because they worked with the British, the Baganda also benefited greatly from
the development of their economy and from better infrastructure including roads, schools and
hospitals in their regions. They became Uganda's educated elite. The British further
differentiated between the north and the south by recruiting personnel for the army, police,
prisons and other security agencies from the north (Berg-Schlosser 1990). These actions further
entrenched the existing divisions and served to heighten prevailing hatred between the various
ethnic groups.
The northern parts of the country, dominated by the Luo ethnic group from Gulu,
Kitgum, Pader and Amuru plus the Nile-Hamites who are the Langi from Lira, Apac and
Dokolo districts, were not catered for in terms of economic development (Apuuli, 2006).
Rather, as shown above, these groups from the north were used as a source of cheap labour in
the south where industries and large agricultural farms had been set up. However, northerners
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taller and in general physically stronger, were also the principle source of military recruitment,
and so were a large pool of trained soldiers, familiar with guns, but many, lacking military
incomes, continued to be cattle dependent and, generally, poor. Southerners on the other hand,
more trusted by the British, were more educated and filled the ranks of civil service, and also
worked either as out growers, small farmers, or on the large agricultural estates established by
the British to grow the new cash crops such as coffee, tea and cotton (Jackson, 2002). The
differential treatment of northerners and southerners became increasingly problematic under
British rule, particularly as other colonies began to achieve Independence through armed
struggle (Laruni, 2015). Yet, the British relationship with the southerners was strong enough
to make possible a peaceful transition from colonial status to Independence.
Nonetheless, the domination of security agencies by the northerners (notably the
Nilotics) gave them unlimited access to guns, which Dicklitch and Lwanga (2003) argue helped
to set the stage for the ensuing civil wars and repressive regimes. It was also, as Lindermann
shows, the economic divisions between an impoverished north and a more prosperous south
that continued to promote sectarian tendencies among Ugandans, which meant that, following
Independence, many continued to think about their identity in terms of their ethnic group, rather
than as being Ugandan (Lindemann, 2011a). A case in point is that most of the post-colonial
leaders have preferred to be surrounded by immediate relatives, trusted friends from their
ethnic identity and all high-level security positions are given to members of their ethnic group
(Lindemann, 2011b; Okumu-Alya, 2009, p. 1).

Post-colonial Uganda
Yet, although Uganda had a relatively peaceful move to Independence in 1962, this
peaceful situation did not last long after the British left. Van Acker argues that in general,
“[i]ndependence found Uganda with an entrenched racial separation of economic function and
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privilege, keenly felt religious divisions, and a widespread resentment of preferential treatment
accorded to the Baganda” (2004, p. 341). The seeds of mistrust among Ugandans had been
planted during the colonial period and the promotion of ethnic-based politics divided the
country rather than united it. Since addressing these political mistakes after Independence was
not a priority for subsequent leaders (quite the opposite), this led to turmoil in the post-colonial
era.
The issue of ethnic divisions has been a significant problem for Uganda since
Independence. Differences in political opinions and struggles to hold onto power by some
ethnic groups, have continually undermined the push for nation building and a strong
centralized political system (Laruni, 2015). When Uganda held its first elections in 1962, the
political parties were heavily sectarian in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Baganda, as the
principal collaborators with the British, had become part of their administration system so,
when Uganda became independent, in an active demonstration that ethnic division was to
remain a tool of oppression between different ethnic groups (Rohner et al., 2013) they became
the new administrators, replacing the departing colonialists.
In favouring some ethnic groups over others, British policies were disastrous for future
nation building (Laruni, 2015). For example, the recruitment policy in the security agencies
undermined the country’s future stability. It was the responsibility of the British-trained army
and the police to protect the country as a whole, and the new administrators who replaced the
colonialists at the time of Independence, but, in a mistake with long-lasting consequences, the
“instruments of violence: the armed forces” were left where they had been under the British,
in the hands of the Acholi and the Langi from the north (Cheney, 2005, p. 25). The army, as
Van Acker argues, was little more than “an instrument of domestic politics”, which in turn was
itself “increasingly a function of ethnic retaliation.” Violence became a means to an end, and
an instrument of social relationships (2004, p. 338).
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Further, the divisive political foundations Uganda inherited from the colonial power,
also had a severe effect on the formation of future political parties: “Uganda’s post-colonial
attempts to adopt social transformative goals and to create new political structures for popular
mobilization rapidly ran into the obstacles posed by this colonial legacy” (Van Acker, 2004, p.
341). Such legacies were instrumental in the lack of a sense of national identity, and especially
in terms of building independent national political institutions.
Arguably, religion was an even more significant (and longstanding) divisive factor.
Indeed, Kasozi goes so far as to suggest that the violence between Bafransa (Roman Catholics),
Bangereza (Anglican Protestants) and Bawadi (Muslims) during the colonial period was worse
than anything experienced in the centuries-long history of the kingdom of Buganda. After
Independence, the formation of political parties such as the Democratic Party (DP), and the
Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) was influenced by colonial political divisions of religion
and tribe (Byamukama, 2003), reflecting the marked lines of division which followed ethnicity
and religion, particularly between Catholic and Anglican (the latter becoming the most
widespread and influential during the pre-colonial period, and retaining that position after
Independence) (Carney, p.769). The Uganda People’s Congress party, formed by Milton Obote
in 1962, drew its support from the Church Missionary Society (CMS), Anglicans, known in
Uganda as Protestants: most UPC supporters were from east and northern Uganda where its
leader came from. The other major party, the Democratic Party, drew its support from the
Catholics and the mainly Bantu people from the centre, south and west of the country. The DP
(founded, 1954) was anti-communist and actively defended the interests of Ugandan Catholics
(Carney, 2017). Its founders and most significant support were from the central region, where
Catholics were the majority. Because of its roots in the Catholic Church, others called it ‘Diini
ya Paapa’ DP” Religion for the Pope,” with the implication that it was foreign controlled. The
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other predominantly ethnic party was the Kabaka Yekka (KY) party (“Only the King”), named
for its leader, the then-king Mutesa of Buganda. For Dicklitch (1995), it is clear that
Rather than mitigating inherited divisions, the political parties
that existed after independence only exacerbated them. The major
ethnic, religious, and regional differences were magnified within the
major political parties (1995, p. 107).
This remains an unchallenged position in discussions of post-colonial Uganda. Indeed,
Haynes, writing more recently, takes it a step further, arguing that the “divisions precluded the
formation of a national culture in Uganda and help explain the emergence and development of
anti-state ethnic and religious groups” (2007, p. 312).
A spirit of interdependence between the peoples of the different regions in Uganda has
never been encouraged by the succession of more or less legitimate and repressive political
leaders (Berg-Schlosser 1990) who have rather planted seeds of hatred contributing both to a
lack of nationalism and a lack of human security which, as Dicklitch reads them have led only
to “a semblance of authority and stability” depending on “patronage, coercion, repression, and
the support of the politicized military” (1995, pp. 105-106). These divisions have battered
Uganda and resulted in thousands of people losing their lives.
The self-interested tendencies of the leaders of Uganda since Independence have
contributed negatively to the country’s peace and development, stagnated the economy and
hampered sustainable development.
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Figure 1. Ethnographic map of Uganda. Source: Ethnographic Uganda. From
“Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda ”
(Otunnu, 2002, p. 14).
Milton Obote’s first Presidency of Uganda (1966-71)
Milton Obote, a Langi, from northern Uganda, and party leader of the Uganda People’s
Congress, became the first Prime Minister of independent Uganda in 1962. He then became
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president in 1966-71. Obote came to power through an unlikely alliance between the UPC and
the Kabaka Yekka parties which had previously been strongly opposed to each other (BergSchlosser 1990). Although they formed a government of national unity, they had different
ideologies and aims, e.g, monachism and republicanism. When Obote attacked the residence
of the King of Buganda in 1966, the alliance broke down and he was able to rewrite the 1962
Independence Constitution in his own interests, and without consulting Parliament. His UPC
government was able to suppress all political opposition. He successfully removed the
Executive President (King Mutesa II) from power and proclaimed Uganda a republic, thereby
abolishing the system of traditional kingdoms and denying Buganda its federal status. He then
declared himself Executive President (Karlström, 1996). The ongoing political unease between
the King of Buganda and Prime Minister Obote created long lasting enmity between the
Baganda and people from northern Uganda especially the Langi and Acholi.
The attack on the King’s residence, together with the deposition of the King of Buganda,
also soured relationships between the people from the north and those from the south,
specifically the Baganda (McDonough, 2008). Obote’s actions were a source of trouble
between the northern region and the Buganda Kingdom as he became increasingly authoritarian
and reduced the civil liberties of all Ugandans (McDonough, 2008). Realizing he could rule
without the support of Buganda, Obote introduced policies which further alienated the Baganda.
Commenting on these changes Okuku (2002) argues that Obote’s despotic administration
shattered any hope of widespread economic development or a democratic solution to what was
essentially a civil conflict. Throughout his rule, Obote had the support of the police and the
army which marked the beginning of military intervention in the politics of Uganda.
The army was headed by Idi Amin, a British-trained northerner and ethnic Kakwa, who
rose up the ranks because of his cruelty during Obote’s dictatorial regime. Idi Amin used his
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charisma and understanding of the techniques of political propaganda to help him stage a coup
against the civilian President Obote in 1971 (Nayenga, 1979).
The reasons for this were complex. First, there was antagonism within the military
because Obote favoured people from his own ethnic group, the Langis. Second, many military
people were dissatisfied with the changing of the Independence Constitution which helped
Obote to seize power. Third, the deposition of the Buganda King as an Executive President
also riled many (Lindemann, 2011a). In addition, Obote’s UPC government had been
weakened by the conflict with the Buganda Kingdom, whose inhabitants welcomed the rise of
Amin (Lindemann, 2011b). All these led to a power struggle between Obote and Amin and the
coup in 1971 in which Amin came to power.

Idi Amin’s Regime (1971-1979)
Amin took control of Uganda on January 25th, 1971. As a result, Obote and many other
Ugandans, including the current president Yoweri Museveni, fled to Tanzania where they
started to mobilize themselves to fight against Idi Amin. Amin’s regime was characterised by
continuing arbitrary violence, and many people were killed for opposing the government. The
regime was the most oppressive Uganda has ever known: Amin persecuted anyone whom he
suspected of opposing his regime. Those persecuted were mostly from the Acholi and Langi
ethnic groups, especially those with a military background, as well as religious leaders such as
the Anglican Archbishop Janani Luwum, journalists, intellectuals, judges, artists, minority
groups and Obote supporters (Saul, 1976).
Another notable characteristic of Amin’s regime was the expulsion of Israelis for
refusing to sell him arms to fight neighbouring countries, and on a larger scale the mass
expulsion of people of South Asian descent (Nayenga, 1979). They had been brought to
Uganda by the British as labour for the construction of the national railway system and had
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remained as shop keepers and small industrialists. Amin declared that expelling Asians was ‘a
war of economic liberation’ intended to hand the economy back to local Ugandans (Jamal,
1976). Their expulsion resulted in the confiscation of their houses, shops and industries and
redistribution to Africans (Patel, 1972). He also accused them of failing to integrate into
Uganda’s culture (Patel, 1972). However, despite having expelled the whole Asian population,
including business people, Amin’s regime failed to create the economic basis necessary to rally
political support. As Brett argues, “the attempt to maintain power by force made him wipe out
able people, undermine property rights and entrepreneurship, and thus reduce economic
efficiency and the resources available to the state” (1995b, pp. 137-138). More recently
Peterson (2016) observes that the crises in Uganda in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in medical
staff leaving the country, a scarcity of modern pharmaceuticals and a deterioration in much of
the infrastructure. As a result, the country’s health system, once greatly admired in Africa, was
left in a dire state (Peterson, 2016b). Such consequences of Amin’s actions and style of
leadership brought him enemies both within and outside the country and soured relationships
with the international community, particularly Britain.
The human rights situation during Amin’s regime was dire. Violations in the form of
state repression were carried out not only by security agents but also by political activists. Many
people used the breakdown of law and order as an opportunity to enrich themselves through
stealing, killing and plundering (Kasozi, Musisi, & Sejjengo, 1994). Large numbers of
Ugandans fled into exile during Amin’s reign of terror, the greatest number, including many
prominent politicians, fleeing to Tanzania. When Amin invaded Tanzania’s territory in order
to annex part of it to Uganda, President Julius Kambalage Nyerere declared war on Uganda.
While out of Uganda, the exiles formed different fighting groups to oust Amin. They included
former President Obote’s supporters, the Save Uganda Movement (SUM), whose political
leadership included Ateker Ejalu, Oyite Ojok and Yona Kanyomozi and the Front for National
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Salvation (FRONASA), headed by Museveni. However, these groups did not pose a threat to
Amin until they joined forces and met in Moshi, Tanzania, where they formed one group, the
Uganda National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A) in 1978. Then, together with the
Tanzanian Peoples Defence Forces, they invaded Uganda and overthrew the Amin regime
(1980, p. 467). Previously, the government of Tanzania had refused to assist any of the separate
groups but after the invasion of Amin’s forces into Tanzanian territory, the Tanzanian
government began to provide each group with training and arms (Gertzel, 1980).
Amin’s reign of terror had a negative impacts on the political, social and economic
aspects of the country. Internationally the regime was unpopular especially in some parts of
the western world due to its lack of human rights. The three linked institutions of government,
Parliament, the Judiciary and the Executive, were broken down by the dominance of the
military which attacked the human security of Ugandans. Yet, ironically, although the
immediate cause of the fall of Amin’s regime was the Ugandan exiles in Tanzania together
with the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Forces, Gertzel (1980) and Brett (1995b) agree that it was
not the exiles who brought about an end to Amin’s rule, but dissension within the army and
decreased backing from his Muslim supporters. Amin fled to Libya and later to Saudi Arabia
where he stayed until his death in 2003.

The turbulent period after Amin’s downfall, January 1979 – December 1980
After the downfall of Amin in 1979, the country needed a strong leader in order to
embark on the reconstruction process. However, the resurfacing of ethnic tensions and rivalry
aimed at capturing power undermined efforts to rebuild the country. Instead of reconstruction
the downfall ushered in another turbulent and bloody period which again affected the security
of many Ugandans.
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The UNLF gained power following Amin’s fall and embarked on the daunting task of
rebuilding the country socially, economically and politically: describing the situation in April
1979, Gertzel (1980) describes Uganda as in a real sense a ‘broken-backed’ state and argues
that a breakdown in a society’s institutions had had a profound effect on the country’s
development.
During the 1979-1980 period, ideological differences between the groups that had come
together to form the UNLA at Moshi resurfaced again (Kasfir, 2005). The infighting within the
UNLA led to three different and short-lived government formations during a 20-month period
(April 1979-December 1980) those of: (i) Yusufu Lule (April - June 1979): (ii) Godfrey Binaisa
(June 1979 - May 1980); and (iii) Paul Muwanga (May - December 1980). These three interim
governments were each backed by former Ugandan rebel groups which had fought the Amin
regime: during this period, ethnicity dominated politics, and specific ethnic groups carried out
various retribution against their opponents.
Indeed, although short-lived, they are representative of all Ugandan regimes after
Independence, characterized by:
devaluation of human lives, the use of force in social
interactions, the presentation by the power elite of political problems
as being essentially military in nature, the diminishing of space and
tolerance for competition, the abandonment of western-type education
and entrepreneurial success as the criterion for upward economic and
political mobility, and the domination of civilian institutions by the
armed forces (Omara-Otunnu, 1992, p. 445).
The third of these regimes was led by Paul Muwanga, who chaired a Military
Commission, effectively the country’s government, which organized the controversial Makara
(2010) December 1980 general elections which brought Obote, still at the head of the UPC
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back to power (Allen, 1991; Brett, 1995b; Kasfir, 2005). The fairness of the elections was
contested by many and widely considered to be fraudulent (Adyanga, 2015). They were
organized on a multiparty basis but failed to produce a clear and uncontested winner, sparking
another wave of instability between 1981-1986.

The second Milton Obote government 1980 – 1985
During this second period of Obote control, ethnic divisions further resurfaced when,
in order to contain any military threats to his regime, he made sure that his fellow Langi and
Acholi dominated the army (Laruni, 2015). It was also repressive, especially for the people
from the southern part of Uganda as they had not supported him either when he was toppled
by Idi Amin or during the 1980 elections. During Obote’s second presidency the country was
regarded as having one of the worst human rights records in the world: “Obote was able to
create nearly as much havoc as Amin. Obote’s army and political thugs … butchered and
massacred nearly six hundred thousand people, leaving piles of skulls and decomposing bodies
in a part of the country called the Luwero Triangle” (Carson, 2005, p. 4).
Many atrocities were committed by the UNLA which was comprised mainly of people
from Obote’s ethnic group, the Langi. Allen (1991) points out that the second Obote regime
fell apart as a direct result of ethnically-based misunderstandings between the Acholi and Langi,
in particular that two senior Acholi army officers, Bazilio Olala Okello and Tito Okello Lutwa,
were overlooked when Obote appointed a new commander in chief of the army.
As a result, Obote was overthrown in a military coup led by these two officers (7 July
1985) (McDonough, 2008). The ongoing infighting within the army, specifically between the
Acholi and Langi, resulted in a chaotic situation. Yoweri Museveni, a Munyankole from
western Uganda, with his ethnically-based National Resistance Army (NRA) seized the
opportunity and on 26th January 1986 captured power. Museveni formed a government of
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national unity and declared himself the President. Since then, Museveni has dominated
Ugandan politics, introducing many democratic reforms during his early years which
consolidated him in power. These reforms gained him support in the southern part of the
country but not in the north and improved on Uganda’s past human rights record. The conflict
during Obote’s second regime which resulted in Museveni coming to power was played out in
the Luwero Triangle.

The Luwero conflict 1981-1986
The Luwero Triangle conflict between the then-Government army, the Uganda
National Liberation Army (UNLA) and the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M)
lasted from 1981 to 1986 and was mainly fought in Buganda, central Uganda. Bernard (2017)
argues that the government was responding to guerrilla attacks by the NRA on its forces
through violent retaliatory attacks aimed at both stopping NRA forces from capturing
government weapons and forcing them out of the areas they were operating in (Bernard, p.191,
2017).
Prior to his overthrow, then-President Obote called the areas where the NRA/M led by
Museveni operated, along the Luwero, Mityana and Masaka roads, between three major lakes,
Victoria, Albert and Kyoga (the current districts of Luwero, Nakaseke, Mubende, Mityana,
Mpigi and to a lesser extent in Nakasongola and Mukono (see Map 2 below), the Luwero
Triangle. The fighting in this area, often referred to as the NRA Bush War, greatly affected
surrounding areas such as Zirobwe, Buzibwera, Kikyusa and Nakaseke.
The Luwero Triangle also refers to the location of a number of post-conflict
reconstruction programmes in the area. After the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came
to power, they called the area their “political mecca” (Mamdani, 1988). The Uganda Bureau
of Statistics 2011 Report, records that the district constitutes 2,180.9 square kms, with a
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population of approximately 429,000 people. The main ethnic groups in the district are the
Baganda, Balaro (people of Rwandan origin) and Baruli. Other minorities include the Nubians
and Banyole. The economy is mainly crop farming, 86.3%. The adult literacy rate is 82.1
percent and life expectancy is 44 years (Kasfir, 2005).

71

Figure 2. Map of Luwero Triangle. Muhoozi Kainerugaba (2010), Battles of the
Ugandan Resistance; A tradition of Manoeuvre

The main cause of this conflict was the alleged rigging of the 1980 elections. The
Baganda, Banyankole, Banyolo, Batoro, Bakiga, Basoga and other small, southern and western

72
ethnic groups voted overwhelmingly for the opposition Democratic Party (DP). So, when the
results were announced, followed by widespread allegations that the election had not been free
and fair, Museveni and his NRA were forced to go to the bush and fight the government. Many
Ugandans had a feeling that Obote and his UPC party, regained power through elections which
were not free and fair (Kasfir, 2005). This belief gave the NRA a fertile ground, and an
advantage in terms of political climate, to grow and to continue to fight the regime. As a result,
Museveni began his rise to power by waging a guerrilla war in the Triangle.
The civil conflict in the Luwero Triangle took place in an area where the then- President
Milton Obote was extremely unpopular (Kanyinga, Gibbon, Kiondo, & Tidemand, 1994, p.
21). The Baganda ethnic group blamed and resented Obote for forcing their King into exile and
for abolishing the monarchy. They also resented the repressive actions of the army: NRA
members were welcomed when they arrived in the Luwero Triangle area (Brett, 1995b).
Ethnic divisions also helped to flame this conflict (Lindemann, 2011b). The NRM/A
founders from western Uganda were mainly Banyankole, Museveni’s tribe, and dominated the
political and military wings of the movement. Although this civil conflict was fought in
Buganda, an area predominantly inhabited by the Baganda, the largest tribe in Uganda, apart
from a few elites, they did not join the struggle. According to Kasfir “[t]he leaders of the NRA
chose to begin their guerrilla war in the former kingdom of Buganda because the opportunity
to mobilise popular support was greatest there” (2005, p. 282).
When the NRM/A defeated the northern-dominated army in 1986, this group, which
comprised people from the south and western part of Uganda, subsequently became the
backbone of Museveni’s regime. This rebellion, which was led by Museveni, was seen as the
southern ethnic groups fighting against the northern dominated army. People from the northern
part of Uganda saw this change: people who were not supposed to be in the army had taken up
arms, thus altering the status quo set by the colonialists before independence.

73

Consequences of the Luwero conflict
The Luwero conflict was violent and the repercussions were experienced long after the
conflict ended (Gersony, 1997). Mass killings were carried out by the Uganda National
Liberation Army (UNLA), particularly the Special Forces of former President Milton Obote,
who committed many atrocities while fighting the NRA. Bernard (2017) reports “an estimated
50,000–300,000 civilian deaths in this region. At the end of the war, thousands of unidentified
human remains were found in the area in forms of skulls and bones” (Bernard, 2017, p. 188).
Although the rigging of the 1980 elections was the main trigger for Museveni’s rebellion in the
Luwero Triangle, atrocities carried out by the army further undermined the UNLF’s reputation
among civilians, who subsequently brought Museveni to power. For example, the UNLA,
almost 90% of which were Acholi and Langi, brutally murdered civilians in the Luwero
Triangle, leaving many young boys and girls without parents (Bøås, 2004). Commenting on
the violent behaviour of the UNLA, Bernard further argues that “The presence of the UNLA
soldiers and the personal militia of UPC local leaders stationed in these districts, who besides
killing also engaged in looting and more general violence against civilians, led many villagers
to abandon their properties and flee the area” (Bernard, 2017, p. 191). Gersony (1997) describes
one military engagement near the Namugongo Christian shrine, east of Kampala as a “massacre
in which scores of civilians were killed” and reports civilians being “brought into Luwero to
be killed and Acholi soldiers bringing home stolen goods and abducting young girls” (1997, p.
8). Such acts of brutality forced some orphaned children to join the NRA for their safety. As a
result, Museveni’s NRA/M recruited many child soldiers, which had long standing
consequences.
Widespread accusations of human rights abuses by the UNLA when fighting the
guerrillas (NRA) resulted in the NRA receiving more support from affected people. The
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frustration of the Obote government in failing to defeat the NRA militarily, and the
incompetence with which the counter-guerrilla war was waged, produced a crisis in the
government. The immediate cause was the death of the Chief of Staff, Brigadier Oyite Ojok in
1983. According to Brett, “senior Acholi officers not promoted [including Tito Okello and
Bazilio who initiated the Acholi backed coup which ousted Obote] after the death of Oyite
Ojok in 1983 were excluded by Obote again in 1985 after heavy fighting between Langi and
Acholi soldiers” (1995b, pp. 143-144). The infighting between Acholi and Langi ethnic groups
which Obote’s second regime relied on, ended in a coup which was led by two Acholi military
officers Bazilio Okello and Tito Okello (Lindemann, 2011b).

The Okello coup 1985
In July 1985, a faction of the UNLA dominated by officers from the Acholi ethnic group,
in a concerted effort, and in conjunction with ex-Amin soldiers (the so-called Former Uganda
National Army-FUNA), retreated to southern Sudan, to a place called Owiny Kibul, where they
planned their coup to overthrow President Obote. As a result, the mutineers ousted Obote and
installed Tito Okello as president on July 27, 1985.
The new government of General Tito Okello Lutwa pledged to reconcile the nation and
offered to talk to Museveni and the leadership of the NRA. Peace talks took place in Nairobi
chaired by the then-President of Kenya Daniel Arap Moi. After a few months, the Nairobi
Peace Accord was reached, but fighting continued until the NRA defeated the Okello regime
militarily (Nabudere, 1986). The situation in Kampala before the NRA took over was
characterized by anarchy. Different armed factions controlled different zones. Brett (1995b)
argues that the NRA used the situation as an excuse to disregard the Nairobi Peace Accord.
They took over the capital, Kampala, with ease and formed the government headed by
Museveni in January 1986.
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The NRA defeated the UNLA and ended the northerners’ domination in Ugandan
politics. However, the new situation set the scene for yet more conflicts between north and
south whereby northerners, through different armed rebellions, tried to regain power. Brett
(1995) establishes that “the [NRA] victory of 1986 was seen as one of south over north, and
thus created the prospect ‘of discrimination, neglect and marginalisation’ for northerners”
(1995b, p. 145). Nonetheless, Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti have argued more recently, the
northern rebel movements continue, comprised for the most part of former Ugandan army
personnel, often Acholi (Rohner et al., 2013, pp. 223-224).

Museveni’s regime 1986 to the present
President Museveni came to power as a result of waging a five-year guerrilla war,
popularly known as the Luwero Triangle conflict, against President Milton Obote whom he
accused of carrying out election malpractices (Uganda: Reconstruction: Politics, economics,
2004). When Museveni came to power, he promised a fundamental change in Uganda’s politics.
Initially he was greeted with jubilation, mainly by the people from the southern part of Uganda
and was seen as a saviour from the brutal forces of the northerners. As a reminder to the people
about the past regimes’ atrocities, Museveni had built large wooden tables with woven reed
tops, which were positioned along major roads throughout Luwero Triangle, in places such as
Matuga, Nakaseke, Namulonge and Kakoge: On these were displayed the skulls and bones of
people who had died as a result of northern brutality (Bernard, 2017). My memory is that these
bones stayed three to four years, before a formal memorial was built, a constant reminder to
the whole population.
Peterson (2016) argues that when Museveni came to power, he and the NRM leaders
were full of zeal. They aimed to rid Uganda of the excesses of the Obote government by ending
corruption and promoting democracy and ethnic cooperation. Peterson further points out that

76
when Museveni’s “cadres fairly overflowed with millenarian energy and reformist zeal. They
set out to transform Uganda’s public life, purge superstition, put an end to ethnic division, and
promote local democracy” (Peterson, 2016a, p. 271). Museveni brought different fighting
groups together and established a broad-based government, though dominated by people from
the south. However, Khisa (2016) questions this, arguing that “Museveni worked on
legitimating his rule domestically by reaching out to the different shades of the extant political
class, thus able to hide the iron-fist of the NRA behind the velvet glove of broad-base” (Khisa,
2016, p. 733).
Since that time, Museveni has won successive elections in 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and
2016. The first ten years saw stability and development mainly in the southern and western
regions of the country and internationally, President Museveni was hailed as part of Africa’s
‘new breed’ of leaders for his ability to create stability in Uganda and achieve both political
liberalization and economic growth, and was attributed with having established peace in central
and western Uganda and bringing about improvements that boosted the economic
circumstances of many in the south of Uganda (Rubongoya, 2007).
However, in order to expedite the recovery process, Museveni banned all political party
activities. He introduced what he referred to as the Movement system, which was based on the
principles of participatory democracy, similar to the system in use in socialist Tanzania. As
Carbone (2003) establishes, banning political parties was normalised, “articulated by the NRM
leadership as a reaction to a post-independence history of sectarian and ethnically based
political parties, the alleged cause of sequential patterns of ethnic exclusion, political violence
and chronic instability” (2003, p. 486). Yet while for some the Movement system, which was
used for ten years, was not democratic (Tripp, 2004) for others it was the best solution to
Uganda’s problems (Makara, Rakner, & Svåsand, 2009). One such widely-approved of major
development of the system was the creation of Resistance Councils (RCs), which elected local
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leaders from various levels such as the Village, Parish, Sub County and District (Makara et al.,
2009).
At the beginning of the NRM government, Museveni promised fundamental changes
for the benefit of the country. However, he inherited a country which still had a colonial
mentality, and his efforts to rebuild the country were bogged down by its postcolonial
inheritance (Petersen & Espeland, 2010). To ensure political survival Uganda’s political
leaders have continually relied on the armed forces to keep the civilian population in check
(Petersen & Espeland, 2010). Although Museveni’s rise to power was at first welcomed in the
west and south of the country, people from the north were not happy from the start. The
overthrow of the Obote and Okello regimes meant that some northerners lost positions in the
army, ministerial positions, ambassadorships, and control of semi-state bodies, potentially a
challenging situation given the ethnic implications. This continued the practices inherited from
the British colonialists, a use of ethnicity in Uganda’s politics that Okuku argues “is …
intimately linked to political and economic conditions, especially the unequal distribution of
and competition for power and wealth” (2002, p. 2). It is not surprising then that as people from
northern Uganda felt increasingly marginalized, ethnic tensions rose again, which subsequently
led to the rise of rebel groups like the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA), drawing on the belief of people from northern Uganda that “they are the bornwarrior Acholi in whose hands the leadership of the country must always rest” (Mutibwa, 1987).
During the first ten years of Museveni’s rule, characterized by sustained economic and
social growth, the regime received enormous financial support from international institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) (Stewart & Sullivan,
1998) which helped the government to finance its development programmes. Commenting on
Uganda’s progress during this period, Hickey (2005) points out that Uganda “has led observers
to laud the Government of Uganda’s ‘‘ownership’’ of the poverty reduction agenda, creating
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the impression that Uganda offers a showcase for the type of politics that can underpin propoor policy reforms” (2005, p. 995). During that decade, Uganda was referred to as a model of
development by international institutions. From 1990-94, for example, economic growth was
at 5.6 per cent per annum. However, although the country was praised internationally for
implementing conditions of major financial institutions as a means to implement its
development programmes, conditions for many Ugandans, especially those in northern Uganda,
were not good. It was obvious to those of us working in the field that many were suffering
because of unemployment, increased nepotism and widespread corruption (Izama & Wilkerson,
2011). Indeed this was also becoming evident to external observers: as Atkinson suggests,
during this period Uganda became “essentially two separate countries: one included the
peaceful and relatively prosperous western, southern, and central parts of Uganda, with a
growing economy that has won Museveni much praise from the World Bank, IMF and other
donors (including the US): the other was a war-torn, impoverished, isolated North” (Atkinson,
2009, p. 10).
Another major reform during Museveni’s early rule, was that a broad-based
government was put in place, which incorporated people from all over Uganda, representing
all political parties in key political positions. This was followed by a gradual restoration of civil
society including the legal and educational systems. Although there was relative stability
during the first ten years of Museveni’s rule, his efforts and policies aimed at rebuilding the
country did not please some sections of the Ugandan population. The NRM government tried
to incorporate people who had different political views, however, politically it was difficult to
sustain them all, especially the extremists (Makara, Rakner, and Svåsand, 2009, p. 190). At
the same time, the promotion of the Movement system of administration and the suspension of
all political parties’ activities in 1986, which was seen by some as an act of suppressing all
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forms of political opinion, led many rebels to surface and start fighting the regime (Makara et
al., 2009, p. 190).
Museveni’s prolonged stay in power has increasingly become a concern to many
Ugandans. During his reign, he has changed the Constitution to allow himself to re-stand for
presidency by removing the presidential term limit clauses (Petersen & Espeland, 2010), and
has re-introduced multi-party elections, which so far work in his favour because he is still
(2019) President. In addition to these tactics, Khisa (2016) points out that in an effort to secure
his longevity in political power, Museveni was astute enough to put aside his socialist agenda
and replace it with more neoliberal values (2016, p.733). In addition, coercive measures by
using the police and different security organizations, presidential manipulation and election
rigging, have assisted to secure his hold on power (Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). In the same way,
Khisa argues that he “has combined the use of patronage resources with coercion and informal
socio-political networks. A combination of these three factors serves to entrench a regime of
rewards and punishment which regulates and directs political behaviour, especially
constraining defection” (2016, p.730). In an effort by opposition members to defeat Museveni
through elections, they tried to form coalitions, for example, in the 2016 elections. However,
they have been unsuccessful: as Beardsworth argues, “The motivations for building coalitions
in Uganda are clear – in a context where political party activities were restricted for more than
two decades, even the oldest and most established opposition parties are weak, fragmented and
severely under-resourced” (2016 p 752,). It is difficult to defeat incumbent leaders even when
people demand change.
The legality of elections has been repeatedly challenged by civil society organisations
and opposition parties which have continued to complain about the increased narrowing of
democratic space through the introduction of parliamentary bills which hinder freedom of
speech and encourage nepotism. Critics also complain of widespread abuse of human rights
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and corruption, especially by the security agencies. Tangri and Mwenda (2008) point out that
“[t]he limited extent of accountability and transparency in the defence budget and procurement
practices created abundant opportunities for corruption by government and army leaders,
providing a financially lucrative means of rewarding them in order to retain their loyalty” (2008,
p. 184). Such actions have fuelled various threats to the human security of the people
specifically in northern Uganda. In particular, Tangri and Mwenda (2010) show that Museveni
secured and maintained his power by using military force to silence his opponents (Tangri &
Mwenda, 2010). Musisi, writing for the Monitor newspaper cites a statement by the former
UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, after the 2016 general elections in Uganda, in which he
states that “The European Union and Commonwealth observer groups, found the election was
unfair, that there was “voter intimidation [by the government], a biased Electoral Commission,
incidents of violence and harassment of Opposition politicians” (Fredrick, 2016).
Although Museveni promised to tackle all forms of inequality and to abide by the
principles of good governance when he came to power in 1986, up to the present he has failed
to implement these changes. Nepotism and the favouring of particular elites are widespread in
Uganda’s political system and structures: Lindemann (2011b) establishes that top Army
positions and senior cabinet members are all from the President’s ethnic group and some from
his own family: his son is the head of the Presidential Guard Brigade and, in August 2016, his
wife became Minister of Education. Critical description of Museveni’s regime is frequent.
Goloba-Mutebi and Hickey (2013), for example show that it is “characterised by deepening
levels of competitive clientelism, highly personalised forms of public bureaucracy, collusive
state–business relations, and a ruling coalition that is (expensively) inclusive at the lower levels
while becoming narrower and more nepotistic at the pinnacle” (2013, p. 3), and Mwenda and
Tangri (2005) suggest that political appointments in Uganda, are often “political sinecures” …
in the hands of ethnic kinsmen of the political leadership” (2005, p. 459).
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Museveni’s rule has however effectively been limited by armed rebellions based in
northern Uganda including by the Holy Spirit Movement, the Uganda People’s Democratic
Army (UPDA), the Uganda National Rescue Front, and the People’s Redemption Army. These
groups will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
The emergence of rebel groups relates directly to the Luwero Triangle conflict. In
September 1986 child soldiers, popularly known as Kadogo (young fighters), who joined
Museveni’s rebellion (1980-86), were sent to conquer the remnants of the UNLA in the
northern part of Uganda. These Kadogos went on revenge missions, murdering, torturing and
raping for what the UNLA had done to them in the Luwero Triangle (Bøås, 2004). The defeated
UNLA soldiers, who comprised many Acholis, “were promptly implicated in the deaths of
thousands of civilians in the south and west, during the war against Museveni and the NRA”
(Jackson, 2002, pp. 29-30). Because of these revenge missions, the remnants of the UNLA
mobilized themselves and formed a fighting force called the Uganda People’s Defence Army
(UPDA) to fight this mistreatment and also regain power. The formation of the UPDA can be
seen as a direct consequence of the revenge missions carried out by child soldiers in 1986.
With their key leaders either dead, exiled or in disarray, the remnants of the UNLA fled
to southern Sudan: the Acholis in southern Sudan are related to the Acholis of northern Uganda,
only separated by the international borders drawn by the Berlin Conference of 1894. In August
1986 these soldiers, who had by then re-formed into groups, attacked Museveni’s forces, giving
as their reason gross human rights abuses by the victorious NRA. They also accused Museveni
of deceit and failing to honour the Nairobi Peace Agreement.
Armed resistance in northern Uganda began in 1986, when the National Resistance
Army/Movement (NRA/NRM) Government came to power (Branch, 2007b) but the formation
of so many different rebel groups is one of the most disturbing factors of Museveni’s regime.
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In terms of development, there continue to be significant differences between the
regions of Uganda. Leibig (2005) shows that although during Museveni’s rule Uganda has been
relatively stable, the northern region of the country near Sudan have not enjoyed the same
levels of economic development experienced by the regions in the south and centre of the
country. In addition, unemployment especially among the youth is high: “young people in
Uganda are disproportionately affected by high unemployment rates, which [in 2006 were] 76
per cent for males and 72 per cent for females in the 15-19 years group and 92 per cent for
males and 77 per cent for females for the 20-24 years age group” (2007, pp. 14-15).
Museveni has been attacked by both opponents and former allies. His opponents argued
that the increasing narrowing of political space has affected democratic processes and benefited
only his ethnic group members. Former allies have complained about the lack of leadership
turnover and internal democratic space within his political party. And from an international
perspective, writing about Museveni in 2005, former US ambassador to Uganda, Johnnie
Carson, warned that “much of what he has accomplished is in serious risk of stalling, faltering
and possibly opening the door to another dark and negative period in Uganda’s turbulent
history”. Opposition members have been harshly treated and arrested and sometimes charged
with treason. However, the judiciary remains independent, and such cases have not been
successful. In addition, Museveni’s regime has been characterized by the use of the police and
army to silence his critics (Murray, Mesfin, & Wolters, 2016). But further, Museveni has
systematically used the classic political strategy of favours for his supporters, using the
extreme economic hardship sections of the population have faced, to persuade and even coerce
them to support the government, the only means of gaining access to various opportunities,
such as jobs and influence (Tapscott, 2018).
From the onset of his rule, because of colonial legacies, loss of power and jobs by the
people from northern Uganda, ethnically-based rebel groups began to oppose the government.
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The first was the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) which was basically a coalition
of the remnants of the UNLF Acholi group from the north. However, in 1998 the UPDA and
Museveni signed a peace agreement and many UPDA joined the NRA, while others were given
political posts and were absorbed into the ruling government. Other rebel groups were the
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) a Muslim group led by Jamil Mukulu, who was arrested in
2015 in Tanzania and extradited to Uganda. The group is still operating in the western part of
Uganda in the Districts of Bundibugyo and Kasese but is based in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. The Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) was another rebel group composed of
former Idi Amin soldiers. It was headed by Brigadier Moses Ali, however, when Moses Ali
agreed to join the government, UNRF II was formed and led by Ali Bamuze. The group
operated in the north-west Nile part of Uganda. Other minor groups included Force Obote Back
(FOBA) led by Obote, David Anyoti and others: Ninth October Movement (NOM),
KIRIMUTTU- a group mainly in Buganda fighting for a federal government; the Federal
Democratic Army (FDA); the People’s Redemption Army (PRA); and the Uganda Salvation
Army (USA) led by Sera Muwanga based in the eastern part of Uganda Tororo District.
Another group, based in west Nile, and headed by Juma Oris, had an insignificant effect on
security because it did not last long. All the groups recorded here had a negligible impact and
vanished quickly (Lindemann, 2011b).
However, there was one notable rebel group in northern Uganda’s resistance against
Museveni’s regime: the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) led by Alice Lakwena (Cline, 2003).
The significance of this group is explored next as it led to the rise of the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) which was responsible for the carnage which occurred in northern Uganda in the
years between 1988 and 2006 (Cline, 2003).
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Alice Lakwena rebellion 1986-87
Alice Lakwena was born in 1956 and named Alice Auma: she later added the name of
Lakwena which means “she was a messenger” in Acholi dialect. Alice Auma Lakwena, a
member of the Acholi ethnolinguistic group, was the first woman rebel leader to wage a
rebellion against Museveni’s forces in northern Uganda. On 6th August 1986, she formed the
Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). Amone argues that the Holy Spirit Movement was just one of
a number of actively-rebellious groups challenging the National Resistance Movement (NRM)
at that time: (Amone, 2014b). Lakwena claimed that she was fighting evil and would end the
bloodshed being experienced by the Acholi people, which she said was being perpetrated by
NRA fighters. However, the only weapons her rebel fighters had were songs, sticks, stones and
‘magic’ shea butter nut oil or honey. Lakwena also claimed she was possessed by a powerful
warrior spirit and promised her fighters invulnerability to bullets (Amone, 2014b). Allen
reports that she “became a significant figure towards the end of 1986. On 23 September, she
and her followers were given guns in Kitgum District by a former UNLA commander, and in
October a group of about twenty men marched into Gulu town, singing hymns, led by a man
waving a Bible” (1991, pp. 371-372)
Directly linking politics and spirituality, Lakwena told her followers that she was sent
by God in order to purify Uganda and restore Acholi glory. Her emergence caught everyone
by surprise and, although she was illiterate, this did not deter her from leading a rebellion of
mainly men. She developed the so called ‘Holy Spirit Tactics’, by which she led her followers
to believe that through initiation, purification and ritual they could become “invulnerable and
that other magical benefits were theirs to use, including the ability to turn stones into grenades
and bees into allies” (Kasfir, 2005; Vinci, 2005, p. 365). Her support was mainly from the
Acholi and her troops reached to within sixty miles of the capital, Kampala (Amone-P'Olak,
2007).
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Haynes describes Alice’s movement as “a social response to serious upheaval and
external attack in a situation where the state was unable either to establish an effective
administrative structure or to offer significant economic development for the impoverished
Acholi” (2007, p. 310). But, as could be expected, the HSM’s weapons were no match for the
conventional war weapons of the Ugandan army (Jackson, 2002).
After her defeat, Alice fled to Kenya and died on 17th January 2007 at a refugee camp
near Dadaab in northern Kenya (Amone, 2014b). Her exile left the movement with no clear
leadership. However, Joseph Kony, who is claimed to be Lakwena’s nephew (Apuuli, 2004),
seized the leadership and in 1988 rebranded the movement, as the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA). At the beginning, Kony indicated that the LRA’s operations were intended to take over
the government and rule Uganda centered on the Ten Commandments. He quickly lost backing
from the local people, however, and in frustration, started abducting thousands of children to
replenish the group’s ranks, converting the children into killers and releasing them on villages
(Chatlani, 2006). Kony led the lengthiest and bloodstained rebellion in Uganda’s postindependence history. This group will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

Human security and the conflicts in Uganda
Since Independence, Uganda’s politics have been marred by violence, despite various
leaders’ efforts to develop a stable country. Commenting on this turbulence in Uganda, Brett
points out that
conflicts in political and military systems were articulated mainly in
ethnic terms, and this, combined with a refusal to accept the outcome
of democratic processes, led to the destruction of Uganda's
constitutional settlement of 1962, and the emergence of the military as
a political force (1995b, p. 134).
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All attempts to secure people’s security as mandated by the human security approach
have been foiled by either internal or external security threats. Past and present Ugandan
leaders have equated security with their regime’s security in order to safeguard themselves in
power rather than promoting the security of all Ugandans. Some of the political decisions made
by these leaders, indicated above, such as changing presidential term limits in the Constitution,
the promotion of an ethnically-based army and nepotism, have led to disagreements with other
politicians, and more general discontent, resulting in numerous conflicts erupting in various
parts of the country. Force of arms was both the means by which the current government came
to power and the means by which it has retained it.
I argue that the absence of people-centred approaches to protect all Ugandans
irrespective of their ethnic background has led the country into various civil and political
conflicts which have affected Ugandans’ security. The human security approach emphasises
the need to respond to people’s needs in case of any threat to their wellbeing. In Uganda, the
colonial system of administration, which was based on divide and rule, led to unbalanced
regional development. Since Independence subsequent regimes have failed to address this
issue. Failure to address this disparity has led to hatred between different ethnic groups. The
resulting effect has been numerous rebellions and brutal conflicts which have affected the wellbeing of much of the Ugandan population since independence.
An essential component of the human security approach involves instituting appropriate,
comprehensive, multi-sectoral and collaborative programmes aimed at protecting people.
However, in the post-colonial period in Uganda between 1970 and 1985, development
activities aimed at protecting Ugandans were minimal. Under Museveni, this changed but only
in the south and west of the country. Moreover, there is still lack of freedom of speech, little
educational opportunity and few opportunities for women’s empowerment in rural areas. These
are all obstacles to effective development and have greatly contributed to the country’s lack of
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progress. In a potent summary of the situation, Stephen (1991) argues that the political
uncertainties, neglect of duty, corruption in government structures and civilian unrest, which
are rampant in Uganda today, affect the legitimacy of the government and enable dishonest
practices to thrive in the public service sector, civil service and other government agencies.
In addition, Uganda’s security forces, especially the police’s use of coercive measures
and techniques against citizens, especially opposition members, have severely affected many
people’s livelihood and individual security. Ugandan leaders have used the excuse that their
opponents are engaging in or financing subversive activities against the government as a pretext
to violate their human rights. (2013) The police almost always stop opposition political rallies
and arrest, torture and sometimes kill participants (Byaruhanga, 2013). This has led many to
live in a state of fear, unable to achieve what they want, which is against the principles of a
human security approach.
The human security approach contextualises and emphasises the wellbeing of people
within their communities. However, since Independence, the level of corruption among
Uganda’s ruling class has affected the entire government’s administrative systems with diverse
consequences for the wellbeing of the majority of Ugandans. For the elites, personal rather than
country interests have overshadowed the provision of security for other citizens. As discussed
above, leaders have catered to their relatives first, then their ethnic group, who are then able to
dominate the administration of key ministries. The lack of human security for many Ugandans
shows a picture of people struggling to cope within the system. The general lack of concern by
various government regimes to address these issues has affected people’s security in the
country as a whole.
In terms of entrepreneurship and individual advancement as stressed by the human
security approach, it is only those who have had strong connections to the ruling elites who
have been able to carry on successful businesses. This bias has continued during Museveni’s
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regime. Although Uganda has made steady progress on poverty reduction since 1986, these
gains have not been experienced evenly, with northern and eastern parts of the country badly
off and western and central regions relatively well off. Such disparities mean that many
Ugandans experience a lack of security and wellbeing. President Museveni’s long term and
continuing regime has shown a heightened form of nepotism and a lack of security concern for
the people in northern Uganda. Thus, his policies and attitude towards northern Uganda need
to be addressed.
Other regimes also neglected to protect Ugandan citizens from threats. Thus, politically
motivated torture and killings perpetrated by government security agents undermined people’s
security. Commenting on the security situation since Uganda became independent, Kirunda
argues that “[d]uring these regimes, security of neither person nor property was guaranteed,
but was threatened by the state and its agencies. The most notorious proponent of violations
was the army” (2008, p. 3). The human security approach enables the devising of means to
address the various threats to people within their communities. However, Wordofa (2004)
shows that in Uganda, the various regimes have failed to address problems related to increasing
high unemployment due to increases in population, poor education specifically in rural areas,
poor health services and decaying urban infrastructure due to rural-urban migration.
Human security emphasises individuals taking on a role within their communities in
tackling conflicts. The advantages of involving individuals within their own localities are better
assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation of security and peace building initiatives
for those involved, since they know their needs and wants better than government officials in
towns or international NGOs. In the mid-2000s, Branch observed that peace was unlikely
“[w]ithout local participatory institutions and the development of relations of accountability
between the rural population and the central government mediated by a national Acholi
political elite” (2005, p. 12), yet almost fifteen years later, such recommendations remain
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dreams in northern Uganda, where the government did not involve the people or consult them
on how to stop the conflict and end their suffering.
The human security challenges which have engulfed Uganda since Independence,
necessitate a broad historical understanding of Uganda’s political setup. Viable
mechanisms aimed at protecting people from serious threats such as those emanating from
ethnic related conflicts and crimes committed by army officers were missing as were programs
addressing people’s lack of empowerment. To promote peace in Uganda, leaders needed to
change their leadership styles. There was a need to identify the disenfranchised, promote good
governance and empower the people. Dealing with such issues as advocated by the human
security approach, could have promoted peace and stability. As discussed above, various
regimes used coercive and brutal means against Ugandans to force order and maintain the status
quo. Such actions cannot promote human security. The focus should be to address people’s
basic concerns. Addressing these concerns was the only political option to promote human
security. As will be discussed in the next chapter, these deficiencies contributed to the brutal
conflict in northern Uganda which lasted for more than two decades.

Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the colonial legacy led to the future political instabilities
which engulfed the country.

The major leaders since Independence, Obote, Amin and

Museveni, have been discussed and their failures to unite the country exposed. The Luwero
Triangle civil conflict, which subsequently led to Museveni’s rise to power, provided a
background for the rise of various rebel groups, specifically the LRA, which up to the time of
writing has not been defeated, although its operations in northern Uganda have ceased. The
chapter has emphasized the argument that the politicization of ethnic and socio-economic
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divisions was a basis for disunity among Ugandans and contributed greatly to the northern
Uganda conflict. The next chapter discusses the civil conflict in northern Uganda.

91
Chapter Four
The causes of the civil war in northern Uganda and the reasons for its longevity

Introduction
This chapter discusses the causes of the civil conflict in northern Uganda which lasted
more than two decades. The chapter examines the reasons for the emergence of different rebel
groups specifically the LRA whose actions caused anarchy in the region. It contributes to
answering the central research question of the thesis by exploring the ways key stakeholders
understood people centred principles, through the different perspectives on human security
principles explored in this thesis, and how those differences contributed to the ineffective
implementation of those principles in the period 1988-2016. It also examines the ways NGOs
attempted to use these approaches to address the ethnically-based, harsh, socio-economic
conditions in the north.
As in the previous chapter, this chapter argues that the failure to address the politicallybased ethnic and socio-economic divisions was a major contribution to the causes and longevity
of the conflict in northern Uganda. The humanitarian and security crisis which followed saw
many local and international humanitarian organizations moving in to assist civilians affected
by the atrocities committed by the LRA. However, as I argue, these interventions were not
always advantageous to the people in northern Uganda.
The reasons behind the emergence of the LRA will be scrutinized, and the social,
political and economic situation will be discussed, as will the local, national, regional and
international peace building and conflict resolution interventions which took place in northern
Uganda. A human security approach will be used to explain how human insecurities in northern
communities contributed to the conflict which started in 1988 and did not end until 2006. The
application of the human security concept in this research tests the concept’s relevance in a
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conflict situation. Since being used in 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994), it has
raised debates among scholars, policy makers, humanitarian agencies, human rights and peace
activists as to whether its component practices are a feasible strategy to alleviate the human
suffering occurring in various parts of the world (Christie, 2010). Despite limited success
during the conflict their applicability was nonetheless evident, for example, in the setting up of
health and educational services, the provision of temporary housing facilities and the
construction of boreholes in IDP camps. This suggests that the approaches used by INGOs and
local NGOs in northern Uganda were an important corrective to state security as the
government lacked the capacity to handle the situation unilaterally.
When discussing the different armed resistance groups in northern Uganda from 19862006, the previous chapter revealed a picture of anarchy and crisis which affected many
innocent people in the region. The various fighting groups, including the Uganda People’s
Democratic Army (UPDA), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), and the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA), devastated the region by staging armed resistance against the Museveni
government. However, as discussed below, government forces also committed atrocities
against the people they were supposed to protect, which contributed to a virtual lack of security
for many northern Ugandans for more than two decades.
From the time Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) government came
to power in 1986 until 2006, northern Uganda experienced a deadly civil conflict during which
the security of civilians was compromised. This 20-year period of unrest resulted in a
humanitarian crisis during which many people were killed either by the rebels or Uganda’s
military, or left homeless and displaced. Others, especially children, were abducted (Human
Rights Report, 2005; Dagne, 2011). The government of Uganda responded to this civil unrest
with military and non-military means. Ten years after the ending of the conflict (2016) the main
rebel group, the LRA, had still not been defeated but had moved out of northern Uganda into

93
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic
(CAR).
During the initial period of the insurgency, the LRA were able to sustain their fight
because of their tactics and also because they received logistical support from Sudan (as will
be shown below). This conflict, as described by Pham, Vinck, Wierda, and Stover, was
responsible for the destruction of “any semblance of ordinary life in the northern districts”
(2005). It represented a new type of warfare where civilians were frequently the main targets
of vicious attacks seriously compromising their security.
Direct confrontation in northern Uganda between the LRA and the Ugandan
government forces known as the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) stopped in 2006
when representatives of the LRA and government of Uganda officials signed the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement in Juba, South Sudan, following peace talks there. The genesis of these
talks and their implications for the conflict in northern Uganda are discussed in more detail in
chapter six.

The causes of the conflict
The most enduring conflict suffered by Ugandans was that between the government of
Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The politically-based ethnic and socioeconomic problems created by the legacy of the colonial administration and the degree to which
they were politicized by different rebel groups, specifically the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),
partially caused the northern Uganda conflict (Nannyonjo, 2005; Otunnu, 2002; Tindigarukayo,
1988). However, there were other contributing factors, the main trigger being the military coup
by General Tito Okello and the ensuing military oppression. In response, as analysed above,
the National Resistance Army (NRA), led by Yoweri Museveni, engaged in a fierce offensive
in the Luwero Triangle and finally forced the Acholi militants to flee further north (Baines,
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2007). This was followed by revenge missions in northern Uganda undertaken by some NRA
soldiers for the brutal acts perpetrated by the UNLF soldiers during the Luwero Triangle
conflict. These and other activities in turn led to the emergence of subsequent rebel groups
which in turn led to the emergence of the LRA. As a result, trauma, excessive violation of
human rights, displacement and other forms of suffering by innocent civilians became
characteristic of the conflict in northern Uganda between 1986-2006.
The discussion below examines how Uganda’s politically-based ethnic and socioeconomic divisions contributed to prolonging the conflict in the north. As pointed out in chapter
one, an historical perspective indicates that inter-ethnic conflicts had their origins prior to
colonisation. However, they were exacerbated by the British, and after Independence in 1962,
begun to increase in intensity even before 1986 when Museveni came to power. This was partly
because successive leaders since Independence prioritized their own hold on power and failed
to address the subsequent social, political and economic issues which divided Ugandans (Van
Acker, 2004).
Those who taste power become more hungry for power: or so, it seemed to me and my
colleagues, humanitarian workers were doing a balancing act between the powerful and the
powerless. While to those of us on the ground during this period, this was a classic struggle for
power between two rival groups played out in an environment in which external actors could
have excessive influence, scholars differ on the causes of the conflict in northern Uganda which
began in 1986. Doom and Vlassenroot (1999) attribute the conflict to divisions between the
north and south of Uganda pointing out the most marked division in the recruitment of the
military from the north and civil servants from the south (1999, pp. 7-8). Van Acker (2004)
stresses the lack of political stability in Uganda in the mid-1980s, while for Jackson (2002) it
was the uneven socio-economic factors between the north and the south which he says “fuelled
continuous ethnic violence” (2002, p. 29). Similarly, Khadiagala (2001) argues that LRA
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leaders used the lack of educational, health and communication facilities including uneven
social-economic development between northern and southern Uganda as reasons to fight
(Laruni, 2015). Apuuli cites a different reason, arguing that the northerners were were doing
no more than trying to win back the control they had had until January 1986 (2004, p. 392).
Finnström (2006) supports Apuuli’s view of the northerners wanting to regain power.
Finnström sums up the range of opinions: “The causes and consequences of the war in northern
Uganda, the reasons for it, and facts about it… differ, depending on whom you are listening to”
(2008, p. 8). In political terms, although specifically not referring to the northern Uganda
situation, Talentino (2004) offers clues to the causes of the conflict when he argues that “when
a unifying and legitimate state structure is absent, group identifications will remain strong and
counteract internal efforts at nation-building” (2004, p. 557). In the same way, Laruni shows
that Acholi power brokers used the poor economic situation in the north both to exacerbate the
existing north, south tensions and to negotiate with the government for a better political and
economic deal (Laruni, 2015).
While scholars differ on the causes of the civil war, government of Uganda officials
described it as a conflict without a cause and referred to the LRA as a group of bandits (Baines,
2010) and, at times, as terrorists (Apuuli, 2004). However, as with my own observation (above),
Bøås and Jennings (2008) point out an international dimension of the conflict. They argue that
there was an international dimension to the conflict with the LRA, citing it as an off-shoot of
the ongoing enmity between the governments of Sudan and Uganda (Bøås & Jennings, 2008).
Similarly, Apuuli (2011) contends that a thorough understanding of the armed struggle in
northern Uganda requires an examination of both its structural and immediate causes (Apuuli,
2011). A critical analysis of the history of Ugandan politics and the formation of the LRA,
which at first received support from the Acholi, indicates that it is not possible to conclude
simplistically, as the government did, that this conflict was without a cause (Otunnu, 2002),
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the socio-economic and political conditions in the north initially helped the LRA in their
struggle because people in the north wanted to improve their situation.
Although the UNLA was mainly composed of Acholi and Langi from northern Uganda,
misunderstandings and a power struggle between the two groups within the military, led the
Acholi to overthrow the Langi-dominated government. The coup (May 1985) was carried out
by General Tito Okello (an Acholi), to oust the Langi Milton Obote (a Langi), Milton Obote’s
regime from power. This can also be seen as another cause of the conflict. Mamdani (1988)
argues that the Okello coup led to the emergence of various independent armed factions each
of which controlled a specific territory. The army was weakened which gave an added
advantage to the LRA, and subsequently allowed Museveni to capture power in January 1986.
The British legacy of ‘divide and rule’, especially as it was manifested in the ethnic
conflict between north and south, was perpetuated by subsequent regimes since Independence
(Kisekka-Ntale, 2007). For example, none of the subsequent leaders tried to form a Ugandan
national army or police force comprised of individuals from all ethnic groups (Nannyonjo,
2005). Rather, since independence the army’s formation has corresponded to the leader’s ethnic
group. The different perspectives which were held by the colonial and post-colonial leaders
undermined Uganda’s future stability. Talentino (2004) explores this colonial legacy when he
shows that “while international actors define nation-building as a top-down strategy aimed at
developing structures of political and economic governance, internal actors emphasise bottomup processes designed to bridge societal divisions and demonstrate the tangible benefits of
cooperation” (2004, p. 558). In addition, the uneven development between the north and south
of Uganda can also be viewed as another cause of the conflict. Citing the Uganda Bureau of
Statistics 2010 figures, Mabikke states that, “in absolute terms, the persons living in poverty
[in northern Uganda] increased from 2.9 million in 2002/03 to 3.3 million in 2005/06” (2011,
p. 1). Although the issue of unbalanced development has been raised by numerous writers such
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as Nyadru (1988); International Crisis Group (2004); Allen (2006); Refugee Law Project
(2004); Okot (1989); Otunnu (2002) as one of the causes of the conflict, I argue that it should
be remembered that the northerners were in control of government resources for over twenty
years before Museveni came to power. However, while in power they, like others before him,
did nothing to develop the northern region.
The lack of sustainable democratic state building since Independence by various
regimes is another cause of the conflict in northern Uganda. Talentino (2004) although not
specifically referring to northern Uganda situation, argues that political intervention is usually
needed to address situations where there is a need for integration of divisive groups and greater
social cohesion (Talentino, 2004). State building involves the formation of new government
institutions and the consolidation of existing ones. However, in Uganda neither occurred. Yet,
good state building is fundamental to protecting people’s human security (Tripp, 2004), and
security issues associated with failed states include poverty, terrorism and internal conflicts
(Krasner, 2004). Beswick and Marquette recognise the difficulty of bringing about change: “In
states that have experienced conflict and instability, state builders often face the task of
establishing and supporting functioning state institutions, necessary to extend some semblance
of control over the national territory and to gain support for the state-building project from
actors who ideally represent the will and interests of citizens” (Beswick & Marquette, 2011,
p. 5).
Acholi moderates and Acholi LRA sympathizers differed in their opinions about how
to end the conflict. The moderates included local people who were suffering in camps, church
leaders, some local politicians and traditional leaders. In contrast, according to people with
whom I talked in camps such as Pabbo, Acet, Lacor, Pader Town Council and Opit camps,
LRA sympathizers were out of touch with the situation as they were mainly prominent
politicians who lived in the diaspora so not experiencing the hardship the people were going
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through. The overthrow of the Obote and Okello regimes resulted in some Acholi and Langi
from northern Uganda, mainly LRA sympathizers, going into exile for their own safety.
Commenting on these expatriates, Odoi-Tanga, shows that the group was regarded as “Acholi
political elites [wanting] to change the political leadership in Uganda, not through the ballot
but the gun” (2009, p. 183). In contrast, politicians who remained in Uganda tended to be more
moderate and took a conciliatory approach to the LRA, at times arguing for a peaceful end to
the conflict. Despite the view of these moderates, Finnström (2003) and Allen (2003) argue
that the brutal nature of the LRA failed to gather any support from local non-politically
motivated Acholis, particularly because the LRA sympathizers inflicted a reign of terror on
their fellow Acholi, whom Kony called traitors because they failed to support him.
Van Acker (2004) suggests “that at the core of the conflict was the failure of
consecutive Ugandan leaders to construct and consolidate a modern state that legitimize[d] and
promote[d] collective aspirations” (2004, p. 336). This is reflected by a Report by International
Alert which argues that “[t]he violence, terror and economic failures of various regimes led by
Northerners only served to consolidate these divisions, creating a north-south polarisation.
When the southern-led NRM seized power in 1986, it was perhaps inevitable that various
factions in the north would seek to regain power” (International Alert, 2008, p. 12). Amongst
these was the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
The LRA started fighting under the leadership of the former catechist Joseph Kony in
1988 (Apuuli, 2004), widely believed to be “a nephew of Lakwena a daughter of Saverino
Lukoya who was once the leader of the Holy Spirit Movement I” (Apuuli, 2011, p. 118).
Kony’s group at first called themselves United Holy Salvation, the Uganda Christian
Army/Movement, then in 1992 the Lord’s Resistance Army. Kony believed that he was sent
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by God to rescue the people of the Acholi region from the brutality of the Museveni’s National
Resistance Army (NRA). His beliefs were a mixture of Christianity, Islam and traditional
beliefs. The LRA was formed after the defeat of Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement
(HSM) in eastern Uganda by the NRA and the signing of an agreement with the northern based
rebel Uganda Peoples Defence Army (UPDA). Doom and Vlassenroot (1999) state that Joseph
Kony seized his opportunity at a time when the army and civil organisations were in disarray
and there was a continuation of mutual distrust. His intention was to overthrow the Museveni
government which was dominated by people from the southern part of Uganda (McNamara,
2013) and mobilized dejected fighters including defeated former government (Obote’s)
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) soldiers who had retreated to the north (Van Acker,
2004). Many of these soldiers joined Kony’s organization, fearing retaliation if they went back
to the communities where they had perpetrated so many brutalities (Vinci, 2005).
The widespread local belief is that as an Acholi Kony received ritual blessings from
cultural elders to fight on their behalf (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999) and that having received
their support, he was blessed culturally to fight in accordance with Acholi customs. Kony was
a tall slender man with a strong commanding voice: “I am fighting for the Acholi people,” he
would say in public (personal observation), while killing Acholis who had joined him but who
were becoming too popular and powerful among the rank and file of either his military or
administrative wing.
Goals, objectives and aims were not clearly defined (Bainomugisha & Tumushabe,
2005): “The LRA has had no coherent ideology, rational political agenda, [and eventually no]
popular support” (Akhavan, 2005, p. 407). This lack of coherence was clearly seen at the
different peace negotiations which the LRA attended because on each occasion they came up
with different demands (as discussed below, chapter six).
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At the beginning of his reign of terror, Kony and the LRA claimed they wanted to
restore the dignity of the Acholi ethnic group and to create a government based on his personal
vision. He claimed to have spiritual powers and wanted to gain power and rule according to
the Ten Commandments (Sinclair, 2013). Like Lakwena, Kony looked on himself as a messiah.
Vlassenroot, Titeca, Adam and De Cordier (2007) accept this uncritically and suggest that the
LRA saw “its struggle as a divine cause directed by God and for the spiritual [salvation] of all
the Acholi people” (2007, p. 971). A more critical analysis of what he advocated and what he
actually did shows he was far from fulfilling Christian beliefs and the aspirations of the local
Acholi community. Nevertheless, during the early years of the rebellion by Alice Lakwena
(Holy Spirit Movement), Kony enjoyed the support of the local Acholi and Langi people who
felt marginalized by the government. As Amone-P'Olak (2007) suggests, initially the Acholi
people supported the rebel groups which later became the LRA, because the NRA had allegedly
committed atrocities against them while ousting the military government composed (mainly of
northerners) (Amone-P'Olak, 2007).
In trying to explain Kony’s attraction, Doom and Vlassenroot argue that he “exercised
a form of charismatic leadership,” (1999, p. 22) which sprang from two complementary streams,
the Acholi cultural traditions and biblical interpretation (Kaplan, 2015). However, with Haroz,
Murray, Bolton, Betancourt, and Bass (2013) I argue that the intimidating atrocities committed
by the LRA instilled fear among those abducted and may have scared others into following
him. Stories of fear and intimidation were told to me again and again during peace negotiations
when I was the Liaison officer (between Caritas and the UN-based Mediation Secretariat)
working often at the assembly points at which LRA combatants were required to present
themselves. Coming out of the bush temporarily, always still carrying their AK 47s, they came
to receive basic social services food, medicine, and clothes, particularly for the women and
children of their families who accompanied them in the bush as shields, but were not permitted
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by Kony and his second-in-command, Vincent Otti, to come to the assembly point. As a
consequence, we were unable to directly assess their condition and help them in case of medical
need.
The socio-economic and political conditions in the north initially helped the LRA in
their struggle because people in the north wanted to advance their own position. They supported
him because he promised to liberate them against Museveni’s forces (Haynes, 2007). Most of
LRA’s fighting force came from the districts of Kitgum, Pader and Gulu. However, as time
went on, and because of people’s increased suffering due to the conflict, many from those
districts turned against Kony, which he saw as a betrayal by his own people. Annan, Brier and
Aryemo (2009) show that once he lost Acholi support, the LRA’s main method of gaining new
recruits was to kidnap adolescents and young adults (Annan, Brier, & Aryemo, 2009). They
captured most of their fighters by raiding schools and forcibly abducting young boys and girls.
The actual number of children abducted is difficult to ascertain. Camp leaders did not
register all the children in the camps due to the large numbers of inhabitants and a lack of
proper facilities for registration. However, it is estimated that between 1988 and 2006 at least
25,000 and up to 38,000 children were abducted by the LRA (Vindevogel et al., 2011, p. 552).
The LRA attempted to convince those abducted that they would be better off in the bush
fighting than being killed by government forces. They used this propaganda when they wanted
to recruit more fighters, especially young boys, into their ranks (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999).
Violent acts were aimed at enforcing discipline within the LRA ranks and destroying
individual will and morality among those captured (Akhavan, 2005). Many rescued abducted
children told their rescuers that they believed that Kony had spirits which directed him (Lomo
& Hovil, 2004b). However, Lomo and Hovil’s (2004a) explanation is that the
institutionalisation of violent acts within the LRA led those captured to believe that such acts
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could not be done by a normal person unless he was possessed by spirits (Lomo & Hovil,
2004a) .
The LRA aimed to recruit or, rather, abduct, its fighters around the age of 12, which
according to international law can constitute a war crime (Beard, 2011). Southwick (2005)
estimated that 90% of the LRA was comprised of abducted children under the age of eighteen.
The LRA preferred these young children because they were easy to control and brainwash
(Beard, 2011) but strong enough to carry weapons. According to Akhavan “[w]ithout access to
volunteers among the Acholi, coercion was the only way that the LRA could maintain its forces”
(2005, p. 407). He argues that the children acted as soldiers and at the same time were victims
of the LRA’s structural command and control. Many children who committed such atrocities
ended up traumatised and unable to return to a normal life with their families and communities
of origin. The effect was to create an army of young Ugandans dependent on the LRA and thus
committed to its campaign of terror against the government and fellow Ugandans. For the
abducted children, this was tantamount to psychological torture and an abuse of their rights as
children. According to Angucia “[t]he abductions were a deliberate guerrilla strategy, a weapon
of choice to systematically terrorize and subjugate the population” (2009, p. 87).
Once captured, the children were tied together and marched to camps where they were
viciously indoctrinated and put through a process which the LRA termed desensitisation (Beard,
2011). The process included forcing them to murder their parents so that they had no family to
escape to and exposing them to acts of horrendous mutilation and violence which was meant
to instil a sense of fear not to run away (Lomo & Hovil, 2004b). At first these atrocities were
carried out in areas specifically targeting the Acholi community (Moy, 2006a).
Thousands of young girls were also abducted (Smith, 2012) and put to work as porters
of firewood and heavy loads, cleaners and cooks. Some were given to LRA commanders to be
used as sexual slaves. Out of the estimated 7,500 girls who were abducted, at least 1,000 girls
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gave birth during captivity (Beard, 2011, p. 12). Due to the high prevalence of sexually
transmitted diseases such as AIDS in Uganda (Goodgame, 1990), the LRA men preferred
young girls with the hope that they were less likely to have sexually transmitted diseases
(Hanlon, 2006). However, this did not stop the spread of HIV/AIDS within the LRA ranks.
Beard notes that “according to World Vision’s rehabilitation centre records for formerly
abducted children, out of eighty-three children in 2002 being tested for HIV, thirteen (seven
boys, six girls) were found to be HIV positive” (2011, p. 12). Many children captured by the
LRA had died by 2002 because of direct fighting with the UPDF, succumbing to various
diseases or because of the extremely harsh punishments administered by the LRA commanders.
Commenting on the harsh treatment of children during the northern Uganda conflict, Leibig
states that “terrible abuses of children’s rights occur[ed] on a daily basis” (2005, p. xx).
Acholi people’s houses were torched (Apuuli, 2004; Weinstein, Stover, Vinck, & Pham,
2007) as a form of retaliation for not supporting the LRA cause. Such acts created displacement,
hunger, malnutrition, death and added more misery to the people. Due to the lack of security
in the region, humanitarian agencies could not reach the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)
camps (discussed below), where many Acholi had been forcibly moved, which further
threatened their security.
The LRA carried out many murderous raids, some of which were publicized worldwide.
One was the massacre of the people of the small town of Atiak situated northwest of Gulu
District in 1995 led by Kony’s Deputy, Vincent Otti. After defeating the UPDF, on April 20th,
1995, the LRA entered the trading center of the town. They rounded up people and took them
to the bush. After being lectured for their alleged collaboration with the Government, over 250
people were murdered in a horrific way (Gersony, 1997). Another such horror was the
abduction of girls from St Mary Aboke’s Girls’ Secondary School in 1996. The LRA under the
command of Ocaya Lagira, raided the Catholic girls’ boarding school, looted the school’s clinic,

104
tried to burn down some of the buildings, and abducted the girls, all of whom were between
the ages of 15 and 17. Most were not seen again until many years later (Vinci, 2005).
Pabbo camp inhabitants described to Caritas staff a later attack, on July 20 and 25, 2002
at Palabek, Kitgum district, when the LRA attacked and looted shops and the food supplies
delivered by the World Food Programme the day before. They also kidnapped the headmaster
and all his family. People also told us that in August 2002 the LRA ordered all humanitarian
agencies operating in northern Uganda to withdraw or risk being attacked. Despite this warning,
relief agencies continued their activities, although with reduced staff and resources and fewer
journeys to the camps, which signified less humanitarian assistance to those in need. Ensuring
the human security of particular groups of northern Ugandans was the aim of humanitarian and
educational organizations during the time of the LRA but as the above examples of LRA tactics
show, it was difficult to achieve and its successful application severely hampered.
LRA atrocities were especially carried out on those whom they suspected to be
collaborators with the government forces. Writing in The Guardian newspaper about the
brutality carried out by the LRA on the Acholi community, David Smith recorded that apart
from forced killings of a friend or a family member and the desecration of dead bodies, the
LRA was “notorious for chopping off limbs as a form of punishment,” (Smith, 2015).
Describing the situation in northern Uganda at the peak of the conflict, Sserwanga, Kiconco,
Nystrand and Mindra make the devastating analysis that “[a]n entire society had been
systematically destroyed physically, culturally, emotionally, socially and economically. The
extent of suffering according to international benchmarks constituted an emergency out of
control” (2014, p. 302).
Atrocities in northern Uganda have been written about in diverse ways. Among those
who have extensively written through personal stories is a Spanish Roman Catholic priest,
Father Carlos Rodriguez Soto, who worked in the region, and who participated fully in the
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activities of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) during the conflict. His
experience involved face-to-face encounters with nearly all the major actors in the conflict
including the LRA in their hideout bases. Soto observed a brutal massacre committed by the
LRA:
As I watched those men wearing combat fatigues and rosaries
around their necks, and as I heard them talk about God and his Angels,
I could not help recalling one of the worst and most repugnant
massacres perpetrated by the LRA in a village near Patongo, in Pader
district, in November 2002. After murdering 20 people, the commander
of the group gave an order to dismember two of the dead bodies, put
the bloody parts in a big cooking pot and boil them in the presence of
the terrified survivors. Such an act, an example of the horrible
mutilations, child abductions and cruel massacres by the LRA,
combined with the pseudo-religious prayers and biblical symbols,
provoked in any normal person the most absolute rejection of the group
and their beliefs (2009, pp. 20-21).
As a result of prolonged brutal atrocities against the Acholi people, the lack of an
explanation to the local and international communities as to why the LRA was fighting, and its
visible lack of political motives and goals, from as early as 1990 the northern Uganda
population started to distance themselves from LRA activities: the LRA was already
demonstrating a lack of management and technical skills, people were leaving its ranks and it
was responding with violence. According to Bussmann (2015) the Acholi people just wanted
peace and there were few signs of Acholi cooperation with the LRA. While the LRA
maintained they were acting in the best interests of the Acholi, once the LRA began their

106
vicious attacks against civilians, any belief that this was the case disappeared (Bussmann,
2015).
The culture of indiscriminate violence which Kony unleashed against his own people,
created more enemies than friends within the Acholi community. The tactic of attacking
civilians made the LRA the most brutal rebel group in northern Uganda’s history. Yet, Lomo
and Hovil (2004b) argue that because the LRA had terrorized northern Uganda for so long,
they could not be described as a band of criminals. Rather they argue that the group had
significant military ability.
A major tactic which has helped the LRA last for such a prolonged period of time has
been its ability to instil fear among its fighters. According to Vinci, “the LRA’s use of fear
acted as a force multiplier in war. It has allowed a tiny insurgent force of between 500 and
3,000 fighters to hold off a government army of 40,000 to 60,000 army and militia troops,
battle the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in southern Sudan, while effectively
controlling millions of civilians in the north [of Uganda]” (2005, p. 361).
Further, the ability of the LRA to persist and cause havoc in northern Uganda can to
some extent be attributed to the Sudanese government, which was its only regional supporter.
Sudan supported the LRA militarily by providing ammunitions and allowing them to use their
territory as a training base (Van Acker, 2004). Jackson (2002) argues that the LRA received
help from the government of Sudan in retaliation for support the government of Uganda gave
to the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), as the two arms of the
Sudanese struggle were named. Not only did Sudan’s support destabilize Gulu and Kitgum,
but it also helped the LRA to fight the SPLA.
With Sudan’s involvement, the northern Uganda conflict became more complicated,
taking on a regional and international dimension (Finnström, 2001; Dolan & Hovil, 2006;Allen,
2006;Okumu-Alya, 2009). In practice, both Uganda and Sudan supported rebel groups within
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each other’s territory. Uganda supported the SPLA and Sudan supported the LRA: “Sudanese
government aid turned the LRA from an army equipped with stones, rifles and machetes into
one equipped with landmines and machine-guns” (Jackson, 2002, p. 30). Many abductees from
Uganda were taken to Sudan for training whereas many Sudanese were trained in Gulu army
barracks (Lomo & Hovil, 2004b). Okumu-Alya (2009) notes that SPLA/M had its radio station
at Gilgil barracks in Arua, north-west of Uganda. SPLA training camps were located at Midigo,
Koboko and Olaba inside Ugandan borders while another was at Gulu barracks in northern
Uganda.
In order to normalize bilateral relations between the government of Uganda and Sudan,
talks started in 1999 which culminated in each side ceasing support for the other’s rebels and
re-establishing diplomatic relations. Enhanced mutual relations led to Sudan agreeing with the
Ugandan government to carry out military operations inside southern Sudan. The UPDF
launched an operation in March 2002, which was code named ‘Operation Iron Fist’. At this
time, hopes were high that the LRA would be defeated. However, the LRA responded by
increasing its attacks in Uganda. Commenting on this operation, Apuuli (2006) suggests that
although it was a success on the Ugandan side as the LRA was dispersed, NGOs claim that it
created more havoc for the civilians whose security situation worsened.
During Museveni’s regime, strained relations with the neighbouring countries of
Rwanda and DRC have resulted in physical fighting, which has affected the security of people
on the borders and worsened bilateral relations between those countries. According to Francis,
“economic growth and development objectives of integration” cannot be achieved in the midst
of armed conflict and regional instability: “The inextricable link between economic
regionalism and security integration highlights the fact that it is impossible to achieve the in an
environment of wars, armed conflicts and perpetual regional political instability” (2006, p. 7).
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Although the involvement of Sudan in the northern Uganda conflict cannot be termed
one of the causes of the conflict, it could be argued that it helped prolong the conflict. Sudan’s
assistance to the LRA also underlined the complexity and the international dimension of the
conflict.

The government of Uganda’s response to the LRA insurgency
The government of Uganda at first underestimated the LRA’s capacity to wage and
sustain a rebellion. As the government had just defeated the Holy Spirit Movement (led by
Alice Lakwena), it was confident the LRA could also be easily defeated using military means
(Lau, 2011). They were clearly wrong, as the LRA persisted and caused a huge humanitarian
crisis in northern Uganda. As Baines argues:
the

Ugandan

government

convinced

international

donors,

humanitarians, media, and its own citizens alike that the LRA was
little more than a rag-tag group of spiritual bandits gone wild,
thereby justifying a military solution to the persistent northern
"problem" and the creation of massive displaced persons camp
(2010, p. 144).
As a consequence, the government refused to accept foreign intervention or to
declare northern Uganda a disaster area. Yet, the Ugandan military struggled to defeat the
LRA: the military strategy proved not to be the best option. Years passed without the LRA
being defeated, and human suffering worsened because of the government’s policy of
internment.
The constitutional obligation of an independent country like Uganda is to provide
security to its citizens. Chapter twelve of Uganda’s Constitution outlines the functions of the
security agencies and their obligation to observe and protect people’s rights as they perform
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their duties (Mukholi, 1995). However, the situation in northern Uganda between 1986 and
2006 was insecure for its citizens and, from the standpoint of a participant, I argue that the
government above all wanted to protect its image for fear of attracting international political
interventions which would have led the country to be labelled as a failed state.
Neither military means and negotiations were successful until 2006 and the signing of
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) which brought peace to northern Uganda
(below, chapter six) (Pham, Vinck, Wierda and Stover, 2005). The government at first referred
to the LRA as bandits but as they caused devastation in the region (with the active participation
of the government of Sudan), it began to refer to the LRA as a terrorist organization (Apuuli,
2004). Naming the LRA as terrorists enabled the Ugandan government to receive more military
assistance from the US government, although at the expense of humanitarian aid to the people
in the IDP camps (McCulloch 2002, p.291). Indeed, Branch argues that it was “Western media,
Western states, non-governmental organizations (NGO), international institutions” (2009,
p.482) that benefited from the terrorist characterization of the LRA.
Branding the LRA as a terrorist organization led to two challenges for human security
in the war-affected region. First, there was a reduced interest by donor agencies in addressing
human security issues. Secondly, it led to increased funding to the government to purchase
more sophisticated weaponry, which brought more misery to the local communities, further
undermining human security (Branch, 2009).
Although the government of Uganda used various initiatives and methods such as
research, community mobilisation, peace negotiations (see table 4.2 below), military operations,
amnesty, disarmament, and political education, to create peace and reconciliation, throughout
this period the government’s preferred strategy to end the conflict was the military option, as
depicted in the Table 1 below. This military strategy, which was and is still supported by the
USA, meant that other strategies were not a priority, and so undermined the efforts of civil and
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traditional leaders in northern Uganda (Quaranto, 2006), and considerably affected the various
peace processes which were attempted in the twenty-year conflict period.

Table 1
Major Government military offensives against the LRA

1

Year
1991

2

2001

3
March 2004
4
14 December 2008
Source: (Pham et al., 2005)

Military offensive
Operation North
Operation Iron Fist was launched inside Sudan after
the development of warm relations between Sudan and
Uganda
Operation Iron Fist II
Operation Lightning Thunder

Table 2
Non-military initiatives by the Government of Uganda to end the conflict
Year
1

1994

2

November 2004February 2005
August 2006

3

Nature of initiative
Attempt to negotiate for a peaceful settlement under
the Minister for the North, Betty Bigombe
Betty Bigombe attempted another peace initiative
which collapsed after a ceasefire was secured
Juba peace talks where the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement was signed

Source: (Pham et al., 2005)

Throughout the 1990s, the government of Uganda fought the LRA without success.
None of the military initiatives listed in 4-1 achieved their aims. For example, despite superior
arms, the UPDF operation code named ‘Iron Fist’, made little progress in conquering the LRA
but rather spread the conflict to the east of the country: this helped the LRA to continue its
terror activities and to abduct young fighters to replenish its fighting force (Royo, 2008; Van
Acker, 2004). Whenever the UPDF intensified its bombardment of the rebels, the LRA divided
into smaller groups of around six to eight fighters, which made it difficult for the government
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forces to fight them. Government military strategies failed (Royo, 2008). Instead they led to
the dispersion of the rebels across a much larger area enabling them to target yet more isolated
villages creating a greater humanitarian crisis.
Non-military initiatives employed by the Government of Uganda as listed in Table 2
above had just as little success: none stopped the LRA from continuing its abductions and other
criminal activities.
The LRA’s insurgency inevitably meant that the Uganda government needed more
resources to fight the LRA: its budget expenditure on defence increased by 2% in the 1998-99
budget, and 60% of its budget was spent on security and defence compared to 12.6% on social
services (Majtenyi, 1998), which was unacceptable to international donors (Willett, 2009, p.
340). Uganda’s economy during that time depended to a great extent on international donor
funds to support its budget requirements (Mwenda & Tangri, 2005). Eventually, donors started
criticising the government’s overspending on the defence budget compared to social services.
In addition, at the height of the conflict (1991-93), the local defence militias, which were
formed to protect the affected communities against LRA attacks, were not well equipped by
the government to fight the LRA (Branch, 2005). Acholi elders and administrative councillors
pleaded with the UPDF to provide local defence units with more and better arms (Branch,
2005). However, their requests were turned down by the UPDF.
The government’s counter insurgency measure of forced internment breached
international laws. Branch argues that “the mode of displacement and internment; the rationale
for displacement; and the conditions of the displaced” were not in line with what is required
internationally (2008, p. 162). However, despite those allegations, there were no arrests or
charges pressed by the international community on those alleged to have committed such
crimes. Rather, the army routinely transferred army personnel to other areas without charge.
Commenting on these allegations, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Ocampo
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said “the crimes committed by the LRA were of higher gravity than alleged crimes committed
by any other group. We are in the process of reviewing information on several other groups in
northern Uganda. There is no doubt that the worst crimes were committed by the LRA”
(Bulletin, 2007). Branch put the government’s actions into perspective arguing that “[i]n
dominant international portrayals of the conflict, … government violence has been downplayed,
if not entirely ignored” (2007b, p. 182).
Meanwhile, during this period (2002-2004) the government of Sudan entered into peace
talks with its own main rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which was
fighting for independence (Apuuli, 2007). These talks deprived the LRA of bases to launch
attacks into Uganda (Apuuli, 2007). In contrast, the Ugandan government was able to capitalize
on the peace talks, which resulted in South Sudan gaining independence in 2011, thus allowing
the UPDF more access into Sudan to fight the LRA. As a result of these talks, military support
from Khartoum to the LRA declined. This led the LRA to relocate its bases to the DRC through
the thick forests of Garamba. According to Nannyonjo the “success of the Sudanese peace
agreement [was] critical for stabilizing both southern Sudan and the relationship between
Uganda and the Sudanese government” (2005, p. 13). The Government of Uganda, however,
had to seek permission to enter the DRC to fight the LRA (Apunyo, 2006), which was known
as a ‘rebel movement on the move’. The relationship between Uganda and the DRC was not
good because the DRC in 1996 allowed Ugandan forces to enter the DRC to pursue another
rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). At that time, Ugandan forces looted mineral
resources and timber from the DRC. Consequently, when the LRA moved into the DRC,
President Museveni and his DRC counterpart Joseph Kabila failed to reach an agreement which
would allow the UPDF to enter DRC and fight the LRA (Le Sage, 2011).
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The context of the northern Uganda civil conflict
For almost 20 years (1988-2006), northern Uganda was an arena for armed conflict
between the Government of Uganda and the LRA. During this period, the UPDF forced people
to live in IDP camps, with minimum security accorded to them by government security
agencies. Mayega et al., (2015) estimate that over 2 million people in the Acholi and Lango
sub-regions of northern Uganda were affected by the conflict, with the Acholi the most severely
affected (Finnegan, 2010). Many people were forced by the UPDF to live in harsh and
desperate conditions. The Government of Uganda claimed that this was necessary to identify
easily LRA combatants. As can be seen in Table 3 below, in some Districts, such as Pader, up
to 95% of the people lived in IDP camps. The harsh conditions in the camps led to acute
malnutrition in children and the undermining of local people’s norms, social networks and
culture (Henttonen, Watts, Roberts, Kaducu, & Borchert, 2008). Yet, this internment policy
was a total failure in terms of securing people’s security. Roberts et al.(2009) called it “a cover
for violation and mass humiliation'” while Wegner (2012) refers to this policy of internment
by the UPDF as a ‘genocide’. The LRA attacked the camps at will. The extent of the
humanitarian crisis is illustrated by the number of camps and the number of people in each
Districts affected by the conflict, shown in Table 3 below.
Table 3
Camps and population 2005-2006
District
Lira
Pader
Kitgum
Apac
Gulu

Total number of IDP camps
42
31
21
18
52

Total persons
351,020
349,538
331,169
107,130
1,599,081

Source: World Food Programme Food distribution lists (September 2005- May 2006)
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During the conflict between 1988 and 2006, there were high levels of poverty and
unemployment, high birth and mortality rates and a lack of social security safety nets
(Nannyonjo, 2005; Sserwanga et al., 2014). The encampment policy restricted people’s
movement and made it difficult for inhabitants to live a decent life. As a result, many people
lived on less than a dollar per day, which was not enough to support their well-being. Social
protection was poor and there was a lack of basic services. Most survived through engaging in
small business and humanitarian handouts (Esuruku, 2011). While the Human Development
Indices (HDIs) and Human Poverty Indices (HPIs) for Uganda in 2005-2006 indicate overall
improvement in other parts of the country (0,488 in 2003 to 0,581 in 2006), the northern region
lagged behind, 2.9 million in 2002/3 to 3.3 million in 2005/6 (Esuruku, 2011, p. 114). It is
obvious that human and economic development had become stagnant in northern Uganda
compared to the rest of the country (Nannyonjo, 2005).
Peace activists and other human rights activists, including religious leaders and
traditional leaders in the northern part of Uganda criticized Museveni for his overuse of the
military, ignoring the suffering of the civilians in the conflict-affected regions, and failing to
address social and unbalanced development between north and eastern Uganda compared to
other parts of Uganda, but to no avail (Khadiagala, 2001).
Forced encampment by the UPDF increased people’s vulnerability and instilled in them
a general fear for their security. This was compounded by a general lack of appropriate
responses from national and international organizations. According to Ban Ki Moon, the UN
Secretary General, as cited in the UN’s Human Security Unit Strategic plan 2014-17, “the
common understanding on human security as agreed by the General Assembly in resolution
66/290, provides a useful way of thinking about how we respond to 21st century challenges”
(Unit, 2014, p. 3). In the northern Uganda situation, the government neglected people’s security
which led to undermining international standards set by the UN to protect those affected by the
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conflict. For Duffield and Waddell (2004), human security portrays international concerns
which are related to humanism and reflects accepted international norms and conventions
aimed at improving people’s security. Such internationally accepted conventions include the
Geneva conventions, UN Declaration of Human Rights and the formation of the International
Criminal Court. Since Uganda is a signatory to these conventions, its membership suggests the
human security of its citizens is an important state consideration.
Uganda’s security strategy was to wipe out the insurgency created by the LRA at
whatever cost. In doing so, Van Acker argues, it ignored “human rights and international
humanitarian law” (2004, p. 335). The government’s strategy contradicted basic human
security principles, for example, community security. Throughout the conflict the government
failed to protect the people and seemingly lacked the capacity to secure their safety. At times
it was accused of perpetrating atrocities (Csopnu, 2004). In theory at least, as Oberleitner
(2005) argues, state and individual security are not mutually exclusive, yet Uganda showed
little concern for appropriate measures which could have protected its citizens better.
The absence of security meant that the people of northern Uganda were vulnerable to
rebel attacks and abductions but also, during the period 1988-2006 a combination of poverty
and conflict resulted in many young rural people migrating to nearby towns, which had
negative consequences for the receiving towns in northern Uganda. These (discussed in detail
in chapter five) included the mushrooming of unplanned informal settlements resulting in
pressure on existing infrastructure. People suffered from poor sanitation, unreliable water
supply, intermittent electricity and an overburdened transport system.
People living in unprotected IDP camps also inevitably encountered problems. The
psychological stresses contributed to aggression and violence (Lomo & Hovil, 2004b) and the
situation was particularly hard on those children who had been abducted and forced to
participate in violence and other aspects of crimes against humanity. Also, actions by both the
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LRA and the UPDF against the local people inflicted untold suffering and led to many human
rights abuses (see below, chapter five). Kasozi (2005) estimates that there were approximately
100,000 indiscriminate child killings and 20,000 abductions in the period 1988 to 2003 (A.
Kasozi, 2005, p. 1054). These abuses prompted Kasozi to argue that part of the LRA campaign
was to destroy the Uganda government’s credibility with the international community as the
government showed itself unable to maintain state security or provide human security for its
citizens. However, unusually, the international practice of support/interference from powerful
nations in fighting local insurgencies, such as that of the LRA, did not occur. Quite simply,
unlike the situation in, for example, DRC, the lack of significant economic resources caused
the turning of an international blind eye to the conflict (Kastner, 2011).

Figure 3. Map of northern Uganda regions affected by war. Source: Allen and
Schomerus (2006), originally obtained from UN OCHA.
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Figure 4. Map of northern Uganda showing numbers of internally displaced people
by District (May 2004). Relief web Map Centre. Internally Displaced Camps and Protected
Villages in Northern Uganda.

Figure 5. The internally displaced persons’ camp at Opit, Gulu District. Note the nontraditional crowding of the huts (Photograph Davis Kawooya, June 2005).
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As a result of the atrocities perpetrated on northern Ugandan communities by both the
LRA and forces of the government of Uganda, and as demonstrated in Figure 4 above, many
people were internally displaced. Writing in 2010, it was possible for Dagne to declare that
“more than 2 million civilians had been affected and that an estimated 90% of the population
in the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader had been displaced” (2010, p. 7). Whyte, Iha,
Mukyala, and Meinert (2013) also agree with Dagne’s claims that the military’s tactics during
the conflict resulted in a lot of displacement. Every person living in the areas shown in Figure
3 above was forced into camps by the army. As well as (theoretically) protecting the IDPs, this
enabled government forces more easily to identify those outside the camps as rebel elements.
This strategy was disastrous in terms of human suffering. The photograph of the camp at Opit,
Gulu District (Figure 5), for example, shows the very close proximity of the huts to each other.
The result of a total lack of both planning and implementation of human security principles.
Okello and Hovil (2007) observe that for those living in the camps it was a daily struggle to
survive because of the stifling of economic activities, the abject poverty, the overcrowded
housing and the ongoing threat of armed attack. These conditions resulted in many families
becoming dependent on food distribution by the World Food Programme (Stark et al., 2010);
people “suffered high levels of poverty as they generally could not travel back to the villages
and farm lands” (Roberts et al., 2009, p. 3).
The setting up of IDP camps was an indication that approximately huge numbers of
people were displaced (Okello & Hovil, 2007) and interned in these camps in 2003. Such
enormous numbers of people forced into the IDP camps led to a humanitarian crisis and a
collapse of the economic and social development of a region which depended entirely on
agriculture.
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Table 4 below shows that up to 46.9% of the total population were interned in these
camps in 2003. Such enormous numbers of people forced into the IDP camps led to a
humanitarian crisis and a collapse of the economic and social development of a region which
depended entirely on agriculture.

Table 4
Total number of IDPs by District 10th October 2003
No

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

District

District Population

IDP
Population

Percentage

Gulu
Kitgum
Pader
Lira
Soroti
Katakwi
Kaberamaido
Kumi
Apac

468,407
419,258
89.5%
286,122
281,372
98.3%
293,679
229,115
78.0%
757,763
79,097
10.4%
371,986
136,112
36.6%
307,032
104,254
34.0%
122,924
97,561
79.4%
388,015
59,207
15.3%
IDPs with host
families estimated at
about 50,000
Total
2,995,928
1,405,976
46.9%
Source: Government of Uganda, Department of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, 2003
By 2003, there were over 150 camps for the internally displaced and hundreds of
thousands of people were dependent on handouts from the World Food Programme to survive
(Stark et al., 2010, pp. 1056-1057). In these camps more than eighty percent of women were
illiterate and a large percentage of children had lost one or both parents (Wierda, Stover, &
Baines, 2006).
The difficulties are symbolised by the lack of any accurate figures for the numbers of
people in the IDP camps. Due to the high insecurity in the area, the length of the conflict, and
a lack of accurate figures kept by both the government and humanitarian organizations, most
of the figures given were estimates. According to Akhavan “In 2003, the population of IDP
camps in the Gulu and Kitgum/Pader districts of northern Uganda doubled from approximately
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four hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand, a figure that represents approximately 75
percent of the region's population of 1.1 million” (2005, p. 209). However, Otim and Wierda
(2008, p. 21) claim that over 1.5 million people were forced into miserable camp conditions.
According to the usually reliable Civil Society Organization for Peace in Northern
Uganda (CSOPNU) in its 2006 report, however, there were


202 IDP camps in northern Uganda.



Between 1.8 and 2 million displaced people (approximately 8 per cent of the
national population).



Population densities exceeding 1,700 people per hectare.



50 per cent of IDPs under the age of 15.



25 per cent of children over 10 years who had lost one or both parents.



Large absences of adult males aged 20–29, as a direct result of the war.



12 per cent of females aged 30–44 who were widows — twice the national
average (C. S. O. f. P. i. N. Uganda, 2006).

The government failed to provide protection for its citizens within the camps: there
was little or no emphasis on human security. The 2004 Annual Report by CSOPNU made the
accusation that “[t]he GoU has failed in its responsibility to provide adequate services for these
people and has also failed to create an effective operating environment for the adequate
provision of national assistance” (2004, p. 113). In such a situation, local and international
NGOs effectively took over the role of government in the provision of basic services (Branch,
2005). The Acholi people in camps survived on the charity of aid agencies (Branch, 2005).
Branch also makes the point that “[w]hile the government euphemistically call[ed] the camps
‘protected villages’, they [were] most accurately identified as internment or concentration
camps, given their origins in forced displacement and the continued government violence used
to keep civilians from leaving” (2009, p. 480).
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Most of these camps had populations of about 2,000 people but only small numbers of
government soldiers assigned to protect them. So, the LRA were able to attack the camps at
will (Roberts et al., 2009). The level and magnitude of human rights abuses by both the LRA
and the UPDF was appalling and, as Joireman, Sawyer and Wilhoit (2012) show, some people
were so desperate, that they even took to protecting themselves by sleeping outside the camps.
Within the camps, poor living conditions had negative consequences on the lives of IDPs
(which will be discussed in more detail in chapter five). According to Nannyonjo (2005) the
widespread dislocation led to a breakdown in traditional values and behaviours and a
subsequent increase in the crime rate (Nannyonjo, 2005) . Because the LRA often attacked
at night, large numbers of people (night commuters as they were known) commuted (walking
for the most part) up to five kilometres daily to and from the towns of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader
which were relatively safe and where they spent nights. The children who did not commute
moved to the centre of the IDP camps (Rockmore, 2016). Despite these precautions, abductions
from within the camps continued (McElroy, Spittal, Atim, Tebere, & Muyinda, 2010). The
security situation on most of the roads leading to these camps was challenging for the delivery
of vital basic supplies to the people: “The LRA … even attacked humanitarian relief convoys
belonging to the UN World Food Programme, which almost one million people rel[ied] on for
sustenance” Akhavan (2005, p. 409). Yet, as Alderman, Gilligan, and Lehrer note, because of
the lack of income generating activities, camp residents depended on food aid from
humanitarian organizations, among them the World Food Programme which “provided
monthly food rations to each household living in the IDP camps” (2012, p. 197). The number
of dependants on relief supplies from aid agencies continued to grow.
During this period, in my role as the research and advocacy Coordinator for Caritas
Uganda, for nine years, I made frequent visits, three to four days each week, from the regional
office in Gulu to nearly forty IDP camps of differing sizes across the three districts Pader, Gulu
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and Kitgum. People forced to live in the camps complained they were poorly managed and
short of the basic social services required by international standards for displaced people. The
conditions in the camps were filthy, and as the conflict continued, they worsened in terms of
sanitation, hygiene and malnutrition. As Roberts summarises, “The camps were characterized
by chronic over-crowding, poor housing, water and sanitation” (2009, p. 3). And, as shown
above, these problems were compounded by the appalling state of human security within the
camps. As the CSOPNU 2004 report noted above, further indicated “the GoU has fallen short
of its obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to guarantee the rights of its
citizens to live in dignity, and to protect them from harm” (2004, p. 11).
Fear of the LRA prevented people moving out of these camps to their farms, which in
the past had provided a livelihood for most people in the affected region. In a report on the
implementation of the recommendations made by the UN Secretary General’s representative
on IDPs following his visit to Uganda, it was noted that, “continued encampment (with
resulting limitations on freedom of movement) and the impact of the ongoing war leave the
majority of people living in the north unprotected. Women and girls are especially at risk, with
chronically high levels of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) reported” (2006, p. 9).
The government tried to protect the people by further setting up what they termed
‘protected villages’. These were smaller camps and the numbers of people were few and
different from the bigger IDP camps (E. Baines & Paddon, 2012; Branch, 2009). However, the
LRA were still able to carry out surprise attacks on the government troops protecting these
villages, resulting in the deaths of both civilians and government soldiers. Although these
villages were set up within the government forces’ areas of operation, they were subjected to
frequent raids and abductions. Sometimes people’s huts were burnt. Thus, those in the villages
lived in a state of constant fear and trauma (Branch, 2011; Dolan, 2013; Dolan & Hovil, 2006).
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The IDP camps and the ‘protected villages’ were criticised by northern Uganda
politicians, human rights organizations and civil society organizations for their lack of
protection from LRA attacks and the poor living standards which lacked basic social services
(Branch, 2008). As Laruni indicates, “Numerous accusations of brutality by National
Resistance Army and Uganda People's Defence Force soldiers against Acholi civilians during
the conflict have been levied against the government, leading many Acholi to believe that,
rather than helping to restore peace in the Acholi communities, the NRM's motives were more
concerned with eradicating them all together” (2015, p. 213).
Although the duty of the state is to defend its citizens from insecurity, the government
of Uganda’s response to the LRA insurgency brought more harm than good to the people of
northern Uganda:
[the] policies of the Ugandan government and military play[ed]
a major role in determining livelihood strategies (through forced
displacement and regulations on movement) as do the policies of the
humanitarian aid community (through provision of certain types of aid,
the manner in which aid is allocated (Stites, Mazurana, & Carlson,
2006, p. 11).
The excessive human rights cruelties by the UPDF as a result of the military attacks
against the LRA, not only resulted in an increase in high death rates, they inevitably fuelled
more hatred among the people confined in IDP camps. According to Latigo, quoting from the
local press, President Museveni in July 1994 referred to the Acholi people “as being like
grasshoppers in a bottle in which they will eat each other before they find their way out” (2008,
p. 89). Such comments by the head of state, angered many people from the Acholi sub-region,
and left them feeling humiliated and dehumanized as an ethnic group (Otunnu, 1998).
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Interventions by humanitarian non-government organizations (NGOs)
The media played a significant role in magnifying the humanitarian crisis in northern
Uganda. In doing so, they brought the conflict to the attention of the international community
which enabled many international aid agencies to assist in providing emergency relief such as
high nutrient food, clothing and medical supplies. Caritas Uganda, with which I was working,
appealed to other Caritas members for humanitarian assistance. Among those who responded
positively to the appeal were Caritas organisations from Germany, Norway, and Denmark as
well as Caritas Internationalis. In 2003 media attention also forced the UN Emergency Relief
coordinator, Jan Egeland, to travel to Uganda to assess the extent of the problem, which he
described as “the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world today”
(Mailer, 2008, p. 5). Egeland’s visit, in highlighting the humanitarian situation in Uganda,
helped the international community realize it was in danger of failing to follow its own agenda
of extending humanitarian assistance to those in danger. On his return, addressing the UN
Security Council, Egeland said “20,000 children had been kidnapped, large districts now had
90 per cent of their population displaced and 80 per cent of combatants in the Lord’s Resistance
Movement [are] minors. The situation is a moral outrage’” (C. S. O. f. P. i. N. Uganda, 2006).
According to Mukwana & Ridderbos (2008), Egeland’s visit awakened the international
community’s interest in the affected region and forced Uganda to develop a national policy on
internally displaced persons, based on the guiding principles of internal displacement. These
include:


Holistically addressing protection of people against displacement



Providing IDPs with the right to request protection and assistance from the
government and district authorities



Ensuring IDPs are not discriminated against



Ensuring the government provides educational facilities
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Consulting with those affected especially women and the youth



Translating the IDP policy into local languages



Holding the government accountable for its actions

Jan Egeland’s appeal at the peak of the conflict created considerable awareness of the
conflict and prompted many NGOs to intervene. Although national and international aid
agencies had been slow to respond to this crisis, those humanitarian agencies which responded
to Egeland’s appeal made a very significant contribution towards human survival.
In addition, Egeland argued for NGOs to continue a more permanent presence in the
IDP camps and appealed to the international community to come to the rescue of the people in
northern Uganda. As a result, aid agencies increased funding for social services in the camps.
Schools, health clinics and other basic services begun to be provided for the displaced people.
Despite Egeland’s appeal though, Brown reports that “the majority of the population of the
Acholi sub-region remained displaced, living in squalid conditions in some 200 overcrowded
camps, reliant on food aid, their traditional livelihood patterns and clan systems destroyed”
(Brown, 2006, p. 1).
Organizations which contributed aid included ACF, AMREF, ARLPI, AVSI,
American Refugee Council, Care, Caritas, CRS, ICRC, MSF-Holland, Oxfam/Accord, Save
the Children, UNICEF, World Vision and WFP. Angucia, Zeelen and de Jong note that NGOs
took on distinct roles: “Provision of food was the preserve of the World Food Programme.
Others like AVSI concentrated on health issues, Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative
among others focused on education and War Child, Holland specialized in children’s play”
(2010, p. 226). Together they contributed to improved human security for the millions of people
in the IDP camps.
Local and international aid groups responded in additional ways. Nannyonjo (2005)
specifies some of the areas in which aid agencies assisted such as the provision of basic drugs,
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assistance for HIV-infected persons, the provision of water facilities, classroom and scholastic
materials, psychosocial care and support, tracing and integrating abducted children into the
community, counselling and peace education and community-based reconciliation. As stated
above, some gave humanitarian assistance while others engaged with the two warring factions
on how to solve the conflict through dialogue. Many NGO’s activities became specialized in
order to deal with the huge demand for assistance. For example, some dealt with counselling,
rehabilitation and re-integration, others with health, education, economic livelihood and peace
building.
ACCORD dealt with conflict management, capacity building and public education
on rights and responsibilities whereas AVSI dealt with physical rehabilitation on top of
identification and registration of amputees (Omona, 2008). The heifer project dealt with the
distribution of dairy cattle and the promotion of micro enterprise. ICRC dealt with various
emergencies and the Norwegian Refugee Council dealt with distribution of food and other
relief supplies and conducted empowerment workshops. NGOs helped to fill the gaps left by
the government in providing basic services such as food, water supplies and pit latrines
(Timothy Shaw, 2014). In doing so, they responded to the human security element of designing
appropriate programmes aimed at protecting people by providing comprehensive, multi-sector
and collaborative initiatives to those in need.
NGOs had contrasting ideas on how best to reintegrate formerly abducted children.
Local groups such as the Gulu Support the Children Organization (GUSCO) used traditional
practices known to the people whereas World Vision (WV), an international Christian relief
and development organization, combined Christian ideas based on the commandments of God,
with a western style format of counselling (Akello, Richters, & Reis, 2006). Although they
were not always successful, most NGOs continued with providing counselling and psycho-
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social support for formerly abducted people especially rescued women who had borne children
to LRA commanders while they were in captivity.
While working for Caritas I came to an understanding that supporting formerly
abducted children using foreign-based methods was not as effective in mending broken
community relationships as approaches based on local practices that the people understood and
valued. I could see that GUSCO’s use of local people-centred practices were more respected
within the communities and more effective. For example, the ceremony of cleansing the body
(moyo kum) which involved elders appealing to the ancestors for their blessings and washing
away evil spirits from those returning from captivity often was effective. During my period in
northern Uganda, I witnessed four community ceremonies (two in Pader and two in Kitgum)
in which former combatants went through a process of reconciling with the dead spirits and
seeking for forgiveness among community members. These helped former combatants to partly
reconcile and re-integrate with local communities where these ceremonies took place.
Other effective ceremonies included cleansing an area (moyo piny) and bending the
spear (gomo tong), both of which took place after a community-mediated process, in which the
wrongdoer accepted blame, requested pardon and agreed to pay reparations to those affected.
Performing such ceremonies according to Acholi cultural norms was held in high esteem and
was respected by community members. People performed them willingly, believing that it was
good for the community’s wellbeing. These traditional ceremonies were rooted in Acholi
traditional beliefs of the sacredness of social stability in families. The German researcher,
Thomas Harlacher who also worked with Caritas Gulu concurs that these traditional practices
were effective, recognising that, although there was no written information to support the
usefulness of these practices, “many traditional rituals and procedures had the potential of
fostering healing among the war-torn communities” (Harlacher, 2009, p. vii).
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Ironically, the role of aid agencies in providing basic services helped the government’s
strategy of forced displacement of people into camps. As Branch notes
If the relief agencies had not intervened, the government
simply would not have been able to sustain the camps through
violence alone. But once the humanitarian infrastructure had been
deployed and movement out of the camps had been halted, forced
internment became a viable long-term strategy (2009, p. 484).
Therefore, it is clear that the setting up of IDP camps helped the government to
continue its military approach to the conflict while forcing civilians to become dependent on
aid relief. In fact, Branch (2009) argues that without NGO assistance, the humanitarian disaster
would have been even more catastrophic since all the government’s resources were being put
into strengthening the military while neglecting civilian human security.
During the conflict, there was limited cooperation between humanitarian
organizations and the UPDF. This cooperation was based on the condition that any
humanitarian assistance had to be cleared by the military. Indeed, as Branch shows, aid
agencies “found it in their interest to cooperate openly with the government’s
counterinsurgency to the point of enabling its policy of mass forced displacement and
internment” (2009, p. 479). The UPDF coordinated military escorts and land mine clearance in
areas where humanitarian assistance was to be delivered. However, at the peak of the conflict
(1998-2002), the imposition of various restrictions on humanitarian organizations by the UPDF
irritated some agencies and most withdrew from the region. According to Brown, during that
period, NGO and UN employees rarely visited the camps or initiated new humanitarian
programmes. As a result, the basic needs of the inhabitants were barely addressed (Brown,
2006).
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The UPDF restrictions coupled with the heightened security situation led to the mass
withdrawal of NGOs. This severely affected the people in the camps who were depending on
the relief services provided by NGOs, both local and international for their survival. During
this period, as I and other observers still in place could see all too clearly, the conflict situation
was even more severe than reported by the local and international media (Nassanga, 2007).
The critical situation highlighted the need for donor countries to provide a key role in
terms of financial and political assistance. The international community’s support also seemed
essential in finding a lasting solution in the conflict since the local military option preferred by
the government had failed. The regional dimension of the conflict and the worsening
relationship between Uganda and Sudan demanded high level talks between the two countries
because both countries were accusing one another of harbouring rebels fighting their respective
regimes.

Identifying the causes of the longevity of the conflict using a human security approach
In a conflict situation, a human security approach aims at bringing together the two
warring parties to negotiate their differences and re-establish normality. However, in the case
of northern Uganda, neither the government nor the LRA wanted to confer or to accept defeat.
This stand-off led to a continuation of the conflict and to the suffering of the people of that
region.
Yet the conflict in northern Uganda demonstrated the need to engage a human security
approach in order to have meaningful humanitarian assistance for those suffering during the
conflict. However, it is important to note that the security situation during the conflict caught
both the people and the government by surprise.
Although the key elements of human security had already been recognized by
international institutions and organizations because the Ugandan government did not attend to
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the needs of the northern Ugandans, the human security situation was left in the hands of nongovernment entities. For example, the government played down the seriousness of the northern
Uganda situation with the President jokingly comparing the “LRA with ‘a jigger [worm] in the
toe’. You need a safety pin to remove it” (Taylor, 2005, p. 566). His comment indicated that
the security objectives of the state and the human security of the communities affected by the
conflict were at odds, and that the situation was simply going on and on.
A human security approach can help to explore the root causes of the longevity of a
conflict: it is argued here that applying this approach in northern Uganda in terms of exploring
social, economic, and political causes, and other related issues like ethnic exclusion and
political grievances, could have helped unearth accompanying inequalities and identified
people’s capacities for peace building. Close cooperation between NGOs and the government
with the aim of finding lasting solutions should be a priority for all concerned in a conflict
situation. However, as the northern Uganda conflict showed, success cannot be guaranteed.
The government and NGOs analysed the problems, the root causes and how to end the conflict
differently. A reason for why different interpretations occur is provided by Conteh-Morgan:
many peacebuilding efforts undermine the emphasis on
human security because people are viewed as the "means" to
political stability as opposed to being the "end" of all peacebuilding
efforts. People are also viewed as the means to a stable state
conducive to the infiltration of globalization trends (2005, p. 70).
This difference was evident in northern Uganda, where the government treated people
as pawns and showed little respect for the work of the INGOs and local NGOs. The
government’s approach to the conflict was to use only military means, while the NGOs,
religious leaders and traditional leaders favoured a more people-centred approach through
negotiation. As a result, the relationship between the NGOs and the government was damaged,
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which led to a loss of trust and, in turn, the prolongation of the war. Further, a human security
perspective emphasizes the need for cultural sensitivity. In the northern Ugandan conflict, both
the actions and the speech of some politicians and commanders of the government forces
angered the locals who felt that their cultural practices and community needs were ignored.

The role of NGOs in promoting people centered approaches in northern Uganda
For many years (1988-2006), NGOs took center stage in providing humanitarian
assistance to those in need: people centered in form, NGOs’ responses to the worsening
humanitarian situation in northern Uganda post conflict, often resembled a human security
agenda. There is no available data which shows that NGOs used a human security approach. A
basic tenet of a human security approach is to assist people to deal with unexpected and
potentially dangerous or harmful circumstances which can emanate from either local,
international or environmental disasters or infections that afflict humanity (Weller, 2014). In
northern Uganda, NGO operations throughout the conflict showed a desire to promote what
can be read as the human security approach. This was demonstrated by their readiness to
confront the status quo, their closeness to the local people, their ability to reach out to the
vulnerable majority and to address the threats to those in their care through partnership building.
Richmond notes that “NGOs provide an important bridge between the local and the global,
public and private, and so may facilitate the broader forms of prevention, peacemaking,
peacekeeping, and peace building that are now required” (2003, p. 4).
Although many NGOs faced security obstacles when providing humanitarian
assistance, the use of a people centred framework was at the centre of their operations. For
example, Caritas used its humanitarian donor networks like the Catholic Agency for
Development (a charity in England and Wales) CAFORD, Caritas Norway, Caritas Germany
and Caritas Denmark to lobby for more humanitarian assistance when the crisis was at its worst.
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During my years working with Caritas, one notable contribution CAFORD offered to Caritas
staff was training in how to respond in emergencies in line with international humanitarian
principles, to act ethically and responsibly at all times, training which was of much practical
value in the field. The Caritas relationship with the LRA was expressed through hundreds of
small interactions with Caritas staff each time the LRA fighters came into an assembly point:
a continual and stressful balancing act. Both the CAFORD training and the Caritas ideals,
enabled the organisation and its people to act impartially and to remain in the field throughout
the conflict: this led the LRA to trust the organization. This trust showed itself in many ways.
At one incident, when the LRA faced intense bombardment from UPDF army helicopters in
Kitgum, they were forced to abandon some of the abducted people who were injured and
contacted Caritas to pick them up. Caritas had then to contact the UPDF personnel who escorted
our staff to where these people were abandoned and collect them.
Both local and international NGOs collaborated with and assisted local people to
improve their security by providing economic opportunities, education, health care, and human
rights advocacy discussed above, chapter three). During the period 1998-2004, NGOs’
provision of basic social services became critical in ensuring human security. However, there
was a negative consequence in this otherwise successful work. The UPDF enforced strict
measures which were supposed to be complied with before NGOs entered or supplied any
assistance to those in camps. These measures included the military systematically checking
every supply truck and giving clearance before aid could enter the camps. Such restrictions
delayed humanitarian assistance which increased threats to human security. In some cases, the
UPDF assumed humanitarian, development and peacebuilding roles for which they were not
suitably trained, forcing humanitarian organizations to suspend their operations at the peak of
the conflict for their staff’s safety. The involvement of UPDF in distributing humanitarian
assistance complicated the process. Communications from the UPDF and from the various
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INGOs and NGOs operating in camps were at times at loggerheads. No doubt many NGOs
would have agreed with Maya that “the government should [have] focus[ed] more on building
up its own delivery capacity rather than managing the work of NGOs” (2008, p. 23). These
complications limited the capacity of NGOs to use a people centred approach to assist in the
humanitarian crisis in the northern Ugandan conflict.
Involving NGOs in initiatives which have security implications has the potential to
improve NGO-government relationships, including in the sharing of information. However, in
northern Uganda this did not happen, souring relationships. One of the reasons is almost
certainly as Fox argues, that a human security approach “recognizes the limited role the state
plays at times, and in doing so challenges the centrality of the state as the sole actor” (Fox,
2004, p. 476).
As discussed above a human security approach tackles security issues, governance
and socio-economic challenges in diverse ways. By providing basic services to the people of
northern Uganda during the conflict, NGOs demonstrated their desire, even though they were
not always successful, to provide human security in a variety of ways. First, they set up offices
within the affected region to coordinate their own activities and help local groups and
communities mount a rapid response to sudden unexpected disasters in the region through
sharing decision making and programming with locals. They also addressed the local health
and livelihood issues which affected the people. Second, during the conflict, many NGOs
demonstrated their accountability to both the donors and the communities they served, which
gave them a comparative advantage over the government which was normally corrupt. In
addition, they tried to align their efforts with what the local populations needed.
For example, a report by NORAD, for all Norwegian funded NGOs operating in
northern Uganda which included the Norwegian Refugee Council, CARE Norway, Save the
Children Norway, Norwegian Red Cross, Caritas Norway and Médecins sans Frontières
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Norway, stated that “the choice and relevancy of core activities is largely informed by
community needs identified through formal and informal needs assessments and baselines
surveys” (2009, p. 26). This was an indication that NGOs were willing to work within local
cultural norms and environmental contexts, and with the participation of the people affected.
The NGOs’ record of engaging with local communities and the rapport they established with
the communities made them better placed than the government to get involved in people
centred/human security program development. During the conflict, my observation of Caritas
decision-making and responses, was that these depended primarily on feedback from the people.
This information helped us identify the neediest in the region and design appropriate
programmes for them.
The lives of many NGO staff members were placed at risk, often for very small
reasons, as they tried to assist the people. One of the Caritas Gulu team members (name
withheld) was shot and injured in 2002 at Parabek (Gulu District) by the LRA; he was going
on a humanitarian mission, but he did not have the necessary bread to bribe the LRA. NGOs
were prepared and able to support the people but the security situation on the ground frequently
undermined the use of a people centered approach: “The humanitarian relief effort took place
in an environment characterized by chronic insecurity” (Maya, 2008, p. 5).
NGOs engaged the locals through community meetings, printing of posters and
capacity building workshops. These included teaching participants how to avoid diseases like
AIDS and malaria, how to build safe sources of drinking water and innovative technologies
like fuel efficient stoves and bio-gas cookers using local appropriate technology. NGOs also
addressed the impact of deforestation on the environment (Martin, 2010 ). And, in a different
type of intervention, realizing the need to address the threat of AIDS in the camps, they set up
voluntary testing and counselling centres, provided free condoms and carried out community
sensitization workshops on how to stop the spread of the virus.

135
Although NGOs are competent and practiced at working on short term interventions
to improve the lives and livelihoods of people in conflict situations, their common long-term
strategy is to empower people so that they can deal with these threats themselves. To this end,
in northern Uganda, NGOs also worked on designing long term preventative measures which
could be employed when people felt their security was being threatened. NGOs see as part of
their undertaking the process of assisting in the two-way dissemination of information by
representing the political fears of the poor, who are traditionally ignored, to international
decision-makers, thus contributing to making the world’s political and economic institutions
more accountable (Nyamugasira, 1998). The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative
(ARLPI), a local NGO, for example, encouraged people’s participation in political matters
through community peace-building workshops. The group encouraged and influenced the
passing of the Amnesty Act 2000 (discussed in chapter six), as one measure to end the conflict.
At the Juba peace talks, many NGOs provided information on how the conflict could be
handled. Such representation helped to develop a strong civil society network and created a
platform to address future threats to human security (Nyamugasira, 1998).
In northern Uganda, other people centred/human security areas which NGOs
addressed through capacity building included good governance through popular participation
and transparency. According to Guzman in the field of enhanced peace and reconciliation,
SAFE (a USAID funded program for Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Equity and Peace
emphasised “building the capacity of local community faith and civil society organizations as
well as promoting local networks” (2013, p. 11). In attempting to improve people’s livelihoods,
NGOs used sensitisation advocacy workshops, organised community meetings and sponsored
radio programmes aimed at ensuring the long-term realization of security in the region (Makara,
2003). Thus, NGOs filled the gaps left by the government in the process of fostering the
security of the people (Clark, 2015). This role was carried out especially by those NGOs which
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had a relationship with international peace organizations. For example, Pax Christi had access
to the European Union and various United Nations forums, including at UN headquarters in
the New York, one of which in 2004 Bishop Odama (chairman of the ARLPI) addressed on
the situation in northern Uganda (Otim, 2009).
Although the most important aim of many NGOs which operated in northern Uganda
during the conflict was to cater for the wellbeing of the people, the security situation hampered
many of their initiatives and so further undermined the use of a people centred/human security
approach in the conflict situation. This is demonstrated in more detail in the following chapter
which discusses in detail the social, political and economic consequences of the conflict in
northern Uganda.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the causes of the northern Uganda conflict, a conflict which
exposed the weaknesses of state-centric concepts of security. It highlighted the importance of
involving the affected people in decision making, respect for human rights and the need to
understand better the relationship between conflict management, human rights, human security
and the international community’s engagement in solving conflicts. The neglect of such issues
prolonged the conflict which impacted negatively on people’s security.
The poor security situation prevented aid workers from effectively applying a people
centered/human security approach. It also led to ineffectual coordination between humanitarian
agencies and the military as there was a lack of consultation, shared information and
constructive dialogue between the two.
The human security approach considers individuals as central to security issues. The
approach also emphasizes the importance of addressing people’s needs and acknowledging
their capacities and values, which was the opposite of what occurred in northern Uganda.
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International efforts to solve the conflict locally should have more readily supported local
leaders’ strategies to manage and solve the conflict (Bar‐Tal, Halperin, & De Rivera, 2007).
In addition, policies which were introduced and implemented by the government,
coupled with the mistreatment of the locals by government forces, led to a lot of bitterness.
This undermined the legitimacy of state institutions and security strategies, a legitimacy based
on how locals see and access justice and acquire basic human needs. The government’s
Operation Iron Fist in 2002, which increased military pressure on the LRA drastically reduced
the humanitarian situation in northern Uganda, an indication of the government’s lack of
protection of its citizens (Southwick, 2005).
The causes of the northern Uganda conflict were many and led to the emergence of
the LRA which continued to operate for more than two decades. The role of the government of
Sudan in supporting the LRA as a retaliative measure against Uganda’s support of the SPLA,
worsened the humanitarian situation in the area and prolonged the conflict. The government of
Uganda’s response to the conflict was mainly the use of the military, which did not protect
people’s security. Rather it put people’s lives in more danger as they were caught up in the
fighting. The government’s anti-insurgency measure of creating IDP camps was not the best
solution to protect civilians. Instead it brought them more misery. Also, people’s well-being
was compromised in the camps. A lack of basic social services created further security threats
to the people. As a result, the conflict led to various human security threats which affected
every sector of the community. In addition, the failure by the government of Uganda to deal
with the causes of the conflict through meaningful discussions with the affected people
contributed to an escalation of the conflict and more human insecurities. The issues identified
above demonstrated that, even if the Ugandan government had wanted to apply a human
security approach during northern Ugandan conflict it would have been difficult. This conflict
was the longest and most brutal to threaten the human security of the people in northern Uganda
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since independence. It led to widespread death, injury and resulted in many health-related
consequences for the people in the affected region. The consequences of the conflict on both
the people and the region are discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Five
Consequences of the northern Uganda conflict
Introduction
As chapter four showed, the humanitarian crisis can be attributed to a lack of
appropriate responses to stop the conflict and the failure of the UPDF to defeat the LRA. This
chapter discusses the contexts of the social, political and economic consequences of the
humanitarian in northern Uganda. It supports the first hypothesis of the thesis which opens up
questions about the ethnic and social economic divisions in Uganda. The chapter explores the
ways that the sustained politically-based ethnic and socio-economic divisions was a major
contributor to the longevity of the conflict leading to catastrophic consequences for the people
and the region. Further, it unpacks the different perspectives held by key stakeholders in the
northern Uganda conflict and how they led to catastrophic consequences for the people of
northern Uganda and the region.
As previous chapters have begun to show, the northern Uganda conflict affected the
lives of many people in many ways. Although the LRA’s intention was to overthrow the
Museveni regime, the main victims of the conflict were the civilians (Dagne, 2010). People
lost their lives, others were abducted by the rebels, others lost their homes and means of
livelihood. This was a humanitarian crisis in the region (Otunnu, 2002). Notably affected were
the Districts of Pader, Gulu and Kitgum in the Acholi sub-region (2,279,788) with an overflow
into the Districts of Lira, Otuke, and Aleptong in the Lango sub-region (458,150) with
populations. Throughout the conflict, relationships in these Districts between the people and
the government were fraught, indeed, as Dolan argues, when Uganda’s volatile political
history is examined, it is clear what led many northern Ugandans to have little faith in the
government (Dolan, 2008).
At the peak of the conflict, the humanitarian situation was appalling. However, the
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government in Kampala intentionally censored news of it from reaching the international
community, using all available means to cover up the extent of the humanitarian crisis faced
by the people in the vast camps in the north (Branch, 2008). By the time the international
community realized what was occurring in northern Uganda, it was too late for the many
people whose human rights and security had long been violated (Otunnu, 1998). The conflict
had social, political, economic, cultural, moral and emotional consequences which left many
people in the region in a dire state. These consequences are the subjects of this chapter.

Political consequences
The arbitrary use of violent means by the LRA to achieve its aims led to political
instability in the whole of northern Uganda (Atim, Mazurana, & Marshak, 2018), leading to
lawlessness and turmoil, decreasing people’s security (Kizza, Knizek, Kinyanda, &
Hjelmeland, 2012), and increasing the intensity of the violence perpetrated on civilians by
both the UPDF and the LRA (Moorehead & Rone, 2005), which had severely negative effects
on social and economic activities in the region (Lomo & Hovil, 2004b), and the need for the
formation of IDP camps. For Mergelsberg, tragically, this was a meaningless conflict (2012,
p. 65). The political consequences included increased loss of freedom of speech and security,
increased human rights abuses, and increased opportunities for corruption and, as the
government imposed restrictive measures on the peoples’ advocates such as the politicians,
they too became voiceless (Armstrong, 2008). The impacts were widespread across the
government’s institutional framework, the political system and policy development, to the
point that early in the conflict the government’s political structures in the region had
effectively ceased functioning. As a result, the army took over the role of politicians in
decision making processes (Brett, 1995b) with the immediate consequence that people living
in northern Uganda became direct targets of security reforms/measures. Even before the LRA
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was branded a terrorist group, there were restrictions on people’s freedom of speech and
movement (Branch, 2011) but the government’s emphasis on intensifying security measures
had led to the people of northern Uganda being regarded as terrorists or opponents of the
government, which automatically excluded them from being part of the development process
of the country.
The Kampala government appealed for more funding primarily for social measures,
but the persistence of the conflict meant the funds were diverted for military purposes.
Ironically, such funding led to more suffering while also ignoring affected people’s security
concerns (Macdonald, 2017a). Consequently, the conflict-affected communities in northern
Uganda mistrusted the government and on several occasions during national elections voted
overwhelmingly for the opposition party as, for example, in 2001 and 2006 (Izama and
Wilkerson, 2011), demonstrating the negative perceptions and mistrust of many northerners
towards the Museveni regime.
Museveni used the conflict to protect his own political position: by demonizing the
LRA as a terrorist organization, his government achieved access to more international funding
and armaments (Kustenbauder, 2010). Uganda was perceived as a strong ally of the USA in
the effort to fight terrorism, and it can be argued that the principal reason the government
insisted on using a sustained military rather than humanitarian approach was that it had
received substantial military support from the US. However, even when funding, such as the
$US100 million received from the 2003 East African counterterrorism initiative (Whitaker,
2010, p. 651) was designed to counter terrorism through a mix of social, military and political
measures, much of the assistance was used to finance internal military campaigns against the
Kampala government’s opponents.
Branch (2009) argues that the enforcement of the camp system benefited the
government politically because potentially camps were the main source of government
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opposition and cites an example where people who were vocal were denied access to areas
where food aid was supplied (Branch, 2009): this confirms what I and other aid workers
constantly witnessed, that people in the camps were usually too frightened to speak against
injustices committed by the Army. In addition, the government worked to increase its political
control over the people and the authority of traditional leaders to regulate and mediate among
people consequently was greatly decreased (Branch, 2013).

Social consequences
The northern Uganda conflict resulted in both short and long-term effects on people’s
well-being, not least because the lack of meaningful association and cooperation between the
government of Uganda and humanitarian agencies working in the area exposed the people of
the region to insecurity and its consequences.
Bradbury (1998) notes that by late 1997 the number of people displaced in the
affected region had already reached 479,000 (Bradbury, 1998, p. 331). Displacement had two
forms (Lehrer, 2008): one, internal, with the formation of displaced people’s camps within
the country, and other more informal displacement, including some who had the means and
relatives to migrate to the capital, Kampala, and the second, external to Uganda, to Kenya,
Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, and further afield to Europe, the US and Australia
(Rockmore, 2016). In northern Uganda migrants faced hostility from those into whose areas
they had unwillingly migrated (Esuruku, 2011). However, many internally displaced people
ended up in camps (Table 4-4), which lacked basic necessities and heavily relied on
humanitarian aid (Branch, 2008). Describing the situation in northern Uganda, Daley states
that since the mid-1990s “forced displacement [has been] of a magnitude and duration unusual
in the modern world” (2013, p. 893). The high numbers of displaced people at the peak of the
conflict meant that in 2010 Uganda was ranked as having the third largest number of IDPs,
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totalling to 1, 405,976 IDPs in nine northern Uganda districts namely Gulu, Kitgum, Pader,
Lira, Soroti, Katakwi, Kaberamaido, Kumi and Apac (Kindi, 2010, p. 2).
Many of the negative aspects of enforced camp life have been discussed above
(chapter 4), but here it is necessary to address the issue of the widespread breakdown of family
norms (Cagney, 2011; Finn, 2012). The changing living environment people faced during
encampment impacted greatly on people’s sense of morality and family values. It led to
decaying moral situations within the affected families and the community in general
(Mergelsberg, 2012). In Acholi culture, people value their traditions because these guide their
interactions on a daily basis (Ochen, 2012). Cultural norms and observance of those norms
are the basis of many cultural institutions in both rural and urban Uganda, and Africa more
generally. Any practice which deviates from those norms is regarded as a taboo. In the
northern Uganda situation, it proved impossible to practise Acholi norms in the camp
environment. For example, sexual practices occurred among minors, which was counter to
tradition. Traditionally, “premenstrual sex was forbidden and was the cause of much
consternation and stigma for both families involved. In fact, if a child was discovered having
sex prior to menstruation the incident became a kin and community issue and was dealt with
in the same manner as a sexual assault that took place in the bush” (Patel et al., 2012).
However, all this was much affected by the conflict and the subsequent encampment (Ochen,
2012).
The social consequences of the conflict were also related to the disruption of
traditional community settings. Traditionally people have worked communally as a unit so as
to depend on one another. This helps them to console one another in times of trouble, to share
information and to protect themselves against serious crimes. The creation of camps which
the people were not used to, and which lacked basic services, contributed to increased crime,
prostitution and the breakdown of the traditional communitarian system. The lack of
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community ownership during camp life also directly contributed to the lack of human security
in the region.
While working with Caritas during the conflict, through informal discussions with
the elders and through community meetings, I recognised the depth of their reliance on the
strength of traditional social practices, such as that the men were the bread winners while the
women were carers at home. Yet, as other observers have also noted, I saw that due to
insecurity and restrictions on their freedom of movement, these traditional roles had changed,
within a short period of time (Davenport, 2011). Men lost their power and authority within
the family and were no longer able to provide for their families. Rather they became dependent
on handouts. As a result, some women took on responsibilities traditionally outside what they
were supposed to do. This was intended to increase family income while maintaining
traditional domestic duties (Reinke, 2016), but it had negative effects on family relationships.
As a result of the displacement of nearly 95% of people in Lira, Pader, Kitgum, and
Gulu Districts (Jacobsen, Marshak, Ofori-Adjei, & Kembabazi, 2006) the displaced
population had limited access to land which led to a dramatic decrease in food production and
in turn led to high levels of chronic and acute malnutrition (Horn, 2009). This was because of
the stringent restrictions imposed on those in camps by the military due to security reasons.
These restrictions confined them in camps without going to their original homes (Alderman
et al., 2012), yet the nature of camps did not enable people to carry out farming or own
livestock due to lack of farm space due to overcrowding. Therefore more than 80% of those
in IDP camps were dependent on external food aid (Podszun, 2011). Acquiring water for
drinking, cooking, etc, was also a big problem: every day people had to wait an average of
two hours to get water from the few available boreholes (Corbin, 2008). Commenting on this
situation, a report by the Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda
(CSOPNU) concluded that these conditions led to 95% of the 1.2 million people in the camps
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living in absolute poverty (2006, p. 24).
An alternative, slightly higher figure of 1.5 million people in 2005/2006 (UNHCR,
2007), makes the point that despite attempts to register people and manage the camps, the
situation was only just under control, and for aid workers and organisations this was a daily
struggle to estimate needs in specific places. The camps were very overcrowded and, as the
photograph in figure 5 shows, the huts were extremely close together, crowded in on one
another in a way that no Ugandan village would ever be. Appropriate sanitary facilities such
as latrines were almost non-existent, increasing the risk of diarrheal diseases, and the poor
security situation impacted on immunization programmes aimed at eradicating various
preventable diseases. People’s health was seriously affected. Accorsi (2005) point out that the
effects of the conflict and displacement on the health system led to the perseverance and reemerging of diseases, increased poverty and malnutrition among children and an increase in
war related injuries and infectious diseases(Accorsi et al., 2005).
Enforced camp life led people to resort to various coping mechanisms which were
unusual in local cultures. As an aid worker I heard such stories, and in situations where I
came to accept them as terrible realities. For example, when talking with people in Pabbo
camp one day in June, 2005, I was told by one man that due to the lack of proper income
generating activities to buy food and other necessities, some parents allowed their daughters
to become prostitutes or engage in ‘survival sex’ especially with UPDF soldiers at the end of
the month, which was when the soldiers received their wages (and see below, (LieblingKalifani et al., 2008). Such money was then used by the family to buy necessities. Although
not particularly referring to the situation in northern Uganda, Patel et al., (2012) make the
point that in conflict situations, girls’ lack of power to make independent decisions, increases
the risk of acquiring HIV/AIDS (2012, pp. 2-3). In the northern Uganda situation, scholars
continue to debate whether the increase of HIV infection was caused by the displacement

146
(Mergelsberg, 2012). Yet, as a Caritas worker, I was confronted with the obvious situation
that in order to survive, some northern Ugandan children resorted to prostitution, which
certainly exposed them both to psychological harms, as well as HIV/AIDS.
The psychological harm inflicted on people during the conflict had dire
consequences: Amone-P’Olak (2008) argues that the resulting and diverse effects on the
Acholi communities will not heal quickly. For example, the sense of community belonging
which contributed to people’s lack of emotional and human security, was eroded during the
conflict. Forced conscription of both mature people and under-aged children led to slight or
serious psychosocial consequences depending on the circumstances. The experiences of
abducted people during captivity were varied and always traumatic, resulting in widespread
post-traumatic stress disorder (Pham, Vinck, & Stover, 2008).
Due to the government’s inability to deliver basic services to people in the camps,
the responsibility of providing the basic needs was left largely to aid and humanitarian
agencies. The role of NGOs is further discussed in chapter seven. What is significant here is
that despite the efforts of NGOs, many people, forced into these camps for their own
protection, were in fact placed in more danger: as Mergelsberg (2012) argues, the government
put people in camps to control them instead of protecting them against the LRA rebels (2012,
p. 65). Poor collaboration and coordination meant that human security needs were not
satisfactorily met, by the government of Uganda or by international or local aid agencies: both
women’s and men’s traditional roles and practices were disrupted, challenged and often
destroyed in these camps. Further, as Okello and Hovil (2007) argue, because the war
undermined traditional community structures, women were denied the traditional/cultural
assistance they would have received from their husbands before the conflict. Consequently,
they often had to work harder, and travel longer distances to look for food and other household
requirements, with the result that often they were separated from their children for the whole
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day, with numbers of negative effects for the children (Okello & Hovil, 2007).
In some cases, as Whyte, Iha, Mukyala, & Meinert argue, breakdowns in traditional
practices and forms of moral compliance resulted in previously unheard-of gender conflict,
such as in the practice that developed of men focussing on single women for sexual
satisfaction: many married women were unhappy with this practice (S. R. Whyte, Iha,
Mukyala, & Meinert, 2013). But sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) was something
to which both men and women were subjected to during the conflict. By definition SGBV
includes sexual abuse and exploitation, rape, domestic violence, forced early marriages,
trafficking and female genital mutilation (FGM) (Kahunde, 2014). Many of these occurred as
alarming levels in the IDP camps, as Liebling-Kalifani et al., (2008), for example, show for
Kitgum, pointing out that many experienced rape, defilement, “incest, sexual slavery, forced
marriages and sexual exploitation for survival or in exchange for food” (2008, p. 178).
The psychosocial impact of this type of abuse had long-term effects and was a
concern for activists, not least because its threat to their wellbeing and so its negative
implications for people’s roles in local, national, and regional growth and development
programmes. In a report on the effects of SGBV in Pabbo camp, Gulu District, for example,
Akumu, Amony and Otim (2005) show that it affected survivors’ emotional, mental and
physical health and frequently resulted in hatred of themselves and others and social exclusion
and discrimination.
A study conducted by Kinyanda et al., (2010) on war-related sexual violence and its
psychological consequences on women in Kitgum, shows that 28.6% suffered at least one
form of war-related sexual violence, 72.4% had at least one gynaecological complaint, 75%
had one surgical complaint, 69.4% had significant psychological distress (2010, p. 1). A
similar study in Gulu and Amuru Districts, showed the direct connections between trauma
and dependency and suicide, with an increased number of people committing suicide every
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week (Kizza, Hjelmeland, Kinyanda, & Knizek, 2011, p. 236).
Due to the lack of support services in the camps and the social stigma associated with
SGBV, most cases were not reported to authorities (Liebling-Kalifani et al., 2008; Okello &
Hovil, 2007). Victims, especially men, were not supported psychologically and women were
affected in such a way that their reproductive systems no longer function normally (Akumu
et al., 2005).
Life in the camps destroyed the social fabric on which the Acholi people thrived. The
difficult camp life led to the destruction of community values. Feelings of despair were
increasingly expressed, there were increased numbers of suicides, and increases in HIV/AIDS
cases, particularly after ‘survival sex’ (Liebling-Kalifani et al., 2008).
As a consequence of the conflict, the human rights of many people in the affected
area of northern Uganda were compromised (Apuuli, 2006; Okello & Hovil, 2007; B. Roberts,
Ocaka, Browne, Oyok, & Sondorp, 2008, p. 7; Ssenyonjo, 2005, 2007). It was alleged that
while carrying out counter insurgency measures against the LRA the UPDF constantly
violated people’s human rights, on the same scale as the indicted LRA commanders had done
(Freeland, 2015): committing violations which included excessive use of force to arrest
suspects, forced displacement of people to IDP camps, arbitrary arrests and detention without
trial, torture of suspects, widespread killings of civilians in camps, disappearances of people
without trace, and rape (Freeland, 2015). Human rights defenders who tried to speak against
these abuses were targeted by both sides through the use of direct violence against them,
intimidation, and mistreatment (Branch, 2009): both warring parties committed atrocities,
human rights violations, against the people of the region (Baines, 2007). Many were tortured
and others died at the hands of those who were supposed to protect them.
During the later period of the conflict (2002-2006) conditions deteriorated. People
had no freedom to speak against injustices carried out against them in the camps and, although
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government structures like the District Administrator’s office, the local Resistance Councils
and the Resident Minister representing the office of the President were operating, these were
all silent on the abuses carried out against the people (Branch, 2005). There was an increasing
general sense of fear and disenchantment among the people in IDP camps. The protected
villages, as the camps became known as in this later period, were a breeding ground for many
preventable diseases due to overcrowding and lack of income generating activities (LieblingKalifani et al., 2008). Illnesses became more widespread in camps because the region was
becoming too dangerous for humanitarian aid agencies or the government of Uganda to
deliver consistent health services and there was a total breakdown in the social service system
in the whole of the Acholi and Lango sub-regions (Nannyonjo, 2005).
Living through the effects of prolonged conflict, and witnessing war-related
shootings, killings, torture, rape, and murder of family members left many people traumatized
and with a heightened sense of insecurity: the long and deadly government military campaigns
coupled with frequent attacks by the LRA had lasting social effects on the young men and
women who both directly and indirectly took part in combat operations.

Social consequences for children
Children were frequent victims of the conflict and the problems for children were
visible to development workers in the region, such as myself. Higher poverty levels and lower
social development indicators in northern Uganda were reflected in the low level of children’s
access to basic social services (Higgins, 2004). These, and the other problems I and other aid
workers were confronted by, have also been identified by humanitarian organizations working
in the region such as Human Rights Watch, UNICEF, World Vision, GUSCO, Caritas, and
Invisible Children (Beard, 2011; Ochen, 2012).
Having been abducted at a tender age and involuntarily forced to join the LRA,
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children were indoctrinated and then forced to commit atrocities, often against people from
their own tribe. An estimated number of abducted children in 2003, stood at 20,000 (Weber
& Rone, 2003, p. 17). Writing eight years later, Vindevogel et al. (2011) took a different view
on the number of abducted children, noting that due to the precarious registrations, the
numbers range from 25,000 to 38,000. In my view, and from my observations, even these can
be no more than estimated numbers. The security situation and lack of logistics at that time
prevented exact numbers being possible (2011, p. 552). During times of intense confrontation
between the LRA and UPDF, and as abductions increased, many children escaped the rural
areas and some IDPs and moved into urban areas at night because of their relative safety
(Akello, Reis, & Richters, 2010; Dunn, 2004). This ‘night commuting’ as it was popularly
known, was one of the coping strategies used by children as a result of the prolonged conflict
and displacement (Emry, 2004; Latigo, 2008).

However, irrespective of this commuting,

thousands were abducted and forced to join the LRA.
The suffering borne by children during the conflict demanded assistance from both
local and international agencies. The work of the World Vision reception centres for abducted
children, after they escaped or were rescued, provided havens for these children to undergo
a rehabilitation process (Edmondson, 2005). A survey conducted by the World Food
Programme in 2009 found that 32% and 18% of children were malnourished in Anaka and
Pabbo camps respectively (Dolan, 2013, p. 161).
The LRA’s actions against children led to an entire generation of children living in
poverty and suffering chronic hunger and disease. Older children often had to care for younger
siblings, subsequently leading to their dependency on humanitarian assistance for survival
(Spitzer & Twikirize, 2013). The children’s wellbeing was not helped by the comparatively
weak government investment in protective services for children, the limited or inadequate
capacities and resources available to address child protection issues as well as the gap in
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services left by the pull out of some humanitarian agencies (Weber, 2013).
Saile, Ertl, Neuner and Catani (2014) argue that the effects of the conflict on family
values also contributed to the maltreatment of children. Children’s rights were advocated for
by various agencies working for children in northern Uganda. However, many of the local
people disregarded these rights, labelling them ‘spoiling our children’ (Ochen, 2012). Such
comments led to the under-reporting of violations against children and, in northern Uganda,
not all police stations even had the capacity to provide monthly reports of child protection
violations. The long-term prospects of these children and the likely effects on their education,
depended entirely on the quick establishment of well-equipped rehabilitation centres: this did
not occur (Ager et al, 2011).
Children born in the camps lacked quality education. In the same way, those
abducted at an early age, never had a chance of going to primary or secondary school. The
insecurity and lack of infrastructure rapidly affected the quality of education in northern
Uganda. Although school enrolments were high, especially in primary schools, as a result of
the government policy of Universal Primary Education (UPE) (Alderman et al., 2012), actual
attendance and performance were below the required levels. This was due to frequent
displacement, parents’ loss of earnings on which they depended for school fees, and a lack of
safe and suitable learning environments. According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2006),
only 38% of those enrolled completed primary seven and 40% of student dropouts were due
to education being too expensive for many parents to afford. Although humanitarian agencies
provided scholastic materials and built schools (Ezati, McBrien, Stewart, Ssempala, &
Ssenkusu, 2016), the standards of children’s education were far below the rest of the country
(Higgins, 2004), while many skilled teachers fled the region ,which led to a shortage of skilled
personnel in the education sector (Stites et al., 2006). In schools, those teachers who were left,
were overwhelmed by the numbers, but also, as a Report by the Women’s Commission for
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Refugee Women and Children (2005) shows, a lack of suitable accommodation and scholastic
material for school children.
The consequences that have flowed from this are diverse: children born in camps
and those growing up in the post conflict era were affected by their lack of education
(particularly for child combatants) or the interruption in their education, have had problems
in adulthood, affecting their potential to compete favourably in the labour market, particularly
because they lacked the skills necessary to get employment and so productivity was
diminished. Thus, their wages were lower by a third compared to children from other regions
of Uganda, leading to continuing poverty and inequality. The futures of the northern children
have been severely affected (Annan, Blattman, Carlson, & Mazurana, 2008; Blattman &
Annan, 2010).
The conflict affected boys and girls differently. For the boys, according to Blattman
and Annan (2010), a lack of education and time spent in captivity were the main impacts on
their earning capacity. For the girls who came back from captivity with babies, it was difficult
for them to be trained or educated because no one was willing to look after their children
while they were being trained. Denov (2006) argues that these girls were vulnerable to further
sexual exploitation because they faced difficulties in finding husbands or partners and were
more likely to become prostitutes. Some of the girls faced problems of neglect, rejection, and
abuse because, according to the cultural practices of the Acholi, children are not recognized
without the father introducing himself officially to the parents of the mother and paying bride
price (Akello, 2013).
The effects of the conflict on children, both those abducted and those who were born
and lived in the camps, deprived them of a peaceful and organized environment. They lacked
support from and protection by their families including adequate educational opportunities
(Spitzer and Twikirize, 2013). Thus, children became targets of armed forces in the northern
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Uganda (2013, p. 68). The absence of a peaceful environment for the children to grow up in,
affected their socialization. In addition, those who were abducted were stigmatized and
discriminated against in their communities when they returned. Such treatment had long
lasting effects on children’s mental health, which led to adjustment difficulties, anxiety
disorders, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder problems (Bolton et al, 2007).
Exposing children and young adults to violent activities, left them vulnerable to behavioral
problems (Ertl, Pfeiffer, Schauer, Elbert, and Neuner, 2011).
NGOs and other humanitarian groups played a significant role in looking after
orphaned and formerly abducted children. As many of the children lacked shelter, money to
pay for school fees and scholastic materials, sufficient food, beddings, clothing, and medical
care (Akello et al., 2010), they were taken to child reception centres run by local and
international NGOs including World Vision Children of War Rehabilitation Centre (WVC),
Sr. Rachelle Reception Centre (RRC), Gulu Support the Children’s Organization (GUSCO),
and Kitgum Concerned Women’s Association Rehabilitation Centre (KICWA) (AmoneP'Olak, 2007). While in these centres, the childrens’ lives improved. They were protected
from the LRA and taught various skills aimed at helping them become self-reliant. However,
such programmes did not reach all children.
Involving underage children in war practices, as the LRA did in northern Uganda,
was a human rights abuse and a crime against international law. Testimonies from children
abducted by the LRA reveal the extent to which children’s human rights were severely
violated by the LRA as part of their indoctrination in LRA ranks (Spitzer and Twikirize,2013).
As discussed in chapter four, boys abducted by the LRA took part in the actual fighting during
which many lost their lives. On the other hand, girls were used sexually by the LRA
commanders and combatants and sometimes forced to move long distances while carrying
their belongings and their own babies: in this process, an estimated 10,000 girls became forced
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child mothers (Akello, 2013, p. 149) and were exposed to sexually transmitted diseases: in
such a situation, the probability of acquiring HIV through forced sexual intercourse between
military or rebel fighters and the local population was high (Thomas & Tiessen, 2010).
Finding ways to support formerly abducted young girls and successfully integrate them into
society was emphasized by humanitarian agencies and partly by the government programmes.
Such applications of what are effectively human security principles can provide a firm
foundation in shifting positive directions to assist war affected girls and raise their profiles
(Denov, 2006). In order to improve their economic livelihoods, Veale, Mckay, Worthen and
Wessells (2013) advocated for using a culturally-grounded participation model, to help the
young girls/women develop skills in self-reliance. Examples they gave included setting up
group or individual businesses, community drama groups and community cleaning. Such
activities were aimed at improving their health, social relationships and economic selfreliance which, to some extent, contributed to an improvement in their livelihood.
The main challenge many humanitarian agencies and government in northern
Uganda faced when assisting formerly abducted girls was acquiring productive assets, such
as hoes, pangas, seeds and restocking animals, but they also needed to access working capital
and address the shortage of appropriate skills. AVSI, an Italian NGO, in its effort to make
some girls self-reliant, provided cash grants of approximately $US150 and offered free basic
skills training to those participating in the programme. Preliminary reports showed that there
was an increase in business activities and a reduction in poverty among those participating in
the AVSI programme (Blattman et al., 2013).
In Acholi culture, parents play an important role in the upbringing of all children in
the community. However, during the conflict, parents were not able to guide their children in
a traditional manner. Verdeli et al., (2008) recognised other impacts including the constant
fear the children experienced, and their disruptive relationships with caregivers, family and
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community members, with some even having to prematurely take on adult family roles (2008,
pp. 605-606). The abuse children experienced during the conflict led Blattman and Annan
(2010) to acknowledge the long-term challenge that children’s rehabilitation presented.

Impacts on women
The conflict in northern Uganda forced women to live complex and challenging lives.
The camps were supposed to provide safety from the LRA violence. However, once in the
camps, for many women the risk was no longer the rebels. The new dangers women faced
stemmed from the attitudes of men in general. Those who were forced into IDPs faced
excessive alcohol consumption by, and increased violence from, their husbands (Saile, Neuner,
Ertl, & Catani, 2013). Many women suffered some form of violence, including marital rape,
emotional and psychological abuse, battering and verbal abuse, sexual exploitation or
harassment within the home. Further, many women suffered post-traumatic stress from their
abuse at the hands of the rebels when they were abducted and forced to act as both work and
sex slaves. (Saile et al., 2013)
Decision making culturally, in most African communities, traditionally is done by
men. Acholi society is such a patriarchal culture in which the interests of men are prioritised
over those of women, and assumes women to be submissive to their husbands (Harris, 2014).
However, due to the conflict in the region women’s roles changed, especially during
emergencies, transition and in the recovery process (Omona & Aduo, 2013). This and other
cultural practices gave rise to desperate behaviours which at times undermined womens’
traditional rights (Saile et al., 2013; Stark et al., 2009). For example, women had “low
bargaining power” in terms of safe sex practices: women feared being beaten or their men
going to other women if they demanded their husbands use condoms. Yet, the likelihood of
women contracting HIV was greater than that of men because of widow inheritance,
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polygamy by already-infected men, alcoholism, silence about sex, traditional ceremonies,
submissive place of women and resistance to condom use (Rujumba & Kwiringira, 2010).
Women also had limited knowledge of their rights within marriage and as a result faced threats
whenever they talked about divorce.
Clearly, the existence of statutory, cultural and other forms of discriminatory
practices affected women negatively, often resulting in the denial of property and ownership
rights and so women were particularly threatened by loss of shelter through evictions (Land
& Thern, 2014). Post-conflict, many households were headed by widows or single mothers;
the demands of caring for many vulnerable children put significant stress on these women
which resulted in their further impoverishment.
The various burdens women faced during camp life included ensuring that their
families survive by collecting firewood, fetching water from bore holes and caring for their
children. Although, before the conflict, women were able to do all these things without fear
of being raped, during the conflict they lived in constant fear of being raped by the UPDF,
LRA and other criminal elements (Okello and Hovil, 2007). Although it is the national
government’s responsibility to protect its citizens Henttonen et al., (2008, p. 129), in northern
Uganda, the national government failed to prioritize issues relating to the security of women,
but even in the so-called protected camps, women were regularly raped when collecting water
and firewood (Blumberg, 2015).
Although the human security approach emphasises addressing the needs of women
during humanitarian crises (Chenoy, 2009), humanitarian agencies failed to differentiate
women’s security interests from those of men. When NGOs did try to introduce new
initiatives for women, mainstreaming gender issues into their work, men frequently actively
resisted them, speaking negatively (personal observations); (Omona & Aduo, 2013). The
blocking of such initiatives resulted in the security of women being highly compromised.
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Of particular concern to aid workers were sexual and other forms of violence against
women which greatly affected their security. Understanding the causes of sexual and genderbased violence (SGBV), which in any community are based on local/cultural norms, often
including gender-based discrimination, is a key to preventing gender violence/inequality in
conflict and post conflict situations (Davies & True, 2015). Yet, in dealing with women’s
security in northern Uganda, addressing issues related to SGBV was never a high priority
(Thomas & Tiessen, 2010). The extreme social pressures caused by conflict and displacement,
the consequent break down of social support safety nets, the erosion of positive cultural
values, chronic violence, the spread of HIV and economic desperation led to an increase in
women- and child-headed households and the adoption of practices and behaviours, like
prostitution and overconsumption of alcohol, that were not supportive of child care and
protection, and so impacted on the family as a whole.

Economic consequences
Throughout the insurgency period, because of the prevailing insecurity, there were no
tangible development activities in northern Uganda (Ssewanyana, Younger, & Kasirye, 2007).
The conflict strained all economic development in the area leading to a collapse of almost all
formerly established income generating activities on which people relied. The twenty years of
armed resistance by the LRA resulted in the region having a lower level of economic
development than the rest of the country (Ssewanyana et al., 2007).
Because of fear of attack by the LRA, people were not able to start income generating
activities (Rockmore, 2016). The widespread destruction of the existing infrastructure, such
as the destruction of hospitals and schools, which provided not only basic social services but,
to some, a source of income, further contributed greatly to the poverty of the people. The
destruction of infrastructure slowed or halted much of the usual economic activity. The LRA
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planted landmines on main roads and carried out frequent ambushes on trucks and buses, and
the insurgency destroyed homes, property, schools, and hospitals, creating an intimidating
work and living environment. Any proposed development activity was impeded, leading to
more suffering of the people. Commenting on the economic micro-level consequences of the
conflict in northern Uganda, Deininger (2003) argues that the conflict had a significant impact
at the household level and future investment planning for the whole region, which in turn
affected the broader economy (Deininger, 2003). The conﬂict led to increased unemployment
and loss of income due to the collapse of economic activity.
Due to insecurity in the region, there was little public investment (Blattman, Fiala,
& Martinez, 2012). The conflict also increased the cost of doing business and led to substantial
capital ﬂight. Most investors preferred doing business in areas which were stable. As a
consequence, there was a negative attitude towards investment ventures in the region. This
was supported by official government policy documents which recognised that the human
security situation was a central factor in determining investment ventures in northern Uganda
(Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010).
The lack of well-equipped educational institutions meant there was little training of
skilled workers such as carpenters, teachers, programme officers, doctors, nurses etc which
posed a significant risk to the young generation in northern Uganda. As a result, these young
people had few opportunities to benefit from any economic upturn that might become
available during the recovery period. The better paying jobs went to people from other regions
who had better qualifications (Stites et al., 2006).
The economic consequences of the conflict were clearly negative for northern
Ugandans, and perhaps especially for people with disabilities (Liebling-Kalifani et al., 2008).
Due to the breakdown of the country’s health system, this group of people was ignored by
government agencies. Their physical disabilities often gave rise to increased poverty which
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affected their socio-economic wellbeing. As for many other northern Ugandans, people with
disabilities relied on international organizations for support and help to identify appropriate
resources and rebuild their skills.
Because of the absence of proper accountability mechanisms by the government
of Uganda, UPDF officers were able to use the conflict to enrich themselves (Van Acker, 2004).
The officers’ corrupt practices promoted corrupt tendencies throughout the Army leading
civilians to believe that, because the Army officers benefited so much from the conflict, they
did not want the conflict to end. Following the example of the army many civilians begun to
engage in corrupt practices; corruption became the cause of economic failure in government
departments, which had widespread economic and political impacts, beyond northern Uganda.
Nationally, ggovernment expenditure, until 1991, focused on improving services and
infrastructure, but from that time was shifted to accommodate increased military spending: the
defence budget increased from $US 32 million in 1990, to $US 44 million in 1991, $US 88
million in 1996, over $US 155 million in 2003, and $US 196-203 million in 2004 (Mwenda &
Tangri, 2005), the figures marking the progress of the conflict in the north.
During the conflict, the region lagged behind the rest of the country in all sectors.
Insecurity affected every aspect of people’s lives. It hampered aid work, stunted economic
development activities, and created a culture of fear and suspicion among people to invest in
the area (Lomo, Naggaga, & Hovil, 2001).

Consequences for human security
Human security stresses the importance of people’s safety from all forms of threats.
It is clear from the discussion above that the consequences of the conflict in northern Uganda
greatly affected people’s wellbeing. A people centred/human security approach emphasizes
protection of the individual. The social, political and economic consequences of the conflict
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discussed above show that the people were not protected by the Ugandan government. This
in turn indicates the differing views by different actors which impeded the application of the
people centred/human security approach during conflict. For example, despite the opposition
of humanitarian organizations, cultural leaders and politicians, the government policy of
forcing the people out of their homes into IDP camps and the lack of a comprehensive plan to
protect them in the camps brought suffering with catastrophic consequences.
Correctly instigated, a human security approach entails all stakeholders collaborating
in the design of appropriate measures to deter threats to vulnerable people. However, in the
northern Ugandan situation, there was no significant collaboration. Stakeholders such as
INGOs, NGOs, other humanitarian agencies and the government each responded in ways they
felt most feasible. In addition, a human security approach emphasizes people’s participation
in designing programs to alleviate the distress within their localities, people in the IDP camps
were given little encouragement to participate in planning for their well-being or for an end
to the conflict.
The Ugandan government’s emphasis on using a military approach rather than
identifying the sources of the conflict had terrible consequences for the people in northern
regions including prolonging the conflict, and as a consequence the conflict has had several
long-term legacies, including the significant number of children and women left as orphans
and widows. Even though INGOs, NGOs and other humanitarian groups attempted to provide
basic social services, the insecure situation was not conducive to reaching everyone suffering,
thus rendering the application of the human security approach limited and ineffective during
conflict situation. The assistance provided was never enough to cope with the enormous
number of people in need.
The northern Uganda conflict has also led to a lowering of the literacy levels of
children, forcing many into child labour activities and affected the social and economic
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development of many adolescents (Blattman & Annan, 2010). As recognised by Chandler
(2012), the implementation of a human security approach, which emphasised designing
appropriate programmes, would have addressed the needs of at-risk children and teenagers
and could have led to many young people having a sustained income base.

Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the consequences of failing to address the ethnically
based socio-economic divisions in Uganda following independence. The dire social,
economic and political circumstances of the northern Uganda people during the conflict were
a direct result of the cruelty and human rights violations perpetrated by the LRA and UPDF
and of the effects of displacement on the Acholi people and their culture. The chapter
demonstrates the difficulties of applying a people centre/human security approach in an
ongoing conflict situation. Eventually, due to the scale of the ongoing atrocities, which
undermined the security of all the civilians in the region and because of pressure from local,
national and international stakeholders the two warring parties agreed to talk. The next chapter
discusses peace initiatives and how they impacted on the conflict situation in northern Uganda.
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Chapter Six
Peace initiatives in the northern Uganda conflict

Introduction
This chapter discusses the successes and failures of the national, local, international
and regional initiatives to bring about peace in northern Uganda. Notable among these were
the impacts of the influence of the religious and traditional Acholi leaders, the Amnesty Act
of 2000, the ICC's intervention and the Juba peace talks. These will be contrasted with the
military approach preferred by the government. Each peace initiative will be examined
through a discussion of both its impact on the conflict and the security of the inhabitants of
northern Uganda. The chapter will argue that the deep-rooted ethnic and socio-economic
divisions within Uganda contributed to the failure of most of these initiatives and that
international interventions like that of the ICC, which emphasized revengeful justice, also
helped prolong the conflict.
As foreshadowed in previous chapters, it is argued here that the northern Uganda
conflict was the result of complex historical issues which complicated the various strategies
intended to usher in peace to the region. In order to explore these complications, it is essential
to position them in the contexts of the political, ethnic and socio-economic divisions
(hypothesis one of the thesis) which hampered most of the peace initiatives while revealing
the diverse interests and views of the various stakeholders, including their lack of agreement
on whether to use local or international approaches to end the conflict. In addition, this chapter
examines the inadequate information, mistaken beliefs and myths and a lack of knowledge
about the internal operations of the LRA that made it difficult to set up and conduct peace
negotiations.
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National initiatives to end the conflict
Although the government of Uganda, and President Museveni in particular, preferred
the use of the military option to end the LRA insurgency, during the two-decade northern
Ugandan conflict, the GoU explored other options aimed at persuading the LRA and other
fighting rebel groups to lay down their arms and stop the suffering of the people in the region.
Nevertheless, the mistrust between the GoU and the LRA undermined almost all of these
efforts (Regts, 2010). In addition, the government's lack of consistency in negotiations, the
LRA's unwillingness to compromise and the ongoing violence contributed to peace proposals
and initiatives not being honoured (Branch, 2007).

The 1988-89 UPDA – Government peace process
The UPDA/M was one of the first armed rebel groups to fight Museveni's regime
when the NRM government took power from Tito Okello in 1986. It comprised mainly former
UNLA soldiers and civilians who had little experience in guerrilla warfare. At first the Acholi
supported the rebellion with elders demonstrating their backing by carrying out traditional war
rituals, including blessing the soldiers with special tree leaves (Acholi, oboke olwedo) (OkumuAlya, 2009). However, the lack of supplies to replenish their arms, political intrigue within the
leadership, factionalism and failure to raise funds from the diaspora, all affected the group's
morale and fighting spirit. Their uprising was short lived due to mounting pressure from the
NRA, which persuaded the UPDA to negotiate with the government, which it did in June 1988,
with most of its leaders surrendering or joining the NRA (Happold, 2007).

The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1990
The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement between the government of Uganda and the
political wing of the UPDA who were in the diaspora (Quinn, 2009a) was the result of a peace
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process secretly rotated between London, Lusaka and Nairobi, the places where most of the
politicians were exiled after the overthrow of the Obote and Okello regimes (Bainomugisha &
Tumushabe, 2005). The government believed that these exiled politicians were behind many
of the insurgencies. It hoped that if these politicians returned home, they would cut off their
support to the LRA, and they would engage in discussions about the notion of Ugandan identity.
After months of negotiations, an agreement was signed on 14 July 1990 in Addis Ababa. Under
the agreement, former combatants were given amnesty and in 1992 their leader Otema Alimadi
went back to Uganda to settle. Although some of the leaders in the diaspora abandoned the
rebellion and returned to Uganda, many fighters stayed in the bush in northern Uganda, forming
the basis of the LRA fighters.

LRA/M Government negotiations of 1993-4
While the GoU continued fighting the LRA in northern Uganda, in the Teso subregion of eastern Uganda another rebel group was formed by Peter Otai, the former Minister
of State for Defence in the second UPC government. He formed a resistance force, the Uganda
People’s Army (UPA), in May 1992 (Lewis, 2016). The formation of the UPA was related to
the government’s failure to protect the people of the Teso region against cattle raids from the
neighbouring Karamajong ethnic group (Lewis, 2016). However, Larson and Lewis argue that
“it is difficult to draw a firm connection between pre-existing, anti-government grievances
and civilians' initial refusal to share information about rebels from the government” (1995b).
Other fighters joined UPA due to the violent nature of the NRA (now known as UPDF) when
they entered the Teso region (Brett, 1995a). On top of the insurgency in northern Uganda, the
NRA also had to engage in aggressive counterinsurgency operations in Teso region where
sympathizers and rebel combatants faced extra-judiciary executions (De Berry, 2000).
However, using their experience of negotiating with the UPDA, the government negotiated
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quickly with the leaders, offering amnesty to the rebels (De Berry, 2000). Having experienced
success with this negotiation, the government set up another negotiating team with the LRA,
but unacceptable demands by the LRA led to the breakdown of these talks and the conflict
continued (Okuku, 2002).

Betty Bigombe’s peace initiatives
Betty Bigombe was born (1957) into the Acholi tribe of northern Uganda. As an
Acholi woman, throughout the conflict she used her positions, as a Minister and chief
negotiator for the government of Uganda, to work tirelessly to restore peace and stability in
northern Uganda (Oywa, 2002). Her determination to achieve peace and her life-risking acts
of mediation brought her face to face with Joseph Kony who Royo (2008) describes as one of
the most ruthless rebel leaders the world has known. She championed core humanitarian
standards and, in order to identify the drivers of human insecurity, promoted what has come to
be called human security principles. She identified acceptable local approaches which involved
consulting different local stakeholders to get their opinions on how to end the conflict
(Kisekka-Ntale, 2007). In doing so, she acquired a reputation for using a bottom-up approach
in her efforts to bring peace to northern Uganda (Kisekka-Ntale, (2007). During numerous
peace initiatives in which she was engaged, her approach offered new opportunities for
resolving the conflict by using processes of effective negotiations (Quaranto, 2006). In short,
Betty Bigombe’s peace initiatives were based on the promotion of human security through
dialogue.
Her first peace initiative as Minister for Northern Uganda was between 1992 and 1994
when she began secret peace meetings with the aim of alleviating the anguish of the people in
northern Uganda. Bigombe's initiatives enabled the establishment of contacts with the top
leadership of the LRA and the top government army leadership. Her efforts in 1994 almost
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succeeded in facilitating peace talks, however, talks collapsed at the last minute (Quaranto,
2006). Lack of trust between the government of Uganda and the LRA leadership was
understood as the underlying cause for the collapse of these talks (Pham, Vinck, Wierda, &
Stover 2005).
The second Bigombe initiative was from 2002-2005, when she continued with her
efforts to mediate between the LRA and the GoU. However, the lack of skilled negotiators,
who failed to consult all the concerned stakeholders on the progress of the peace talks, the lack
of government support to uphold what had been agreed on, and the indictment of the top LRA
leaders by the ICC (discussed below) led to the collapse of this round of talks. Nevertheless,
Bigombe continued with her peace initiatives. On one occasion, her efforts bore some fruit
when President Museveni offered an 18-day ceasefire from 4 February 2005 (Hovil, 2013, p.
3). However, as with other initiatives by Bigombe, this ceasefire did not last long.
During her negotiations for peace, Bigombe sought support from recognized
traditional leaders and managed to arrange an unknown number of meetings with Kony, as well
as her safe passage along with other commanders such as Komakech Omona to these meetings
(Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999). Although her efforts did not end the conflict, they did lead to
some top commanders of the LRA abandoning the rebellion and defecting to the government
side (Apuuli, 2006).
As I observed at close quarters, Bigombe’s peace campaigns included a remarkable
series of unexpected and unpredictable break-through encounters with Kony. She achieved
these unique meetings with him by her deep understanding of the power of traditional
participatory approaches, and her capacity to persuade members of his small leadership group
to act as intermediaries. Through these meetings, she was able to learn more about who he was,
and what his motivations were, than anyone else in the past had been able to discover. As a
result, she was able to interpret for the government something of the motives and intentions of
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the man it sought to destroy militarily (Bainomugisha & Tumushabe, 2005). In addition, on
behalf of the government, she extended a hand of peace to the LRA by using the Amnesty Act.
However, before the process could take off, President Museveni gave a seven-day ultimatum
to the LRA to submit, which sabotaged her efforts. Museveni’s actions effectively ended
Bigombe’s peace talks. The army leadership wanted the rebels to negotiate their surrender,
while Bigombe wanted a settlement “where everybody was a winner” (Bainomugisha &
Tumushabe, 2005, p. 28). The government in Kampala refused any suggestion that they should
talk to the LRA. As a result, the LRA became completely unresponsive to government, except
through military resistance: Kony continued his deadly operations.
Betty Bigombe’s initiatives proved crucial in terms of bringing the warring parties
together. She used her local base as an Acholi, her interest in bringing peace in the area and
her knowledge of the local language to persuade the LRA fighters to lay down their arms.
However, as Dagne (2011) argues, because the GoU had international backing in the form of
providing heavy weapons to fight the LRA, her initiatives were thwarted. Yet, it was on
Bigombe’s efforts at opening contacts with the top leadership of the LRA that the Juba peace
talks were based.

Kony’s willingness to talk peace in November 2002
While Bigombe was negotiating with the LRA in 2002, Kony wrote a letter to
President Museveni through the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI)
(discussed below), showing his interest in ending the conflict through a negotiated settlement.
Throughout the conflict, the ARLPI was instrumental in advancing the needs and articulating
the suffering of the various stakeholders (Kasaija, 2006). In early 2003 both the LRA and the
GoU announced a limited ceasefire aimed at enabling face-to-face talks to take place. The
government formed what it called the Presidential Peace Team (PPT) headed by the First
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Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs, Eria Kategaya, to lead these
negotiations. However, the ceasefire lasted for only a few days because Museveni, citing the
LRA's failure to adhere to the ceasefire, retracted it and ordered a military offensive against
the LRA. However, Quaranto (2007) suggests that it was the government’s bombardment of
the proposed peace contact area which led to the failure of the meeting. The reasons for the
PPT failure were: first, it was mainly formed to satisfy international pressure that the
government try to end the misery of the people in northern Uganda. Second, there was no
replacement for the head of the PPT when he was sacked due to his divergent views about the
changing of the constitution to allow Museveni to stand for the third term. Third, the LRA
made no effort to name its own negotiating team (Bainomugisha & Tumushabe, 2005). The
government used this excuse to continue the offensive and the LRA continued to carry out
attacks on protected camps and ambush military and civilian convoys
The various peace initiatives discussed above failed to achieve their goal of stopping
the conflict and proved costly to the security of the people in the region. The main challenge
was the lack of trust between the two warring parties which acted as a stumbling block to any
negotiated settlement of the conflict, enabling the continuation of threats to the human security
of the people in northern Uganda.

Local peace initiatives
During the conflict, there were various local initiatives by different actors. Among
them were the Acholi Leaders Peace Initiative, traditional Acholi leaders’ initiatives, the
Amnesty Act and the role of the media in amplifying the conflict locally and internationally.
These initiatives were people-centred and focused on how local people can best be involved
and protected in order to improve security within their communities. In other words, they
emphasized the advantages of using a human security approach in solving conflicts. However,
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as with the national initiatives, local peace initiatives were unsuccessful in bringing peace and
stability to northern Uganda.

Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)
The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, is an interfaith peacebuilding and
conflict transformation organisation, formed in 1997 to encourage and set up acceptable means
of dialogue between the government and the LRA rebels. As a faith-based organization it
advocated for a local, people-centred approach to ending the conflict (Apuuli, 2011). The main
objective of the ARLPI was to stop conflict and re-establish peace in the region through
negotiations involving all stakeholders. It was an umbrella organization of three religious’
groups, Catholics, Protestants and Moslems, who were based in the Acholi region (Apuuli,
2011). During the conflict (1988-2006), the ARLPI, in conjunction with other NGOs,
advocated for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and a reconciliation process between the
rebels and the community, facilitated contacts on both sides and organised people’s forums
(Paul, 2014).
In contrast to other local humanitarian groups geared towards humanitarian assistance,
the aim of the ARLPI was to bring peace to northern Uganda but not to provide aid (Otim,
2009). The ARLPI based its activities on the human security principle of working with different
stakeholders within the community to highlight the threats the conflict caused the people. In its
advocacy campaigns to end the conflict, it highlighted human security components of reducing
fear and want and emphasising the need to live in a dignified environment. In a particularly
effective summation of the situation, Bainomugisha and Tumusabe, suggest that the ARLPI
“advocated vigorously for a comprehensive amnesty law intended to promote reconciliation,
forgiveness and healing in the community” (2005, p. 50). Other areas emphasized by the
ARLPIs’ program involved:
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Promoting the use of interreligious dialogues to both strengthen coexistence
and pluralism.



Equipping people with the skills to educate their respective followers about
interreligious dialogue.



Providing their followers with the necessary skills to become active facilitators
in peace dialogue.



Training their followers in conflict transformation to be active peacemakers in
their respective communities.

The ARLPI’s effect on ending the conflict in northern Uganda cannot be
underestimated (Kasaija, 2006). For many people in northern Uganda religion is not just an
abstract and simple belief system, but something embedded in their daily life. Koppes (2012)
argues that religion has been and will continue to be an important basis for individual and group
identity in northern Uganda. I agree with Koppes. While working for Caritas, I saw religious
leaders, in particular the Catholic Bishop of Gulu diocese, John Baptist Odama, a powerful
preacher, effectively use his position to guide and motivate congregations during mass to strive
for respect, peace, justice, tolerance and understanding in everyday life.
The role of the ARLPI in searching for peace and reconciliation was also recognized
by Khadiagala (2001) who argued that engaging local and international actors the group was
able to campaign for ways to alleviate the socioeconomic problems facing northern Ugandans
(2001, p. ii). The ARLPI’s approach was important because it moved away from the usual
“religious polarization and partisanship”. In doing so, it was “a courageous attempt to put an
end to the cycle of violence” (Diaz, 2005, p. 27). Since the ARLPI was a locally-based
organization formed to articulate the needs and priorities of the people, it provided a solid basis
on which to discuss and find lasting solutions to the conflict. This provided a contrast to using
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foreign interventions designed by international organizations, most of whom had no idea of the
origins of the conflict.
During the conflict, religious bodies complemented the security efforts of the
government. Although they were unable to deal with the underlying causes of the conflict, their
activities helped reduce threats to the security of those in camps by creating development
opportunities (Khadiagala, 2001). They also worked with government agencies and the
international community to improve people’s physical, economic and social needs. As a result,
they played a key role in reducing the threats to humanity and therefore improved, to some
extent, people’s human security. Commenting on the role of the ALRPI in bridging the gap
between the government and the local population in the conflict, Khadiagala (2001) suggests
that by taking on a leadership role the ARLPI acted as a bridge-builder between the Acholi
and the Ugandan government (Khadiagala, 2001).

Traditional Acholi leaders
Traditional leaders in the Acholi sub-region, through their paramount chief, Acholi
cultural leader, Rwot David Onen Achana II, argued that they could deal with the LRA and
end the conflict using traditional restorative approaches. They claimed that by using locally
known, traditional dispute mechanisms, which emphasized all-inclusive engagement with the
people affected, trust could be established with the LRA which could end the conflict (Apuuli,
2006). While working for Caritas, I observed traditional leaders in the region urge the
government to use locally accepted and traditional dispute mechanisms, including addressing
LRA grievances by using the human security principle of empowering individuals and local
communities to manage and devise means of stopping the conflict and achieving stability in
the region. In this case, effective mobilization of the Acholi people, combined with the
government’s counter insurgency measures would have led to the defeat of the rebels, thus
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leading to peace (Branch, 2005).
When the government referred the LRA case to the ICC, traditional leaders lobbied
the government to stop outsiders interfering with what they thought was a local problem which
required a local solution, and which could be dealt with by the traditional leaders. Traditional
leaders’ views encouraged debate about which approach to justice was suitable for the
northern Uganda situation, the local restorative approach or a retributive approach to justice.
However, Baines (2007) makes the point that the justice debate was much more nuanced than
that canvased by the government or the traditional leaders. She acknowledges that those
affected directly by the conflict preferred the line taken by their traditional leaders arguing
that peace should come first then justice later (Baines, 2007). Even though Acholi traditional
leaders pleaded with the government to end the conflict by negotiated means, their pleas
proved futile.
Most of the people in the affected region and many members within the LRA
respected the traditional leaders. As Latigo (2008) argues, there was a need to use and listen
to what the leaders had to offer, that Acholi people valued their local traditions, beliefs, norms
and customs, and believed in them more than those of foreign politicians or judges. From my
own observations, the use of traditional justice mechanisms, as advocated by the local leaders,
would have been beneficial. Many local people were illiterate, so it was easier for them to
relate to locally known mechanisms which they were familiar with, and which were also
people-centred and conformed to the principles of human security. An advantage of engaging
the traditional leaders in ending the conflict effectively using a human security approach was
to bring decision making mechanisms closer to people and enable them to participate in
matters affecting them in their community. Working closely with the Acholi communities
and observing the ways they value and respect their local leaders; it was clear to me that this
could have helped to end the conflict sooner.
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The Acholi traditional justice system: Mato Oput
The persistence of the conflict and the indictment of the top leadership of the LRA
(discussed below) raise questions of whether seeking justice before the conflict ended could
help the situation. For this situation, the Acholi traditional leaders proposed a traditional
justice mechanism which is built on restoring broken community relationships, a position
supported by Pham, Vinck, Wierda and Stover (2005) who argue for the benefit of using
traditional means and that the Acholi people should decide on how to deal with those who
committed atrocities in a way acceptable to their victims.
The mechanism for clemency and compromise among the Acholi is Mato Oput
(drinking the bitter herb). Traditional Acholi culture sees justice as a means of creating
harmony among the people and restoring social broken relations. It views justice as restorative
rather than retributive (Tom, 2006), encouraging individuals to admit their faults and be
accountable for their actions. Individuals are encouraged to forgive and not to seek revenge.
Tom (2006) describes Mato Oput as both a process and a ritual ceremony that aims at restoring
relationships between clans that have been affected by intentional murder or accidental killing.
Baguma (2013) also argues for the value of using the traditional justice system in the case of
northern Uganda, suggesting that victims believed that prosecutions carried out by an
international body would violate Acholi traditions and lengthen the war by complicating the
LRA’s willingness to negotiate or surrender.
Among the people affected by the conflict who supported the use of Mato Oput were
the former child soldiers who had come back to their communities. They argued that they had
been forced to commit crimes. Some accused the government for failing to defend them. The
use of a traditional justice mechanism, as performed in numerous areas in northern Uganda,
could have reconciled people and helped to entice those still with the LRA to leave it.
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Advocates of the traditional justice mechanism argued that what the people of northern
Uganda needed was peace and that justice could come later or be dealt with in a traditional
form (Blumenson, 2006, p. 809). Similarly, supporting the use of the traditional approach,
MacGinty argues that “since conflict is often culturally located, then it is sensible that attempts
to ameliorate and manage conflict are respectful of culture” (2008, p. 141).
However, not all have agreed: Muwereza (2011) states his scepticism about the
appropriateness of using traditional forms of justice, noting that “when the crimes are of an
international nature as is the case in northern Uganda, this renders local forms of justice
inadequate” (2011, p. 115).

The Amnesty Act 2000
After the years of conflict between 1988 and 2000 and the continual suffering of the
people in northern Uganda, religious, civil society organizations and traditional leaders began
lobbying the government to institute an amnesty for the rebels, especially the LRA, so as to
bring an end to the numerous rebellions in Uganda. A precedent for the amnesty was that
Museveni had used an amnesty to bring back former leader Tito Okello and end the insurgency
caused by the UPDA/M (Apuuli, 2005). Although the government at first resisted calls for the
amnesty, it examined the matter and eventually responded with proposals for a new amnesty
package, which became the Amnesty Act 2000. It was aimed at bringing stability specifically
in the conflict-affected region of northern Uganda, through pardoning armed combatants,
especially the LRA, so that they would abandon their rebellion. It was also aimed at convincing
armed combatants who were fighting the government to hand over their weapons and be
assisted in rebuilding their lives.
It corresponded well with a human security approach which emphasizes responding
to people’s needs in dealing with the sources of threats. The amnesty covered any rebel
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combatants who willingly surrendered and abandoned their involvement in the war.
Nevertheless, the Act did not apply to the top five LRA commanders accused by the ICC for
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Act was implemented by an independent
Amnesty Commission appointed by the government. Blattman & Annan (2008) stated that the
Act pardoned genuine combatants since 1986, and their supporters, so long as they abandoned
their rebel activities. However, Muldoon et al. (2014) point out that the “Commission only
began providing certificates and aid to combatants that returned after 2000” (2014, p. 2).
According to Nannyonjo the major goals of the Amnesty Act were to:


improve public and political leadership with regard to conflict resolution and
reconciliation;



promote dialogue and reconciliation among rebel groups;



demobilize and process applicants seeking amnesty;



provide resettlement assistance that included psychological support and health
care, and financial assistance to those seeking amnesty; and



facilitate long-term social and economic integration through incomegenerating and skills development programmes (2005, p. 12).

Although over 15,000 insurgents surrendered under the Amnesty Act, only about 4,000
received a reintegration package (Nannyonjo, 2005). To be granted an amnesty a person had
to “sign a declaration denouncing their former activities. They were then registered, given an
Amnesty Certificate and in theory, the reintegration package” (2005, p. 45). Notable among
those who benefited from the amnesty were former LRA spokesperson, Brigadier Sam Kolo,
former third-in-command of the LRA, Brigadier Kenneth Banya, and the chief operations
officer, Brigadier Onen Kamdul (Apuuli, 2006). The Amnesty Act covered all those involved
in insurgency through actually participating in the conflicts whether they were combatants or
just supporters of the insurgency (Apuuli, 2006). This was supported by the majority of the
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Acholi people, who were both victims and perpetrators of the war with the LRA (Blumenson,
2005).
The amnesty is still in place in 2019. Although the conflict in northern Uganda has
finished, the LRA has continued to terrorize neighbouring countries. Even so, the government
of Uganda continues to offer amnesty to former rebels through the Act. Also, the Act includes
a pardon and exemption from criminal prosecution by the Ugandan government (Rose, 2008).
The amnesty was not successful in stopping the LRA committing atrocities. Although several
separate fighting groups used this initiative to abandon armed struggle in Uganda, the LRA did
not because the amnesty excluded the top leadership who were the decision makers. Moreover,
the overall effectiveness of the Act was jeopardized because the reintegration packages were
funded by international donors, who restricted their funding because most favoured the ICC to
deal with the conflict (Hovil and Lomo, 2005).

The role of the media
During the entire conflict, the local and international media played a big part in
exposing the humanitarian crisis in the IDP camps. The media’s role in exposing the
deteriorating situation to local and international communities and stakeholders emphasized
upholding the human security element of protecting people in collaboration with other
interested parties when disaster strikes. The media has a role to play in providing channels of
communication between the governed and the government, presenting fresh perspectives on
topical issues, and can act as a watchdog capable of sounding a genuine alarm (Acayo and
Mnjama, 2004).
Apart from journalists, local politicians and human rights advocates helped bring
attention to the extent of the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda (Brisset-Foucault, 2011).
Throughout the conflict, Ugandan journalists, especially those working at radio stations and
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some politicians from northern Uganda, were instrumental in broadcasting peace and
reconciliation messages in the area (Bongyereirwe, 2010). The media were actively engaged
in changing and shaping people’s attitudes towards peace and reconciliation a role which was
recognised before the conflict ended, attracting funding from Britain through its Department
for International Development (DFID) (Daniel, 2010).
Some Ugandan media houses referred to themselves as the ‘voice of the voiceless’
in order to persuade people to participate in solving the conflict (Goretti, 2007). Despite the
government’s efforts to play down the seriousness of the situation, media exposure led the
international community to pressurise the government of Uganda and the LRA to end the
conflict. It further provided the means of communication between the government and the
people in the area. The media, both local and international, presented new perspectives on
how the conflict could be solved through airing and writing about people’s views.
Commenting on the role of the media, Bongyereirwe (2010) credits it with updating locals
and the world about the situation caused by the LRA insurgency in the affected regions. Yet,
Goretti (2007) suggests that, because journalists relied on the Ugandan army helicopters and
trucks to take them to the conflict zone, the independence and objectivity of their reports was
questionable.

International interventions
Although the LRA posed no real threat of overthrowing the government of Uganda,
the failure of local initiatives highlighted the need for a different approach. However, as I
have shown above, that did not occur through local interventions. The human suffering and
the extensive human rights abuses in the region, coupled with international pressure, therefore
led the government of Uganda to allow international involvement in attempting to solve the
conflict. Because of atrocities committed by the LRA, international interventions in terms of
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personnel, resources and legal means had to be employed to reduce the suffering caused by
the LRA and to achieve peace. Also, as the LRA operated beyond Ugandan borders into South
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and later on Central African Republic, the conflict
had taken on an international dimension. Consequently, the international community became
involved in tackling the problem. Notable among these international interventions were the
involvement of the Carter Centre, Kacoke madit and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The Carter Centre and Nairobi Peace Agreement 1999
The Carter Centre, which was headed by the former US President, Jimmy Carter,
played a key role in normalizing relations between Uganda and Sudan (Neu, 2002). The two
countries accused each other of supporting rebel groups fighting in their respective countries
(Prunier, 2004; Vinci, 2007). These counter accusations gave the conflict in northern Uganda
a regional/international dimension which complicated efforts to resolve the conflict. A report
authored by the International Crisis Group (2004, p, 6) points out that “The LRA remains one
of Khartoum’s proxy militias”. In their view, the LRA, lacked any specific political targets
for which they were fighting. Rather, Sudan used the LRA to disorganize the Ugandan
government because of Uganda’s presumed support to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA). In 1999, Uganda and Sudan agreed to a mediation proposed by the Carter Centre
which led to the normalization of diplomatic relations and the signing of the 1999 Nairobi
Peace Agreement by both President Museveni and Sudan’s President Bashir (Neu, 2002).
The Agreement was intended to cease hostilities and stop both countries harbouring
rebels and providing arms to each other’s rebels (Dunn, 2004). One of the reasons why Sudan
accepted the mediation was to improve its international image. At that time, the USA regarded
Sudan as a sponsor of terrorist groups including the LRA. Uganda was also under international
pressure to end the conflict and the suffering of its people. Uganda claimed that had it not
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been for Sudan's military support to the LRA, the conflict would have ended long before.
However, this argument was disputed by a Report for ACCORD authored by Ahere and
Maina which stated that “it is doubtful that it was only Sudan’s support that strengthened the
LRA. Years after Sudan withdrew its support and allowed Uganda’s forces to destroy the
LRA’s operational bases in South Sudan, the UPDF has still not been able to capture Kony”
(2013, p. 4).
The LRA accepted the Carter initiative in principle. However, Garang and the SPLA
did not, which further complicated the issue. Despite, the in-principle acceptance of the
initiative, it had no real effect on the warring parties’ military confrontations. Otto (2002)
observed that, although many people had high hopes that the agreement would resolve the
conflict, their enthusiasm was short-lived. The Nairobi Peace Agreement managed to restore
diplomatic relations between Uganda and Sudan, but Sudan continued to support the LRA
militarily (Dunn, 2004). Meanwhile, the security situation in northern Uganda continued to
worsen because a peaceful settlement of the conflict never materialized.

Kacoke Madit
Kacoke madit, an Acholi word meaning a large meeting, involved international
actors in the northern Uganda conflict holding a conference commissioned by International
Alert in London in May 1997. Organizers of this meeting realized that the obstacles to any
peaceful resolution to the conflict were based on poor relationships between the Acholi people,
the LRA and the GoU. Immediately after the conference, which representatives of the GoU
and the LRA also attended, the resolutions were implemented. However, infighting within the
LRA about who should represent them internationally led to the failure of this initiative
(Lucima, 2002).
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The International Criminal Court
There has been much debate as to why the Ugandan government referred the situation
in northern Uganda to the ICC and to the real timing of ICC’s intervention in the conflict. The
government of Uganda would have preferred to handle its conflict with the LRA without
attracting the attention of the international community. However, after 17 years of failing to
defeat the LRA or to reach a settlement and because of the escalating humanitarian crisis and
intense criticism from both local and international actors, the government decided, in
December 2003, to end its international isolation and refer the case to the International Criminal
Court so that the LRA’s crimes against humanity could be investigated (McNamara, 2013;
Nouwen & Werner, 2010). Although the referral represented a tactic in the Ugandan
military's attempt to defeat the LRA, not a shift of policy, it contained risks and
opportunities for the Museveni government. Internationally the referral and subsequent
indictments to the top LRA leaders were praised by human rights organizations and the UN.
At the local level the Ugandan government, according to Burke White and Kaplan (2009),
wanted to use the ICC to “provide an opportunity to raise the international profile of the conflict,
to pressure the LRA and its supporters particularly Sudan and to transfer the political and
financial costs of apprehension and prosecution to international actors” (Burke-White &
Kaplan, 2009).
The crimes against humanity included murder, enslavement, torture, rape and
enforced disappearance (Happold, 2007) and, since Uganda is a state party to the ICC, the
government was able to invoke Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute which allow for such
a situation to be referred by a state party to the prosecutor. These articles according to Caesius
(1999) indicate that “investigations may be initiated at the request of a state, but then the
Prosecutor must immediately notify all other states, so as to enable those which intend to
exercise their jurisdiction to rely upon the principle of complementarity” (1999, p. 162).
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There is no agreement on the Ugandan government’s reasons for referring the LRA
case to the ICC. By engaging the international community, Museveni was attempting to
improve his chances of defeating the LRA while not having to contend with the logistics of
doing so (Moy, 2006). Another possible reason is that the Ugandan government thought that
indicting the top leadership of the LRA would force junior LRA commanders to surrender and
seek amnesty (Apuuli, 2008). Other reasons for involving the ICC suggested earlier by Apuuli
(2004) include wanting to force Sudan to expel the LRA from its territory, to mobilize support
from neighbouring countries to fight the LRA and to get justice and reparations for the victims
of the LRA. However, Freeland (2015) argues that a more accurate reason was that "Museveni
was eager to alter European perceptions of Ugandan military activities and reshape Sudan's
incentives in dealing with the insurgents" (2015, p. 296). Nouwen and Werner (2010) similarly
emphasise that “The failing military operations and corruption scandals, the rapidly
deteriorating humanitarian situation, and the classification of northern Uganda by the UN
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs as the ‘most forgotten and neglected crisis
in the world' were beginning to tarnish the government's reputation” (2010, p. 948). Akhvan
(2010) argues for a simpler reason: simply to seek international cooperation in ending the
conflict and the suffering of the people.
Among other reasons as to why the ICC became involved in the northern Uganda
conflict that should be recorded here for the light they shed on attitudes within Uganda and
within northern Uganda in particular, are that, first, the ICC was seen as a means of deterring
further atrocities in northern Uganda. As Branch (2007) points out “there is a clear record of
international crimes perpetrated by both the rebels and the government forces in northern
Uganda, many within the ICC’s temporal mandate” (2007b, p. 182); secondly, donor countries
like Britain and Denmark criticized some of the government's policies and tactics on how it
was handling the conflict and threatened to suspend aid to Uganda. This was due to the
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government's increased defence expenditure which was far in advance of the money it was
spending on social services, especially in the war-affected regions of the north. The third reason
was the government's insistence on using a military approach instead of peace talks to end the
conflict in northern Uganda. In fact, against the wishes of international donors much of the aid
money supplied for humanitarian causes was being used by the Ugandan government to help
arm its military in the eastern part of DRC where Uganda was fighting against another rebel
group which was based in DRC (Branch, 2007). Uganda’s sending of troops to fight in the
DRC was a concern for the donors as they saw it as yet another conflict which was impacting
on the budget of a country which was also dependent on donor funds.
The ICC's Chief Prosecutor, Moreno-Ocampo, also had his own agenda, not driven
by the northern Uganda conflict but by international politics. As Branch (2007) suggests, “the
fledging ICC faced the urgent need to establish its efficacy through a viable first case” (2007b,
p. 186). Moreno-Ocampo wanted the institution to attain legitimacy as a working institution
because since its creation in 2002 it had focused largely on its own internal formation. By 2005,
he wanted to show the fledging Court’s credibility and efficacy by using the case of northern
Uganda (Peskin, 2009).
Referring the situation to the ICC helped Uganda’s standing because the international
community had accused Uganda of not doing enough to alleviate the suffering of the people in
northern Uganda. The referral was a way of showing the international community that it was
serious about stopping the conflict with the LRA. Akhavan (2005) emphasizes that " the referral
was an attempt to engage an otherwise aloof international community by transforming the
prosecution of LRA leaders into a litmus test for the much-celebrated promise of global justice"
(2005, p. 404). As it turned out, referring the case to the ICC did not provide a solution since
the government had not sufficiently explored all local avenues of resolving the conflict,
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especially the use of traditional justice systems, which many people in the affected region
preferred.
Uganda's case was the first to be referred to the ICC by a member country. Thus, the
ICC wanted to prove its own worth by investigating these alleged crimes against humanity:
explained, "the voluntary referral of a compelling case by a state party represented both an
early expression of confidence in the nascent institution's mandate and a welcome opportunity
to demonstrate its viability" (Akhavan, 2005, p. 404).
The Ugandan government thought that the seriousness of the crimes committed by the
LRA would mean that the ICC would deal with the case urgently, that the perpetrators would
be punished, and subsequently the war would end. By referring the case to the ICC, the
government managed to convince the international community to support its cause and
discredit the LRA. Indeed, Freeland (2015) observed that "[b]y inviting external scrutiny and
manipulating the investigative process, the Ugandan government received an international seal
of approval for practices that the ICC would normally punish" (2015, p. 293).
In addition, Uganda wanted an independent international institution to deal with this
case to avoid opening further differences between the north and south of the country
(Akhavan,2005). The focus of the investigation was made evident in 2004 at a shared press
briefing of Moreno-Ocampo and President Museveni where they announced that the ICC
would start preliminary investigations into “the situation concerning the Lord's Resistance
Army” (Allen, 2005, p. 45).
After its investigations of the claims against the LRA, the prosecutor of the ICC on
8th July 2005 issued arrest warrants for five top LRA commanders for crimes against humanity.
These included the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, his deputy, Vincent Otti, and other
commanders, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen. Their alleged crimes
included rape, slavery, murder, sexual slavery, and forced enlistment of children (Rose, 2008).
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The leaders of the LRA of course were opposed to being tried at The Hague, claiming
they were innocent, had not done anything wrong and that most of the crimes were committed
by the UPDF. During an interview with a journalist of The Times quoted in the Africa Research
Bulletin (2006), Kony was questioned about the killings and kidnappings done in his name. He
responded "That is not true. It's just propaganda. Museveni went into the villages and cut off
the ears of the people, telling the people it was the work of the LRA".
The principle objective of the ICC was not however to solve the conflict between
Museveni and the LRA, but rather to pursue any prosecutions that it considered warranted
(Branch, 2007b; Peskin, 2009) despite Uganda’s long history of being divided along ethnic
lines, which threatened to jeopardise the ICC's efforts. These issues underpin the literature
which discusses the case. Without specifying ethnicity, Di Giovanni (2005) for example, when
discussing the ICC’s involvement, focusses a spotlight on the government’s failure to tackle
the underlying grievances that pre-dated the fight with the LRA, while underlying ethnic
tensions between the northern and southern parts of Uganda were perhaps another reason why
the impartiality of the ICC was questioned (Allen, 2005). At the time of the referral, ethnic
tensions were still rife, and because the government was dominated by southerners, its referral
of LRA crimes to the ICC was questioned by northerners, particularly because both sides in
the conflict had committed human rights abuses. However, the ICC ignored those of the UPDF
(Allen, 2005, p. 45).
Another cause of concern about the ICC’s impartiality and neutrality was that the
investigators carried out their investigations when the conflict was ongoing, so they were
escorted to places which had been selected by the government (Ssenyonjo, 2007). Moreover,
due to a complex situation whereby the ICC investigators needed cooperation and protection
from the Ugandan army, it proved difficult to carry out an independent investigation
(Ssenyonjo, 2007). The situation was further hampered as court officers had to rely on the
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Uganda government army personnel to enforce arrest warrants (Clark, 2010). And among
northern community leaders and those opposed to Museveni in Kampala it was a commonly
held view that the court was not impartial but was being used by Museveni as a political tool
(Clark, 2008).
What northern Ugandans wanted was the end of the war so that they could go back to
their homes and forget about their life of misery in the IDP camps. However, the ICC insisted
on retributive justice, not taking into consideration the local people's demands to deal with the
crimes using traditional justice mechanisms which emphasise forgiveness and reconciliation
(Armstrong, 2014). These issues later proved critical in negotiating a lasting settlement to the
conflict during the Juba peace talks (discussed below). They generated debates on whether the
ICC could successfully solve conflicts if, as would be advocated when using a human security
approach, the wishes of the affected were not considered or addressed when negotiating a
lasting solution to the conflict. In the northern Uganda conflict , victim communities urged the
ICC to forgo prosecution in favour of a traditional Ugandan forgiveness and reconciliation
process, the Mato Oput (Latigo, 2008).
Researchers such as Beitzel and Castle (2013), writing in favour of the ICC's
intervention, note that "the warrants helped to bring the LRA/M leaders to the negotiating table
in 2006" (2013, p. 43). They argue that this intervention effectively ended the insurgency in
northern Uganda. However, Pham, Vinck, Wierda and Stover (2005) predicted that aiming for
peace at the expense of justice was not a workable long-term plan and that the court's activities
in Uganda prevented the LRA and its supporters from seeking a negotiated settlement to the
conflict. Akhavan however saw some benefit in the ICC’s involvement, arguing that "the ICC
referral significantly weakened the LRA by pressuring Sudan to stop harbouring rebel camps”
and the “new found LRA willingness to negotiate with the government [was] a mark of
desperation resulting from this new reality" (2005, p. 416). During the period 2004-5, the level

186
of violence did reduce dramatically, especially on the side of UPDF, possibly due to its fear of
being reported to the ICC and prosecuted. Nonetheless, the LRA continued to carry out killings.
The ICC's investigations and its subsequent indictment of the LRA leaders helped
legitimize Uganda's military policy against the LRA in the eyes of the international community
but was unfortunate for northern Ugandans as military actions continued to cause them untold
suffering (Branch, 2007b). Countries which supported the ICC, namely Denmark, Norway,
Canada and UK, argued that, by intervening in the northern Uganda conflict, the ICC helped
the government of Uganda set up the International Crimes Division of the High Court which
helped to improve the country's rule of law and accountability. Ugandan courts could have tried
the indicted LRA leaders without the judges being intimidated by the executive (Apuuli, 2008).
The question of the effects of the ICC on the local community generated widely
different views. Diaz (2005) points out that "One of the positive things about the intervention
of the ICC is that it … refocused attention to one of the most neglected humanitarian disasters
in the world" (2005, p. 30). However, some northern Ugandans who supported the ICC's
intervention at first, then changed their minds when they realized that the court could not arrest
any of the perpetrators and also had to rely on government assistance in its fact-finding mission.
Many others saw the ICC as an external and therefore a neo-colonialist institution which
imposed foreign laws on Uganda, because of its perceived underdevelopment (Otim & Wierda,
2008). However, this is a mistaken view, because it is a requirement by the ICC that member
states, such as Uganda modify their laws in accordance with ICC statutes. Since many locals
had not heard of the ICC, it lacked legitimacy in their eyes (Schomerus, 2008). The ICC’s
intervention complicated future locations of peace talks because countries which are signatories
to the Rome Statute are obliged to extradite indicted persons to the court (Schomerus, 2008).
Early in the process, it was clear that the ICC’s involvement would not be a quick solution to
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the conflict because as Schomerus (2008) observes “it had no mandate or executive partner to
act on its arrest warrants and seize the LRA’s elusive leaders” (2008, p. 94).
Ending the conflict was considered a priority by UN agencies and humanitarian and
civil society activists operating in northern Uganda such as Caritas Internationalis, Save the
Children, UNICEF, and World Vision. The UN humanitarian coordinator, Jan Egeland, urged
Uganda to strike a deal with the LRA in order to stop the humanitarian crisis in the region
(Otim & Wierda, 2008). However, to address the conflict and ease the misery of the people in
the war-affected north, it was necessary to address other related issues created by the colonial
administration like the social, economic and political imbalance between the north and the
south of Uganda. Addressing such issues on a national level, using locally acceptable means
rather than involving the ICC, would have helped to forge a way forward to amicably deal with
them (Rose, 2008).
Internationally the referral and subsequent indictments of the top LRA leaders were
praised by human rights organizations and the UN. The former UN secretary general, Kofi
Annan, when commenting on the ICC’s involvement, praised it saying that the indictments
“send a powerful signal around the world that those responsible for such crimes will be held
accountable for their actions”(Moy, 2006b, p. 269). In northern Uganda though, indicting the
LRA leaders further increased the threat to people's security. In fact, the ICC came under
intense condemnation for its interference and was labelled by peace activists as a spoiler in the
endeavour of bringing peace to the region. Apuuli (2006) observes that these criticisms came
mainly from those who were working on the ground during the conflict to pursue a negotiated
settlement: mainly religious leaders under their umbrella organization, the Acholi Religious
Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI), NGOs, academics and mediators.
The referral angered those who had been working on a negotiated settlement of the
conflict because the people centred/human security approach, which they advocated and which

188
emphasizes placing the affected people at the centre of any meaningful discussions to end the
conflict, differed completely to the ICC approach. The ICC's involvement created a tug of war
between locals who wanted peace and many western countries which wanted justice. In Acholi
culture, local approaches are based on rebuilding social trust and restoring the conditions of
communal co-existence. All this is based on the principle of forgiveness and reconciliation
which is people-centred as is the human security approach. However, western justice systems
tend to promote exclusion from the community, which in turn can result in hatred directed at
the perpetrators of crime. Hanlon (2006), commenting on which should come first, peace or
justice, argues that, "For a westerner, forgiveness in lieu of justice sounds like impunity. For
an African steeped in traditional justice what is surprising is that Museveni petitioned the ICC
for the LRA situation, especially considering the African opinion of western jurisprudence"
(2006, p. 298). In this view, widely accepted in Uganda, Museveni disregarded traditional
practices.
The ICC’s involvement rotated around promoting values which are essential for
justice, the redress and deterrence of crimes against humanity, as well as the necessity to restore
peace in northern Uganda. However, the Court was accused of promoting what it was supposed
to protect. Commenting on that issue, Pham, Vinck, Wierda and Stover (2005) suggest that in
the northern Uganda situation there was a need to develop a strategy which incorporated local
and foreign mechanisms intended to bring peace.
Arsanjani and Reisman (2005) argue that "To start war crimes investigations for the
sake of justice at a time when the war is not yet over, risks having in the end neither justice nor
peace delivered" (2005, p. 385). The ICC's involvement in the northern Uganda conflict meant
local and international actors shifted their attention from the local communities who were
suffering as a result of the conflict to the involvement of ICC in the conflict. This change of
attention prolonged the debate on whether peace should come first before the justice or both
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should be pursued simultaneously. As previously mentioned, for many of the people who were
suffering, the dream was to have peace and, as a result, justice to follow. Traylor (2009) though,
viewed the ICC’s arrest warrants as likely to hinder “efforts to bring an end to the conflict”
(2009, p. 34).
Furthermore, the situation in northern Uganda provided an insight into how
internationally led peace initiatives can jeopardize local peace processes. This can be seen in
the case of the LRA refusing to sign the final Juba peace agreement (below). On the other hand,
local initiatives, which emphasized the individual needs approach to ending the conflict, were
accepted by the majority of the northern Uganda people. Allen (2005) encapsulates the negative
effects of the ICC's involvement on the security of the people in northern Uganda. He claims
it was biased, had the potential to increase violence especially against children and witnesses,
that it damaged the peace process by undermining the amnesty and ceasefire and that it
“ignore[d] and disempower[ed] local justice procedures" (2005, p. iv).
The ICC intervention in northern Uganda conflict undermined the principles of human
security because individuals were not regarded as central. According to civil society groups
and most of the local Acholi population, the arrest warrants associated with the ICC indictment
made the peaceful resolution of the conflict less likely (Apuuli, 2006). The LRA did not want
to be tried either locally or in a foreign court and they were not willing to surrender to the
Ugandan government. Also, since the Ugandan military approach had failed to defeat the LRA
or capture its leader, the ICC's intervention was unlikely to change the situation since the ICC
did not have a mechanism to arrest perpetrators of crimes.
The ICC's action of investigating only the LRA and not the UPDF during the conflict
was seen as showing that the ICC put itself and the institution's credibility first, instead of the
plight of the people suffering in the conflict, and undermining the human security approach of
treating people equally (Sinclair 2013). Yet, while Branch (2007) can argue that "the Ugandan
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government cynically referred the ongoing conflict to the ICC, expecting to restrict the ICC's
prosecution to the rebels in order to obtain international support for its militarization and to
entrench, not resolve the war" (2007, pp. 179-180), since it is not within the jurisdiction of the
ICC to arrest suspects, the main reason why the ICC ignored crimes committed by the Ugandan
military should rather be read as pragmatic. It needed cooperation from the government to
investigate the allegations.
In responding to threats to ordinary people, the human security approach first
identifies the sources of those threats. Both the LRA and the UPDF were sources of threats to
the people of northern Uganda. Although the prosecutor at that time, Moreno-Ocampo,
promised to carry out more investigations into the conflict, nothing was done, prompting
writers such as Sinclair (2013) to argue that justice will not be served until the UPDF actions
during the war have been investigated. Indeed, commenting on this imbalance, Sinclair points
out that "it is hard for the victims of conflict in Uganda to entrust [sic] the ICC when it is not
considering the totality of the situation" (Sinclair, 2013, p. 78).
As the western interventionist approach of the ICC as opposed to the localized people
centred/human security approach, shows, external solutions are sometimes not effective. The
human security approach devises means to best protect the people most affected by the decades
of conflict who, as Di Giovanni (2005) relates, continue to express fear and resistance to
historical problems created by the colonialists. His argument then was that intervention would
most likely lead to a continuation of their suffering.
Further, the people centred approach of responding to people's needs within their
communities, based on local values, was severely undermined by the ICC's involvement in the
conflict. Jackson (2009) argues that the Acholi claimed the northern region was left
underdeveloped intentionally, so solutions to the conflict should refer to local norms embedded
in traditional ways of reconciliation which Ojok (2014) refers to as being interpersonal,
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intercommunity or intertribal depending on the magnitude of the offences committed.
Ssenyonjo (2005) points out that the government’s Amnesty Act of 2000, which was
overwhelmingly supported by Uganda's opposition groups and traditional and religious leaders,
would have been enough to persuade the rebels to come out of the bush and stop the conflict.
The ICC's involvement jeopardized those amnesty initiatives because the rebels feared being
arrested and tried at The Hague. Yet, what Ssenyonjo does not account for is that, despite the
Amnesty Act, the conflict continued in the years before the Ugandan referral of the case
to the ICC.
The ICC wanted to combine peace and justice simultaneously in an effort to solve the
conflict. However, those affected by the conflict had mixed feelings on the issue of peace and
justice. Clark (2007) argues that advocates of people affected by the conflict believed there was
a need to have "a multi-faceted transitional justice response, combining several processes and
institutions to address different types of harm caused by different levels of perpetrators" (2007,
p. ii). As discussed above, the ICC’s intervention jeopardized and weakened local peace
initiatives while, when left alone, local peace mechanisms usually had a greater impact because
they were traditionally accepted by the concerned people. Yet, as Grono and O'Brien (2008)
argue, "it is difficult to tell victims of these conflicts that the prosecution of a small number of
people should take precedence over a peace deal that may end the appalling conditions they
endure and the daily risks they face" (2008, p. 14).
The ICC's involvement in the conflict was praised as an achievement by some
international communities and some human rights advocates. Nonetheless, victims of LRA
atrocities preferred a reconciliation and reintegration process within their communities (Lanz,
2007) 9). This suggests that to be successful, international interventions need to be backed by
the full participation of local communities. Although the ICC is internationally recognized by
a number of countries and has set out operational procedures, there is a need to scrutinize its
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operations especially in cases dealing with a notorious rebel group like the LRA: because the
ICC's intervention jeopardized a negotiated settlement in northern Uganda, the LRA exported
its activities to neighbouring countries, affecting people's security in those countries.
Future research is needed to examine how best the ICC could intervene in ongoing
conflict situations like that in northern Uganda and how its intervention affects the victims of
the conflict. Such research is necessary especially because the ICC's intervention helped the
Uganda government rescue its credibility in the eyes of the international community, while at
the same time undermining the security of affected people (Happold, 2007).

Regional peace initiatives
Regional efforts to solve the conflict were dismissed by the government of Uganda,
which insisted this was a local problem which could be solved locally, using local means.
Thus, from the beginning of the conflict, regional countries had offered few resources and
little commitment in the fight against the LRA even though the conflict had impacted on the
security of neighbouring countries in the region. However, in the end, it was regional efforts
which led to the Juba peace talks, which proved to be a turning point in the northern Uganda
conflict and the start of that region’s recovery process.

The Juba peace talks 2006-2008
Before the beginning of the Juba peace talks both local and international initiatives
had failed to bring the two warring parties together. For example, in 2004 there were efforts
aimed at solving the conflict when the LRA appointed two senior commanders, Vincent Otti
and Sam Kolo, to negotiate on their behalf (Dagne, 2011). However, Kolo’s defection to the
government side undermined that prospect of a peaceful settlement.
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In 2006, when South Sudan became semi-autonomous and following the ICC
indictments, Kony declared his wish to conduct peace talks. These talks also coincided with
the address of Bishop Baptist Odama, by then the chairman of the ARLPI, to the UN Security
Council about the situation in northern Uganda which had the effect of persuading the UN,
with the assistance of the international community, to participate in peace talks in Juba,
southern Sudan. The mediator was the then Vice President of South Sudan, Lt. Gen Dr. Riek
Machar Teny Dhourgon, a former rebel in Sudan's own north-south war. After meeting Kony
in the bush near the Congolese border in May 2006, he began mediating between the LRA
and the government of Uganda.
These UN-backed talks were the result of intense pressure from local and
international peace activists (Kasozi, 2012): Stakeholders included the local populations,
religious and faith-based groups and civil-society groups, and countries such as Canada, the
Netherlands and Norway that had been persistent peace advocates (Omach, 2011a). The talks,
also supported by South Africa, Kenya, DRC and Tanzania in the form of military personnel
who formed the bulk of Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring team (CHMT), generated a lot of
enthusiasm among peace activists in those countries (Quinn, 2009b). Other groups who
supported these talks were the traditional and religious leaders from northern Uganda. For
them, peace, based on their traditional values, was their highest priority and the basis for a
new beginning (Armstrong, 2014). In more than 20 years of conflict in northern Uganda, there
had never been such an extensive involvement of international actors focused on finding a
lasting solution to the conflict. In addition, the Juba talks, unlike previous talks, promised a
negotiated settlement because the agenda emphasised ‘reconciliation and accountability’
(Baines, 2007). As a participant in these talks, I was constantly aware that many humanitarian
organizations considered these talks crucial to improving security on the ground which would
mean they could extend their services. The visible longing for peace extended even further:
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while at Atiak camp for example, on my way to Juba for the peace talks, I observed that people
in the camp were praying day and night for the success of these talks.
The Juba talks coincided with changing circumstances in the conflict between north
and South Sudan. The agreement between the north and the SPLM/A to permit a semiautonomous country had a significant bearing on the northern Uganda conflict. During that
period, the Government of South Sudan was interested in ending abductions and massacres
by the LRA in its own territory and stabilizing the fledgling peace agreement in South Sudan
(Baines, 2007). In a similar way, the improving relationship between south and north Sudan
raised prospects for peace in northern Uganda as it was anticipated that the support from
Sudan to the LRA would be cut off (Valérie, 2008).
It is my contention that finding a lasting solution to the conflict demands a concerted
effort by all the relevant countries to address the historical issues related to the conflict.
However, this still has not happened at the time of writing (May 2019). The LRA is still at
large and continuing its reign of terror in countries north of Uganda. My position is supported
by Omeje and Hepner who have pointed out that even those peace negotiations in Uganda
which have been called successful, have not addressed “the historical and political-economic
factors at the root of the conflict and their cross-border or regional ramifications” (2013, p.
86). However, as discussed below, the Juba peace talks tried to address the historical problems
during the agenda setting for the talks.
At the beginning of the Juba talks, August 20, 2006, both the government of Uganda
and the LRA representatives signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). This
resulted in a cessation of brutal attacks occurring in northern Uganda. There were a number of
agendas which formed the basis of the Juba peace talks (Rose, 2008). Agenda one, the CoHA,
was the first formal agreement signed between the LRA and the GoU since the conflict started
and was aimed at creating a favourable environment for talking about peace. Both parties
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agreed that the LRA fighters should assemble at two areas, Owiny Ki-bul in the semiautonomous region of Southern Sudan, and Ri-kwangba near the DRC border.
Under this agreement all armed combatants had to leave Uganda and assemble in the
agreed areas, assembly points, which effectively ended the presence of LRA in northern
Uganda, and so the conflict in northern Uganda (Price, 2007). As part of the conditions set by
the LRA to participate in these talks, the LRA demanded to be given basic social services in
order to be able to concentrate on the talks, which was accepted by the Mediation Secretariat.
According to Sebukyu (2006), then- Deputy Director of Caritas Uganda, the assembled
combatants were to be given basic social services, food, sanitation facilities, medicine and
other nonfood items. These were to be supplied by Caritas Uganda as a development arm of
the Catholic Church with support from the international community, specifically Danish Aid.
Since Caritas was well known by both parties and had the experience, knowledge and good
working relationship with both the LRA and the government, they chose Caritas to provide
the basic needs as requested by the assembled combatants. It took only three weeks for the
first delivery to arrive at the two assembly points (Ri-kwangba and Owiny Kibul in the bush.
They came by truck from Kampala, 320 kilometres to Gulu, and then more than 300
kilometres north-east along muddy unmade roads (bush tracks) to the assembly point.
The monthly deliveries by Caritas continued throughout the peace talks, a strong
indication of the trust LRA had in Caritas. During this period, my team and I put in much
effort to create an acceptable atmosphere to create friendship between Caritas and the LRA.
This was exemplified when different visitors, including members of the Mediation Secretariat
and the CHMT, to the assembly area were stopped and asked very many questions at the LRAmanned roadblocks, while as Caritas staff we could continue to move freely without being
questioned, as we had done during the years we had already worked in the area. Another
indication of the trust the LRA put in Caritas, was that we were allowed to provide basic social
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services for the LRA women and children (who stayed in the bush, not coming into the
assembly area), but when UNICEF wanted to establish a camp for those women and children
to provide similar services, the LRA emphatically refused this proposal.
However, while we had no violence even threats from the LRA, other incidents
which stay in my mind did happen. One was when one of our staff was taken hostage by
members of a South Sudanese community which we used to pass on our way to the assembly
area. They claimed that we needed to compensate them for the atrocities which the LRA did
to their community. They felt that, LRA was getting assistance from our programme, and so
should they. He was released unharmed a week later, but only after negotiations with the
South Sudanese government. The other such incident that stays with me was when LRA
attacked an SPLA camp and killed several soldiers and stole their guns. My team and I did
not know about the fighting until we reached that area and were all of us detained for two
days by the SPLA, claiming that we Ugandans were collaborating with the LRA to kill South
Sudanese.
However, in both these two incidents, we managed to contact the UN representative
who worked with the Mediation Secretariat (headed by the vice President of South Sudan),
which sent Special Forces from the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNIMIS) who
negotiated our release.
After the assembly areas had been set up in South Sudan, what followed was relative
and sustained peace and fewer reported abductions and killings in areas where the LRA had
been based (Grono & O’Brien, 2008). Although there was considerable intimidation by the
LRA in the two assembly areas, these talks were seen by many as the best hope for ushering
in peace in northern Uganda since the conflict began (Grono & O’Brien, 2008; Pham & Vinck,
2007).
Agenda two was signed on May 2, 2007. This centred on finding a lasting solution
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to the end of the conflict and at improving democratic governance, the reintegration process
of LRA combatants and the general recovery process. Agenda three was signed on June 29,
2007. This focused on accountability and reconciliation and was aimed at identifying and
designing acceptable justice mechanisms to accelerate the reconciliation process which were
acceptable to both sides.
Other agendas which included the permanent ceasefire and the agreement on the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the rebel fighters were discussed and signed.
However, only the GoU signed the final peace agreement. The leader of the LRA refused to
come to the final signing ceremony, citing fears of not understanding some of the clauses in
the agreement (Spiegel & Prendergast, 2008). Irrespective of the failure to have the final peace
agreement signed, the talks seemed to offer a lasting solution to the problems of northern
Uganda. Peace and stability were ushered in enabling the implementation of various recovery
programmes and some of the resolutions decided on during the Juba peace talks. Thus, the
reconstruction process began.
Although the Juba peace talks were a regional initiative, external influences, mainly
the insistence of the ICC to prosecute the top leadership of the LRA rather than using locally
known approaches, ended the talks prematurely (Lanz, 2007). The ICC was a major obstacle
to the success of the Juba peace negotiations mainly because the LRA leaders feared for their
own survival and safety (Lanz, 2007). During the Juba peace talks, international institutions
like the UN, UNICEF, AU and countries like Denmark, Sweden, Britain, the United States
and Canada contributed a considerable amount of material resources and diplomatic effort
(Quinn, 2009). For some commentators, however, these efforts were too little, too late.
Armstrong (2014), for example, argues that the war would not have continued nearly so long
if the international community had made such contributions earlier (Armstrong, 2014, p. 594).
However, during the time I worked in northern Uganda (2002-2008), and during my
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participation in the Juba peace process of (2006-2008), I saw no indication that increased
financial, technical and diplomatic resources would have been enough to end the conflict. This
conflict was fought on ideological grounds and I argue that to end it the need was for
understanding and work on the issues which had caused the conflict.
During the Juba negotiations, I realized that there was improved communication
between the LRA and the government which was not the case previously. Indeed, during the
Juba peace process, amnesty was extended to LRA combatants and their leaders plus welfare
and security (Le Sage, 2011). However, this was against the ICC principles (Le Sage, 2011).
Northern Ugandan communities also benefitted as commitments to improve security and
provide more development aid and government employment were also offered to northerners.
This was visible as early as 2007, when the situation in northern Uganda visibly improved. The
signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in August 2006 was instrumental in that
process because it also led to improved security and the beginning of the return of some
internally displaced persons to their former homes (Otim & Wierda, 2008).
In northern Uganda, after more than two decades of fighting, people were testing
peace, and many were optimistic of the outcome. The improved security situation enabled
people to move freely outside the camps and start growing food crops in nearby gardens
without the fear of abduction which they had had in the past. The outcome of the Juba peace
talks paved the way for peace, recovery and development in northern Uganda (Kasozi, 2012;
Martin, Petty, & Acidri, 2009).
The sticking point of the Juba peace talks came though when Kony refused to sign
the final document. He said he feared the ramifications of the ICC’s indictment and claimed
that he did not understand the document. The LRA also claimed it was willing to stop fighting
but only if its leaders were given immunity by the ICC which indicated Kony understood the
implications of the indictments and wanted assurance that he would not be sent to The Hague
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if he signed the final peace agreement (Keller, 2007). The other leaders of the LRA who had
also been indicted by the ICC feared attending the Juba peace talks meetings, so it was left to
some prominent Acholi exiles to negotiate on their behalf. This led Dylan and Kennedy (2012)
to point out that “The LRA’s reliance on ‘political proxies’ – many of whom were more like
consultants than genuine representatives, and whose loyalty and competence was
consequently in doubt, further confused negotiations” (2012, p. 5). The different views
possessed by each of the LRA delegates undermined the talks because they often
misinterpreted the discussions at Juba, which almost certainly confused the indicted leaders
of the LRA still in the bush (Otim & Wierda, 2010). A lot of time and resources were spent
in establishing contacts with these top leaders because they issued orders to their
representatives using satellite phones, which proved costly and complicated the negotiations.
Supporters of the ICC during the Juba peace talks continued pressing for its
involvement. At the same time, the ICC insisted on prosecuting the leadership as per the Rome
Statute. Armstrong (2014) argues that “the indictments against the rebels had an impact on
the LRA/M leadership and influenced their decisions” (2014, p. 594). From the beginning of
the negotiations between the government of Uganda and the LRA at Juba, the issue of
dropping the ICC’s indictment of the top leadership dominated and complicated proceedings
at the negotiating table.
Traditional and religious leaders from the Acholi sub-region realised that the ICC’s
judgement was a stumbling block to solving the conflict and raised the possibility of reviving
traditional cultural ceremonies in order to end the conflict. However, as discussed above, this
strategy received little support from the international community which continued to advocate
for retributive not restorative justice (Baines, 2007). Otim and Wierda (2008) explain the
religious and traditional leaders’ form of justice which emphasises “forgiveness,
reconciliation and reintegration over trial and punishment” (2008, p. 22). Following a western
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perspective, Branch (2007b) argues that the move by the traditionalists to use traditional
justice arose from a sense of exasperation and desperation, rather than from its merits as a
solution. This is supported by Allen, Wadell and Clark (2008), who argue that because there
was a diversity of ethnic groups affected by the conflict, there was no clarity about which
rituals and ceremonies would be most appropriate, which would have made it impossible to
apply a traditional justice system. However, if a traditional justice system, such as Mato Oput
which aimed at bringing unity, peace and justice by determining who the guilty were, had
been used, then seeking expressions of remorse, compensation and finally reconciliation
clearly could have worked (Oola, 2008).
Nonetheless, the signing of the CoHA in Juba in 2006 brought relative stability to the
war-ravaged northern Uganda (Armstrong, 2014). Among the positive outcomes of the Juba
Peace talks was improved security and the government started drafting programmes which
removed restrictions on the movement of people and subsequently led to the return of almost
all IDPs to their original homes. Once home, and because they no longer feared being abducted,
people started to plant crops and engaged in other income generating activities. Further, the
government of Uganda and the LRA reached agreement on addressing some of the historical
origins of the conflict which had affected the country since independence, thus providing a
basis for future peace talks (Armstrong, 2014). The brutality of LRA was a thing of the past
and the Acholi were returning to their land: the long process of reconstruction begun (Branch,
2014).

Reasons for the limited success of the Juba peace talks
Although the talks did not achieve complete success, as many hoped, one notable
accomplishment was peace in northern Uganda. A critical look at the Juba peace talks shows
that both sides were sceptical of each other. The LRA complicated the negotiations by raising
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the issue of the ICC. Also, as agreed in the CoHA, the LRA refused to comply and assemble
at Ri-Kwangba and Owiny Kibul (Valérie, 2008). As I was able to witness, the LRA leader,
Joseph Kony, did not attend any meetings at the Juba peace talks yet he was a key person to
the success of these talks. During the entire talks, Kony only appeared twice (seen once in the
photograph below) and both times, it was at the assembly area at Ri-Kwangba from where he
made decisions on most of the key agenda points, which were then conveyed by his
representatives to the Juba peace talks. Kony’s refusal to attend any meeting, sending only
representatives, hampered any meaningful outcome of these negotiations since he was
regarded as the final decision maker in the LRA’s ranks.

Figure 6. Photograph of top LRA Commanders. Joseph Kony (middle) flanked by
his Deputy, Vincent Otti (to Kony’s left), and other LRA commanders attending a meeting
with the mediator Riak Machal, Vice President of South Sudan at Ri-kwangba one of the
assembly areas agreed on at Juba peace talks. Note the expression on Otti’s face, although he
was often at the assembly area, was always wary, and very attentive what was happening,
while Kony, a commanding figure even when seated, came out of the bush so really his every
word was listened to intently. (Photo: The author, 2007).
The ICC’s involvement in the northern Uganda conflict aided in forcing the LRA to
the negotiating table. As I and other Caritas staff observed whenever we visited the designated
assembly areas at the start of these talks, up until he himself disappeared (mid-2007) almost
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certainly killed on the orders of Kony, Vincent Otti who was the LRA’s ruthless second in
command, was always there waiting to talk to us. The ICC’s insistence that the Uganda
government hand over the indicted LRA leaders though, meant that ultimately the talks failed.
Indeed, many people, including peace activists, blamed the ICC for jeopardizing the Juba
peace talks and attribute their partial failure to the ICC’s arrest warrants for the top leadership
of the LRA (Branch, 2007b; Otim & Wierda, 2008). Fish (2010) is also critical of the ICC’s
role arguing that it “maintained that any effort to reach peace with the LRA violated Uganda's
obligations under the Rome Statute and that the only solution for Museveni was to continue
fighting until Kony was either killed or sent to The Hague” (2010, pp. 1707-1708).
Another contributing reason, according to Fish (2010), was the “inability of the ICC
prosecutor or the Pre-Trial Chamber to suspend a case after the indictment stage [even though
it] undermined the peace negotiations in Juba between the LRA and the Ugandan People’s
Defence Force (UPDF)” (2010, p. 1705). Apuuli cites another reason, that the LRA’s desire
to use the talks to state their case against the ICC’s arrest warrants. He contended that “the
LRA representatives … would not conclude a peace agreement when the warrants were
‘hanging around the necks’ of their commanders” (2011, p. 117).
In addition, Kony and the others who had been indicted were opposed to an ICC trial
(Keller, 2007), while (Bartlet, 2008) identifies another problem, that Kony’s claims to be
unable to distinguish between the ICC and the Special Division of the Uganda High Court,
the setting up of which was agreed on during the Juba peace talks as a way to prosecute LRA
combatants, shows that there was a lack of clear communication between those negotiating
on behalf of the LRA at the Juba peace talks and Kony. However, as Kony had the help of
advisors qualified in international legal systems, his claims of not understanding the
difference were probably a ploy, although his reasons will never be known for sure. Since the
“disappearance” of his deputy Vincent Otti in mid-2007, there have been no public sightings
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of any of those indicted. After the Juba talks, most LRA communications were issued by LRA
representatives (Mwaniki, 2009).
The LRA used the Juba peace talks, according to Le Sage (2011), as a breathing
space to re-organize themselves in DRC, which was not on good terms with Uganda. The
LRA thought that DRC was relatively safe because of the vast forests and because at that time
DRC’s security forces had no control over the area. The LRA took advantage of the situation
and set up their bases in DRC.
Price (2007) attributes the limited success of the Juba peace talks to the different life
styles of the LRA in the bush and the LRA’s negotiating team. The representatives of the LRA
comprised mainly of people from the diaspora, who had fled the country many years
previously and who had little experience of the life of the combatants. This led Price (2007)
to conclude that the negotiating team had “their own political agenda and in fact, [had] little
in common with LRA leader Joseph Kony and his hardened fighters who have been living
and waging their rebellion in the bush for most of their lives” (2007, p. 33).
Although the Juba peace talks did not achieve their goal, they marked the end to the
misery of the people of northern Uganda. By 2016, ten years after the war ended, almost all
the former IDPs had gone back to their original homes. Relative peace in the region led to the
beginning of the recovery process, which is discussed in the next chapter.
Before the Juba peace talks, negotiations, at international, regional, national and local
levels had failed to achieve a peaceful resolution to the northern Uganda conflict. During the
almost twenty years of conflict, there was little meaningful dialogue between the GoU and
the LRA as neither party trusted the other. Resolution was further complicated by the LRA’s
failure to participate in a number of attempted peace negotiations.
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Peace initiatives
Previous chapters have established that the principal areas which threatened the
security of the people in northern Uganda, beyond but underpinning the massive violence,
were issues of economic underdevelopment, a lack of good governance, inadequate food,
health and educational facilities, excessive human rights abuses, and poor security.
Understanding the importance of addressing these issues and relating them to any initiative to
bring peace in the area was of paramount importance. These threats to people’s security
necessitated a thorough understanding of the perceptions of those affected and required their
involvement in designing ways to remedy the problems. In northern Uganda, threats to
security, which were related to a colonial ‘divide and rule’ regime, triggered the conflict and
its catastrophic consequences. The application of a human security approach in designing
appropriate measures to address this division could have reduced some of the suffering of the
people of northern Uganda. However, as Acharya (2001) points, out such an approach “calls
for a shift in security thinking from state security to security of the people, which includes
both individuals and communities” (2001, p. 449).
In using a bottom-up approach in dealing with issues which affected ordinary people
caught up in the northern Uganda conflict, the human security approach could have offered
religious, traditional and other peace activists the opportunity to argue that in order to end the
conflict those involved should sit down and discuss their differences. When the LRA and the
government of Uganda seriously engaged in the Juba peace talks, the conflict ended in
northern Uganda, though it was exported to other countries. During the Juba peace talks, the
major stakeholders’ involvement was a key factor in their success. The only reason the peace
talks were not completely successful was the ICC’s top-down approach, which the LRA
rejected. Advocates of the people centred/human security approach point to the interference
of the ICC in jeopardizing the successful ending of the LRA insurgency. Although this sounds
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controversial, had the government included Acholi in the planning and to lead the troops in
its fight against the LRA, it would have defeated the rebels and thus achieved to peace more
quickly (Branch, 2005). Paris (2001) explains that in conflict situations “peace builders should
focus on root causes of conflict, pay attention to the differences in local conditions from one
operation to the next, seek sustainable and durable results and mobilize local actors and
resources in support of peace” (2001, p. 93). In northern Uganda, these principles were not
always adhered to, although there were examples where they were. For instance, the amnesty
programme, which was people-centred, was overwhelmingly supported by traditional leaders,
religious leaders and some NGOs. However, a lack of support from international donor
countries undermined this initiative. Another preferred local option, the use of traditional
justice systems such as (Mato Oput) which involves the affected people’s participation was
undermined because the government preferred to use the ICC which in turn severely affected
the Juba peace talks. Generally, most of the peace initiatives were too narrow to address the
origins of the conflict, which according to human security principles, were likely to undermine
finding a lasting solution.
The government’s continued use of a military approach contrasted with the approach
of consulting with individuals when it comes to their protection. The various security threats
experienced during the conflict because of the military offensive against the LRA brought
continued misery to the people. What the government needed to do was to be more attentive
to the advice given by the local communities, ARLPI and traditional leaders and abandon their
military approach. GoU actions showed the deep divisions between the members of the
southern-dominated government and people from northern Uganda. Such an environment
could not favour the application of the human security approach. The international community
was right to pressure the government of Uganda to deal with the humanitarian catastrophe
shaped by the persistence of the LRA insurgency. However, as I argued then, and continue to
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argue now, their involvement was not always appropriate to solving the conflict.
Human security and peace-building initiatives are pre-requisites for good governance.
The Government of Uganda failed to achieve good governance by not addressing the issues
which instigated the conflict and so it persisted for over two decades.

Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the various peace initiatives instigated by international,
regional, national and local bodies to end the conflict in northern Uganda. It has demonstrated
that foreign-based interventions and the deep-rooted ethnic divisions failed to end the conflict.
Rather they contributed to a continuation of the threats to the security of the people of northern
Uganda. The failure of the peace initiatives meant the LRA continued to inflict horrific
security threats on northern Ugandans and people in the neighbouring countries of DRC,
South Sudan and CAR. The Juba peace process made substantial inroads in shifting the battle
front from northern Uganda and led to significant enhancement in the lives of many IDPs as
it enabled them to start moving back to their original homes. Consequently, the Juba peace
talks ended the conflict in northern Uganda and marked the beginning of the recovery process
which will be explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter Seven
The post-conflict recovery process in northern Uganda
Introduction
This chapter examines the recovery period from July 2006 to August 2016, discussing
the difficulties which formerly displaced people in northern Uganda faced returning to their
former places of residence, and the roles played by the government of Uganda and
humanitarian organizations in assisting those returnees to resettle. It addresses these through
further testing of the second hypothesis of the thesis: the extent to which the shifting and
multiple meanings of security and people centred/human security principles held by key actors
in the northern Ugandan conflict impeded the socio-economic reconstruction of northern
Uganda. In arguing that human security could have been a productive concept, it was ultimately
of limited value in protecting northern Ugandans during the conflict situation. The
consequences of the withdrawal of many INGOs which were implementing their activities in
line with people centred/human security principles at the beginning of the recovery period and
the effects of those withdrawals on people’s security, especially that of former IDPs, are
examined through analysis of conditions in northern Uganda following the end of the Juba
peace talks (2006), the decongestion process of the IDP camps, the challenges encountered by
international, national and local actors, and the security implications of their initiatives.
As we have seen, the completion of the Juba peace talks and the relocation of the LRA
from northern Uganda to neighbouring countries brought peace and stability to northern
Uganda (Drost, van Wijk, & de Boer, 2014; Joireman et al., 2012). The improved security
situation marked the beginning of the resettlement of thousands of people from IDP camps and
the relocation of others from the bush, nearer to main roads. Working in northern Uganda for
ten years at a critical time, it became evident to me that the relatively secure environment in
was enabling very large numbers, perhaps as many as half, of the 1.8 million displaced persons
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to return home. The improved security and peace situation led to new economic activities,
indicating that investor confidence in the region was rising, marked also by extensive
movement on the road connecting Uganda and Sudan, the opening of new bank branches, and
traders moving freely around and between districts (International Alert, 2008).
Nonetheless, for more than two decades, the region had been characterized by
displacement, the breakdown of traditional social support networks, the erosion of positive
cultural values, a significant increase in women and child-headed households, chronic violence,
the continued spread of HIV and economic depression. Those situations did not disappear
overnight. Humanitarian agencies, policy makers and the government of Uganda, all with
limited resources, faced tough decisions on where and how to manage the recovery process.
The process of recovery was the government of Uganda’s responsibility to spearhead
(Bertasi, 2013). Constitutionally the government was required to design recovery programmes,
increase budgetary allocations to improve the provision of basic services, and strengthen
security so that people could move back to their original homes (Omona, 2008). In conjunction
with foreign donors it responded by planning and designing an action plan, the Peace Recovery
and Development Programme (PRDP) (Adong, 2011) (discussed below). However, assistance
on the ground was often slow in coming. Seven years into the recovery process, although the
guns had fallen silent and there was a general improvement in security, people in northern
Uganda were still physically, physiologically, socially and economically badly off (Chirichetti,
2013). As late as 2015, in the Human Development Report Uganda (2015), the Prime Minister
of Uganda, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, acknowledged that the country still faced major challenges
such as the need to provide economic opportunities, to expand social services, to address youth
unemployment, the capacity of local government, and corruption.
A further problem was that although the Juba peace talks moved the conflict out of
northern Uganda, the LRA had not been defeated. Rather, they moved their operations into
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Sudan, CAR and DRC, where Ugandan government forces continued to pursue them, largely
at the expense of focussing on recovery in northern Uganda (Mukwana & Ridderbos, 2008),
adding to the other issues affecting the recovery process. Although it is not uncommon in postconflict situations, where resources to fund various programmes are scarce, for INGOs to
initially lead the recovery, in northern Uganda, many INGOs reduced their activities or
withdrew earlier than expected (Mukwana & Ridderbos, 2008): another layer of difficulty for
the recovery process.
The main reason for the INGOs’ withdrawal was that when the government declared
the beginning of the recovery development processes (2008) this was interpreted by
international observers as the conclusion of the humanitarian disaster in northern Uganda (Lie,
2015). The gaps left by their departures were immediately evident to us in the field: according
to one Gulu-based UNICEF official (cited in Spitzer and Twikirize, 2013, p.75) approximately
80% of INGOs had left the region by the end of 2010. This was compounded by the
government’s lack of capacity and resources. , in the long run, the government needed to take
control and implement its own development priorities, while the many local NGOs needed to
have capacity to use creative strategies to respond swiftly to the developing social and
economic threats which came after the conflict ended, and political stability had returned. Lack
of funds to assist in recovery work on issues such as gender inequality, environmental
conservation and improving people’s livelihoods inevitably triggered other threats to human
security in the region.
The problem was further increased because the recovery needed to be supported by a
transition plan and sufficient donor funding, but this did not occur. Lie notes that the
withdrawal “weakened the operational consent to and financial basis of the humanitarian
apparatus providing civilian protection and basic services” (2015, p. 1) but an opposing view
is taken by Nuerenberger (2010) who argues that the withdrawal of so many INGOs was
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beneficial because their presence did nothing to encourage long-term development. Instead it
promoted dependency. She argues that, in order to achieve sustainable development, there was
a need to promote local NGOs which would design programmes according to the needs of the
local people, a process which was in line with a human security approach. In the northern
Ugandan situation, this would have meant involving the Acholi in all aspects of the recovery
process with limited intervention by external agencies (Branch, 2007a; Sserwanga et al., 2014).
However, for a variety of reasons, explored below, this did not occur.

Conditions in northern Uganda at the start of the recovery process (2006)
The northern Ugandan conflict destroyed the social, political and economic setup in
the region and undermined traditional ways of life. Recounting the situation at the end of the
conflict in 2006, Spitzer and Twikirize pointed out that civilians had been the most badly
affected and that they were “still suffering” (2013, p. 69). It was a situation characterised by
the declining social status of parents, elders and local leaders, a lack of protection by the
government, poor health, few educational facilities, heavy dependence on humanitarian aid,
and widespread human rights abuses (Finnström, 2008). These issues had a direct impact on
the recovery process.
As soon as the security situation improved, people started to move out of the IDP
camps to transit camps which were closer to their original homes. There they started clearing
land and farming, using seeds provided by development aid agencies. People who had been
involuntarily removed wanted to return to their homes and plots of land as they had been before
the conflict (Joireman et al., 2012). For most returnees, the first stage was to set up in a smaller
transit camp, so that they could monitor the situation with a view to returning to their villages,
if safe to do so. more freedom of movement Compared to the past restrictions freedom of
movement became more possible: humanitarian agencies were able to operate without escorts,
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which enhanced their ability to reach the needy. President Museveni was able to declare in
2007 that “for the first time, in 114 years … the whole of Uganda …[is] peaceful” (Moman,
2012).
Nonetheless, seven years after the end of the conflict, research carried out in northern
Uganda by Dyan Mazurana for the Gulu based Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
(2014), found that “5 percent of the population of Acholi and Lango sub-regions [was]
significantly impaired or incapacitated by war-related physical, psychological and emotional
injuries”. Predictably, Mazurana also found that “[h]ouseholds with war-wounded members
were more likely to have fewer assets, worse food security, fewer livelihood activities, and use
more coping strategies to survive”: the more serious the crime inflicted on a person, the more
likely that person was to have an ongoing injury that impacted on their ability to function
(Mazurana, 2014, p. 3).
On the one hand, the prolonged traumatization of so many people, the shattered
traditions and social cohesion, and the destabilization of both old and new generation shifted
social values: the psycho-social wellbeing of many northern Ugandans was badly affected
(McCormack, 2008). On the other, the region’s development had been hampered by a lack of
investment, poor marketing opportunities, and the breakdown of systems which provided
essential services to the needy. Northern Uganda communities faced significant problems in
acquiring resources needed to maintain peace and protect security, re-integrate ex-combatants,
rebuild the necessary infrastructure, improve on investment opportunities, resettle IDPs, create
employment, eliminate inequalities, and restore the rule of law (Sserwanga et al., 2014).
There were also continuing human rights abuses, most of which were not addressed.
For example, in the areas of rule of law and access to justice, civilian beatings and detention
were meted out to those who were suspected of being LRA returnees. In a survey conducted in
2008 to rate the population’s perception of returnee children after the conflict, it was found that
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while 97% of northern Ugandans welcomed back the abducted children, at least in public, many
“community members [were] still angry at the children (66%) fearful of them (52%) and over
one third (34%) indicated that community members continue[d] to insult children formerly
associated with the LRA” (Atri & Cusimano, 2013, p. 2). Much of the verbal abuse came from
drunk community members (Blattman & Annan, 2008). Although alcohol consumption was
not a serious problem among people within the camps, many used it as a coping mechanism
(B. Roberts, Ocaka, Browne, Oyok, & Sondorp, 2011)check reference. As Sarkin found,
“[p]rotecting the civilian population … [was not] a priority for the government of Uganda”
(2015, p. 112): maintaining human rights and the rule of law were clearly the problems in the
early stages of the recovery.
The health situation, especially the prevalence of HIV/AIDS during the recovery
process was alarming. Liebling-Kalifani et al., record that compared to other regions of Uganda,
northern Uganda had the worst indices. For example, “the region had a prevalence rate of
10.5% [whereas the] national average [ wa]s 6.4%” (Liebling-Kalifani et al., 2008, p. 175). The
Uganda Country progress report on HIV and AIDS 2008 stated the prevalence rates in the
conflict-afflicted northern region to be above 9% (Rujumba & Kwiringira, 2010). This high
rate of HIV/AIDS in northern Uganda was partly due to the “social and economic crises, food
shortages, and reduced access to health care and prevention services” (Fabiani et al., 2007), but
also, as Nattabi, et al. found, to the survival of distorted sexual patterns of behaviour inherited
from the conflict period: “transactional and survival sex” (2011, p. 2). Although people knew
about the dangers of HIV/AIDS, their priority was to receive the basic needs of life rather than
worrying about the dangers of contracting AIDS (Rujumba & Kwiringira, 2010). Community
and district leaders proposed combining information on the effects of HIV/AIDs with
information from other development projects (Rujumba & Kwiringira, 2010). Voluntary
counselling and testing services and the availability of anti-retroviral drugs were limited to
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pregnant women but even then, supplies were not sufficient to reach all who needed them.
Health centres had no drugs to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV/AIDS. Condoms
were few and people needed advice on how to use them and this was combined, as LieblingKalifani et al. note, with “a lower rate of a lower contraceptive use 12%, while the national
average was 23%, and a high rate of abortions and unplanned pregnancies (1 in every 5
pregnant women in northern Uganda carried out an abortion, while 50% of pregnancies were
unwanted)” (2008, p. 175). The only encouraging development was that people were moving
back to their original homes and the camps were becoming less congested, and rape cases
drastically reduced compared to the period when people were confined in the camps
(Westerhaus, Finnegan, Zabulon, & Mukherjee, 2008). Nonetheless, in order to cope in the
post-conflict situation, with the on-going consequences of the years of social and physical
turmoil, such as, for example the life sentence of HIV/AIDS, the need continues for significant
engagement with the social and environmental concerns and needs of those affected (WilhelmSolomon, 2016).
As shown above in chapter five, because the LRA mainly targeted children, the
literacy rates of all children in northern Uganda were badly affected. These continued to be the
lowest in Uganda. At the height of the conflict, only 56% of primary school aged children
attended schools: many children had been afraid to attend. Due to the tense situation, school
days had been shortened, schools opened at 10am, and closed at 2pm and in the few hours they
attended, the children were learning war tactics and survival skills (Willis & Nagel, 2015).
Low literacy rates could thus be directly related to the lack of security during the conflict. At
the beginning of the recovery period, as during the conflict, there was a severe lack of qualified
staff and scholastic materials, and little suitable infrastructure, which placed additional stress
on those teachers who were available. CSOPNU’s 2007 report shows that in most schools the
ratio of teacher to pupil was approximately 1:300 to 1:400 (2007, 31).
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Armed robbers continued to be a security threat. There were widely reported incidents
of boda-boda drivers (motorcycle riders who carry passengers to earn a living) being involved
in robberies, rapes and murders (Allen, 2015). Many of the teenagers had been trained as
young boys to use guns and, as there was widespread unemployment, some resorted to
ambushing traders and violently robbing people of their belongings. These robbers were called
boo-kec, ‘bitter vegetables’ in the local language, meaning they were particularly tough and
much feared (Kroes, 2010).
In the recovery stage, NGOs such as Caritas Gulu, which remained in the region where
I worked, involved people in designing programmes aimed at re-integrating formerly abducted
people into the community. Through workshops and community meetings, they developed
programmes aimed at improving people’s livelihoods, their basic health, their water needs and
the rule of law. However, this process was not easy. Former LRA combatants received a mixed
reaction from community members. For those who had lost their loved ones at the hands of the
LRA, accepting former LRA combat returnees proved to be difficult. Some were able to forgive
but not forget what happened during the conflict. Although some of the returnees were
psychologically resilient and showed little evidence of aggression and violence, they faced
many difficulties being accepted back into community life. Addressing the psychological
trauma of then-former abductees and helping them reunite with their families and communities
were key reconstruction tasks (Kasfir, 2005; Pham, Vinck, & Stover, 2009).
A recovery programme carried out by Caritas Gulu involved holding conflict issue
identification workshops whose aim was for people to identify potential conflict issues, discuss
their possible resolution and incorporate those resolutions into their local development
activities. Commenting on Caritas activities in northern Uganda, Ochen (2012), notes that
Caritas formed community-based structures which improved their efficiency in providing
community-based solutions. The aim of all Caritas operations was to build local capacity in
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planning, conflict resolution, governance, transparency, inclusion and accountability. Such
people-centred initiatives helped the concerned communities to own the recovery process and
achieve their desired goals, especially in the area of gender relations. In order to promote
women-related issues, NGOs and CSOs were formed after the conflict by women specifically
to advance and deal with issues affecting them (Stiftung, 2005). Stories?
Another community-based service offered by Caritas Gulu was the Psychosocial
Support Program which was stationed at Pajule, Pader District. Its aim was to increase
community resilience and assist in the reintegration of former abductees using psychosocial
support (Harlacher, 2009). Almost all of the responses designed by Caritas staff were peoplecentred.

The “decongestion process” of the IDP Camps
The end of the conflict in 2006 triggered the decongestion process, a welcome relief
to the people living in crowded IDP camps (Bozzoli, Brück, & Muhumuza, 2012). However,
the resettlement of people from IDP camps to their original homes did not happen quickly.
Despite the introduction of programmes aimed at resettling those who had been in camps, at
first people were cautious about returning to their original homes (Brown, 2006), there were
multiple challenges for those returning and those who had returned (Bjorkhaug, Morten, Hatloy,
& Jennings, 2007). These included “inadequate basic services such as clean water, education
and health facilities and, because the LRA had not been defeated, some feared they might return
and abduct them” (Bjorkhaug et al., 2007).
Resettlement was carried out in phases. The first was the setting up of small transit
camps near the former homes of displaced people so both women and men could go to their
own gardens during the day and come back to the camp in the evening. Some returnees in
Acholi were hesitant about moving back to their original places, instead preferring to move to
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‘decongestion settlements’, which were camps designed to alleviate the overcrowding and lack
of basic services in the major IDP camps. By late 2007, however, more than 50% of the people
who had been involuntarily displaced, resettled in their home villages or in transit settlements
that were closer to their villages (Bozzoli, Brück, & Muhumuza, 2011).
During community meetings and consultations while I was working with Caritas, I
found that, although some people expressed hesitation about returning, many expressed
willingness to go back to their former homes. They had a number of reasons for wanting to
return. The most generally mentioned were to collect natural resources, raise livestock, better
access land to grow crops, find better living conditions and experience greater independence
and self-reliance. People in semi-settled villages had convincing reasons to continue living
outside the camps because they were not overcrowded. However, many households maintained
a presence in the camps for at least part of the time.
The movement to smaller, less crowded settlements had a positive humanitarian
impact as conditions in the transit camps were markedly better than those in the IDP camps.
However, services to the transit camps were sometimes restricted because of their distances
from the main camps. This situation affected mainly the unaccompanied minors, elderly,
widows and disabled persons whose needs and rights had been neglected (Onegi, 2012).
It was the role of the military to identify new housing sites, which ideally were as
secure as possible, for example, away from landmine sites, unexploded ordinance and bandits,
accessible in case of any trouble and near to water boreholes and social services such as schools
and hospitals (Namakula & Witter, 2014). However, according to Branch “the decision to make
IDPs move to decongestion camps in Kitgum and Pader, while letting IDPs move
spontaneously to transition sites and to their homes in Amuru and Gulu, [was] a political
decision, not one based upon the factual security situation” (2007a, p. 10). Nevertheless, NGOs
and UN agencies continued to serve people in the decongestion camps, which was sometimes
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difficult as water, schools and clinics were not always available in the vicinity.
Commenting on the need for a range of recovery programs at the beginning of the
resettlement period, Bozzoli, Brück, and Muhumuza note that “[t]he observation that
individuals living in camps strive to ensure self-reliance underscores the need for livelihood
interventions and other recovery programmes to target not only returnee households but also
create opportunities for households still in displacement” (2011, p. 1). Although by 2010 most
Acholi had left the IDP camps and resettled in their rural homes, some found it difficult to ‘replace’ themselves according to traditional Acholi notions of belonging to home and land. There
were two reasons for this: cultural practices denied women and children access to land if their
husbands or parents had died, a not uncommon situation; and people were sometimes unable
to lay claim to land and therefore work it because of land wrangles or being unable to identify
its boundaries (Whyte., Babiiha, Mukyala, & Meinert, 2014).
In situations such as the decongestion process, a human security approach would
emphasise the importance of service providers such as the government and other humanitarian
agencies to prioritise the needs of the people they served. In accordance with these principles,
the government of Uganda, NGOs and other international aid agencies started extending
humanitarian and other reconstruction and development efforts to remote areas. The UN in
particular operated on the principle of freedom of movement, which is why UN agencies
provided assistance to those who moved to decongested sites (Brown, 2006).
Although at first forcibly displaced people remained sceptical about the long-term
peace prospects in northern Uganda, they slowly gained confidence and by August 2016 all
displaced people camps had been officially closed and their infrastructure converted into
schools, hospitals and health care centres. The secondary benefit from this was that it helped
town boards and town councils gain status and recognition (Whyte, Babiiha, Mukyala, &
Meinert, 2014).
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Those who have remained in the camps do so for personal reasons such as business
interests or the lack of land to settle on or cultivate. This is the case for some youth who were
born and grew up in camps, which are then the places that they know.

International organizations’ intervention in the recovery process
Because the government failed to respond appropriately to the people’s needs during
northern Uganda’s reconstruction, civil society organizations had to fill that gap and
international humanitarian assistance became crucial in this process (Kelly, 2014). During the
post-conflict period, although many international NGOs left northern Uganda (Branch, 2013)
others recognised that aid continued to be needed: in post-conflict situations on such a scale,
any successful recovery process is directly related to the accessible foreign assistance. Groups
such as UN agencies and INGOs worked with local NGOs, CBOs, and self-help initiators
(Omona, 2008) to share their expertise in governance, sustainable livelihoods, peace-building,
food security and nutrition, small enterprise development, all with the intention of improving
the security of the people in the region (Paul, 2014).
Other organizations such as Action against Hunger (ACF), Associazione Volontari
per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI), CARE, Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI),
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Catholic Relief Services (CRS), GOAL, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Medair,
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), Oxfam and Save the Children in Uganda (SCiU), focused on
the rebuilding of infrastructure such as schools, health centres, roads, and individual
psychosocial support and trauma counselling. Others helped to reintegrate returnees by
providing agricultural seeds and farming tools, and specific human rights programs focused on
alleviating gender-based violence and establishing children’s rights (Dolan & Hovil, 2006).
Most local NGOs? focused on improving people’s livelihoods, food production and housing,
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providing legal aid and childcare, and building capacity in environmental protection and health
related issues such as sensitizing people about AIDS. Such wide-ranging issues covered by
these NGOs made them ‘one-stop shops’ for donor agencies, foreign governments and
multilateral agencies involved in funding security innovations in the region.
During and after the conflict, INGOs worked at identifying issues and designing
governance projects aimed at increasing the ability of the population to take part in the
preparation and monitoring of district government resource allocations. They set up local
community forums to create spaces for communities to deliberate on issues of concern and
bring these to the consideration of local government representatives.
The nature of the INGOs’ operations made them relevant partners in providing
security. AVSI, an Italian NGO which had operated in the region for more than two decades,
based its operations on the grassroots needs of each community. Commenting on AVSI’s
positive contribution to the recovery process, Annan, Green and Brier indicate that its
“approach departs from traditional models of poverty assistance in that it targets the most
vulnerable members of the community and provides them with extensive follow-up services
and social networks alongside grant assistance” (2013, p. 860).
Some other programs however were relatively short-lived, and have been criticized
for having a short-term mentality, being insensitive to local cultures and values, and
introducing programs with unintended negative consequences (Wielders & Amutjojo, 2012).
By August 2016, a significant number of these organizations had closed their programs in
northern Uganda and shifted their attention elsewhere. Some INGOs though, continued to
provide assistance to people returning to their original homes, helping local NGOs develop
their capacity and set up structures for networking (Omach, 2011b). Although Angoma
suggests that many INGOs left at a critical moment, leaving people “stuck between a rock and
hard place in [their] respective villages” (2011, p. ii), while there, they served a useful purpose.
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Since INGOs had set up the foundation for recovery, it was up to the people in the area to
implement and use the capacities and skills imparted to them by the INGOs to change their
situation.
After supplying basic needs during the conflict, INGOs which remained in northern Uganda
necessarily changed their approach from relief provision to peace building, human rights
advocacy, and skills development to those returning from camps to their original homes
(Spitzer & Twikirize, 2013). For a recovery program to succeed, people need to have a say in
the development of suitable programmes. Since the majority of people in northern Uganda
are subsistence farmers, there was a need to promote agriculturally based programmes in the
area. Several INGOs supported people in forming community groups in order to access
assistance through the government’s National Agricultural Advisory Development Services
(NAADS), however, most people did not benefit from this scheme due to the politicisation of
the programme and their lack of knowledge about how the programme operated.
To avoid duplication of services, INGOs had begun to work in partnership with local NGOs
(Compton, 2014). These partnerships provided extensive support during the conflict and
continued in the post-conflict reconstruction period Omona (2008). One combined project,
the cluster approach, administratively bringing together people from several camps was
instigated in 2007 by the UNHCR. It provided humanitarian assistance to IDPs who were
moving out of the camps to their original homes. It ensured that people received assistance
based on their geographical location and included provision of basic health and water needs,
education and livelihood support. The programmes also aided in road construction and
provided capacity building support for district and civil administrators in the rule of law
(Landegger et al., 2011). Although some INGOs thought that their mandate extended beyond
humanitarian aid,?? the cluster approach helped in the transition period from relief to
recovery, specifically when it involved local organizations and district government
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authorities (Bourgeois & Wright, 2007). The positive consequences of the cluster approach
were providing the IASC and UN Country Teams with common understandings, objectives
and directions;


facilitating the humanitarian division of labour;



promoting the exchange of information and ideas between stakeholders



standardizing concepts, definitions and statistical reporting;



encouraging the pooling of tools and techniques;



supporting resource mobilization;



strengthening humanitarian advocacy, IDP protection and the promotion of
human rights; and,



focusing new attention on issues related to camp management and IDP
settlement. Ref?

Many NGOs saw the cluster approach as a way to actively coordinate information
sharing, avoid the replication of activities, and a new method for consolidating accountability
through monitoring the flow of funds.
As the humanitarian relief started to be phased out, and as the success of the cluster
approach became evident, NGO forum boards in different districts affected by the conflict
(Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader) took on the role of monitoring and coordinating national and INGO
activities. In this period, there was a need to put in place a harmonized approach to recovery
and capitalize on efforts set by the cluster approach to advance connections between
communities, development actors at the district level and the office of the Prime Minister.
Although some international humanitarian agencies came with their own programmes,
which did not always consider the needs of the local people, the majority of INGOs planned
and worked directly with the communities, which proved successful by cutting the red tape
involved with the district officials. These groups responded to people’s needs in numerous
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ways. They helped fundraise from international donors, provided cash to help people develop
small projects and support for national and local actors who were involved in the recovery
process. For these reasons, many northern Ugandans regarded INGOs as providing the main
avenue to rebuilding their lives.
One notable contribution of INGOs was the creation of jobs such as drivers, project
officers, monitoring officers and interpreters. However, the winding up of many projects early
during the recovery period affected those who depended on these projects for a living (Meier,
2013).
Those INGOs who remained after the conflict did remarkable work in helping the
Acholi people recover from decades of war and forced displacement. These NGOs worked
towards promoting social change, gender equality, democracy and development in mind when
undertaking peace and reconstruction programmes in northern Uganda (Meier, 2013). However,
the economic and cultural effects of the amount of aid given to northern Uganda raise
provocative questions about the appropriateness and effectiveness of foreign-led development
programs in a post-conflict environment. Indeed, Guzman suggests that donors should stop
thinking that development is simple, predictable and deliverable from outside, and rather accept
that successful recovery processes must consider people’s needs and ensure their involvement
(Guzman, 2013). They are best developed locally, as the human security approach emphasizes,
so that they focus on salient, local issues. Experience on the ground suggests that such
grassroots approaches are most likely to enhance local capacity leading and result in feasible
solutions.

The Ugandan government’s intervention in the recovery
The process of resettling people from camps to their original homes was difficult.
Although it was the responsibility of the government of Uganda to assist its citizens using its
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major initiatives, particularly the IDP policy and the PRDP, during the recovery process, it did
not do so (Ogwang, 2014). Rather, the government’s first response to the cessation of the
conflict was to increase the military budget and to continue its strategy of pursuing the LRA in
DRC and CAR, not instigating political or non-military initiatives. Indeed, after the Juba peace
talks, the UPDF’s operations against the LRA were linked to substantial US military aid (Arieff
& Ploch, 2012) and between December 2008 and November 2010, the US provided more than
$23 US million to the Ugandan army for military operations largely in logistical form (airlifts,
fuel, trucks) and intelligence support. The figure [increased] to more than $40 US million in
subsequent years (Tumutegyereize, 2012, p. 3). Although the government maintained its
pursuit of the LRA, it did also continue to offer amnesty to former combatants until 2012 when
the LRA was finally disbanded. Again, in granting benefits to LRA members, former rebels
but not to northern Ugandans who had suffered, the GoU policy failed to carry out its
responsibilities (McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012).
It can be argued, strongly, that the government would have been better to focus on
building “a more peaceful and prosperous society in northern Uganda” (D. P. Thomas &
Gardner, 2014). Even though the government signalled its intention to implement reforms to
ensure sustainable peace in the region, specifically in the areas of political sensitization, civil
rights and individual security, it was frequently unable to transform planned activities into
actions (Mailer, 2008). It also failed to address the rampant corruption, tackle land related
issues or address the causes of the conflict jeopardizing the security of northern Ugandans.
Reconstruction projects that are still greatly needed in the region are at a standstill/have not
progressed (Ogwang, 2015).
Uganda has a decentralized system of governance through the use of district structures
down to the village level, a system intended to bring services closer to people and encourage
people’s participation in issues which matter to them. However, because the conflict in northern
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Uganda destroyed most of the structures on which decentralization was embedded, government
efforts to design people-centred recovery programmes were hampered by weak and underdeveloped local government institutions, most of which lacked computers, communication
equipment and qualified staff. The lack of basic services and infrastructure also hindered the
recruitment of skilled personnel in the region. In addition, the lack of houses in rural areas
prevented qualified teachers, doctors and police personnel from living in those areas
(Namakula, Witter, & Ssengooba, 2016).
The Ugandan government did though set up several programmes aimed at
reconstruction and recovery in the conflict-affected regions. Among these were the Northern
Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP-1), Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme
(NUREP), Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), Karamoja Integrated Development
Programme (KIDDP), and Post Conflict Reconstruction Programmes (PCRP). The KIDDP had
the overall goal of contributing to security and promoting conditions for recovery and
development in Karamoja region (eastern Uganda) by dealing with the problem of small arms
and light weapons. The government thought the Karamajong ethnic group were continuing, as
they had done during the conflict, to supply weaponry to the LRA, increasing accessibility to
small arms and light weapons, the main source, then and now, of insecurity in northern and
eastern Uganda (Esuruku, 2011). Disarming the Karamajong, the government thought, would
solve the LRA problem and future insecurities for the region. The initiative was unsuccessful:
while the LRA is no longer operational in Uganda, it continues to cause trouble in neighbouring
countries (Central African Republic, DRC, Southern Sudan).
As part of recovery and reconstruction, the government also embarked on large-scale
infrastructure developments such as opening up roads and instituting district governance
structures to coordinate the recovery process. However, as suggested below such big
investments in infrastructure had little effect on the welfare of the people in the region.
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In order to accelerate the recovery process, in October 2007 the government, together
with UN and international humanitarian agencies operating in northern Uganda, launched a
three-year Peace Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP). Formed through the
amalgamation of NUREP and KIDDP, the PRDP came out of the peace talks at Juba between
2006-2007 and was aimed at coordinating the recovery process in northern Uganda for both
donor and government development initiatives. It was intended to allocate resources effectively
in order to achieve social and economic development in the war affected areas and assist those
returning to their homes from the internally displaced camps (Esuruku, 2012). The PRDP
consisted of four strategic objectives. These objectives as outlined by Bertasi (2013) are:
1. Consolidation of state authority:
This objective was aimed at restoring government authority in northern Uganda. It
was to be achieved through reinforcing law and order in communities, extending judicial and
legal services to the people and building the local government (districts) capacity.
2. Rebuilding and empowering communities:
The conflict destroyed previous social, economic and development initiatives in the
area. This objective was aimed at improving the quality of people’s lives through resettling
formerly displaced persons and initiating new community development initiatives.
3. Revitalization of the economy:
Since the conflict destroyed the drivers of economic development in northern Uganda,
this objective was aimed at restoring the productive sectors through infrastructure development
and designing appropriate mechanisms to cater for the environment and national resources.
4. Peace building and reconciliation:
As discussed in chapter four, some of the causes of the northern Uganda conflict were
historical. This objective was aimed at reconciling the people of northern Uganda with the rest
of the country through information sharing, counselling of the victims of the conflict, designing
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mechanisms aimed at eliminating inter-communal conflicts and re-integrating former armed
combatants in the community (Bertasi, 2013).
These four objectives were ambitious. Although on paper their implementation would
have been good for the people of northern Uganda, they have not had the desired effect. The
programme has concentrated more on rebuilding government institutions which has had little
effect on eliminating poverty. Local governments under the programme areas were under
resourced and lacked skilled personnel to implement the plans. For example, health centres
lacked adequate accommodation facilities for the staff and wards for inpatients were poorly
equipped. Although, on paper, the PRDP had sound principles, the government has failed to
implement them, thus undermining its purpose and objectives.
The difficulties are exemplified by a report by the Washington-based ENOUGH
Project in May 2008, a year before PRDP implementation began, which argued that, while
there was a moderately low risk of renewed LRA attacks in northern Uganda, the north’s
immediate needs were “immense” and yet, although the government of Uganda had a multimillion recovery plan, the lack of funding, bureaucracy and political uncertainties were
hindering its implementation.
PRDP has been rolled out in phases. PRDP 1 was from 2009-2012, and PRDP II from
2012-2015. While covering the whole of the northern region of Uganda, its emphasis has been
on the badly conflict-affected regions of north-central Uganda (see map below). In terms of its
implementation, the government releases money to the districts on a quarterly basis. Local
governments are then responsible for planning and implementing priority activities (Esuruku,
2011). However, Otto, Oroma and Cho (2012) note- that local government did not have
employees who had the capacity to engage community members. For example, appropriate
consultations were rarely carried out when planning new projects. Community involvement is
important for the successful identification, planning and implementation of community
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projects. Such involvement would make affected communities more supportive of the
programme activities and would encourage people to monitor and ensure their leaders deliver
the much-needed services.

Figure 7. Map of Uganda showing sub-regions covered by the PRDP. Source: Esuruku, (2011)
Horizons of peace and development in northern Uganda.
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In order for the PRDP to accelerate the recovery process, there was a need to apply a
demand-driven approach which emphasized community involvement and was people-centered.
Although not referring specifically to northern Uganda, Goovaerts, Gasser and Inbal note that
a successful demand-driven approach after a violent conflict needs to aim at “pursuing
development agendas through empowering beneficiaries and giving local stakeholders control
over decisions and resources, while building community capacities for collective decisionmaking and action” (2006, p. 10). In political terms, during the post-conflict reconstruction in
northern Uganda, there was a lack of peacebuilding packages necessarily involving civil and
political actors, to prioritize and engage affected populations in order to develop sustainable
modes of post-conflict accountability (Macdonald, 2017b). The PRDP aimed at achieving these
objectives.
When the government launched its PRDP programme, local NGOs worked hand in
hand with government representatives to ensure its success. However, throughout the recovery
period, the government used the PRDP to provide funds primarily to those individuals who
supported the NRM government, thus politicizing the programme in a way that undermined
the recovery process. Iversen noted the potential of the PRDP for peace building and
reconstruction but criticized it “for being geared towards satisfying the GoU’s political agenda
rather than fostering peace and reconciliation” (2010, p. 76).
Another area the government failed to address during the recovery period was the
issue of children who were born as a result of rape. In most of these recovery programmes
such as the PRDP and NUSAF these children were not catered for (Ladisch, 2015). In a
patriarchal society such as Uganda, it is important for children to know their fathers for cultural
and inheritance purposes. However, those who were born out of rape did not have or belong to
any clan. Most of the time these children are rejected or isolated in the community. Thus, their
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mothers have had to work hard to support them in order to survive. This is explored by Mailer
(2008) who found that in Acholi culture widows and unmarried women who wanted to go back
to their villages had to depend on their male relatives to assist them to construct their homes.
These women then had to provide food or money in return for the assistance. Although many
faced significant difficulties, those who persisted utilized the available small opportunities to
change their lives (Ochen, 2015). But, as shown above, these programmes were not gender
sensitive as they neglected to deal with the needs of the formerly abducted girls:
Girls often return from a fighting force with children born as a
result of forced sexual relations. The presence of these war babies can
worsen their situations, because these girl mothers and their children
are often subject to resentment, due to the children’s unknown paternity,
or because their fathers are known to be rebels McKay (2004a, p. 20).
The PRDP also experienced problems in terms of poor service delivery. Noncompliance with the system procedures for recovery, inadequate national capacity and the high
cost of recovery hampered the government from carrying out its obligations. The lack of inputs
and labour were the main inhibitors for food production in the region. For example, government
contractors supplied substandard agricultural tools such as pangas, hoes and rotten seeds
(Gelsdorf, Maxwell, & Mazurana, 2012). The recovery process also lacked conclusive debates
on strategies for governance, insufficient leadership and poor roll-out strategies (Bailey,
Pavanello, Elhawary, & O’Callaghan, 2009).
In addition, widespread corruption has been another reason for the failure of the
PRDP (Nystrand, 2014). The government faced problems relating to accountability, bribery
and manipulation by politicians to the detriment of community projects (Omona, 2008, p. 138).
Between 2012 and 2013, the office of the Prime Minister, which was coordinating donor funds,
was involved in a corruption scandal involving massive sums, 60 billion Uganda shillings

230
(about $US24.5 million), which led many donors to withdraw funding to the programme.
(Bukuluki, 2013, p. 28).
Corruption affected the successful implementation of many recovery programs. For
example, in another problem involving the Office of the Prime Minister, more than $US12.7
million intended for rebuilding northern Uganda was embezzled (Human Rights Report, 2013).
As a result, in 2012, the European Union, Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and
Norway suspended aid. The history of another government sponsored post-conflict recovery
programme, the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) was also not adequate: for
example, “PRDP money was used to buy the Prime Minister a limousine worth $US 200,000
… this mismanagement is due to a lack of transparency, lack of accountability, and lack of
oversight” (section 6.2.2) (Compton, 2014). Working on the ground during the recovery period,
my own observations convinced me that there was a pressing need to have good administrative
structures in place so that provision of basic social services could be accelerated. However,
widespread nepotism, based on ethnicity and regional affiliations, within the Museveni regime
undermined efforts of the recovery process.
These corruption challenges forced donor countries to change their funding channels
from government to NGOs. However, this caused tension within the Ugandan government
which led it to table an amendment to the NGO Registration Act (2006) in the parliament. This
Act was aimed at controlling and monitoring the activities of many NGOs because of the
significant funding they received from donors. The Act restricted NGO activities, which in
turn affected their contribution to the development of the country, and particularly, service
delivery in post-conflict northern Uganda (Omona, 2008). In addition, as a result of the
corruption scandals, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2009)
determined that it would withdraw aid money unless the government improved its
accountability on humanitarian assistance.
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In that context, an advocacy group, International Alert, which specialises in solving
the root causes of conflict with people across divides, in a 2013 report noted that the PRDP
programme and some policies of international donors in the recovery process tended to
concentrate on the physical, political, educational, and economic infrastructure while
neglecting to develop people’s capacities to manage them so as to enhance participatory human
security (International Alert, 2013). This reflects the argument of this thesis, that the
government’s programmes stood more chance of success if they had been people-centred rather
than centralised in the hands of small elite, which controlled access to funding and therefore to
political power at every level, without transparency and accountability. To be people-centred
would have been to use the human security approach, building the capabilities of stakeholders
at the grassroots level and reducing the opportunities for corruption and mismanagement,
As the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates, in order to safeguard the
security of the people through its decentralization system, the government needed to design
human-centred development projects, such as building houses for education and health workers
and improving their remuneration, which could have attracted qualified personnel to work in
the region and kickstarted the development process. Improving government accountability so
that the government could maintain the confidence of donors and the people of the area, is
another area which was critical to a successful recovery process. By any measure the
government’s accountability left much to be desired.

Local NGO interventions in the recovery process
During the recovery period, more and more local NGOs became prominent in the area
of development. As Omona observes, they “filled the gap created by the failure of the market
and government” (2008, p. 139). The change in emphasis from relief to development
necessitated local NGOs taking centre stage since they were more likely than the government
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to emphasize people’s participation and community-led development initiatives. The particular
advantage of local NGOs over government was their smallness in size and flexibility in tackling
threats to security. They were also familiar with local issues and conversant with local cultural
practices and language. Their comparative lack of bureaucracy gave them an advantage over
local government and in cases where government failed to provide basic services to its people,
NGOs filled the gap (Banks & Hulme, 2012). They did this by advocating for and enabling
people-centred approaches which promoted human rights, gender equality, children’s rights,
freedom of speech, political rights and health-related issues.
Local NGOs which operated during the recovery were of three types. The first were
the religious groups which were able to operate across a wide area due to their affiliations with
parishioners, rather than being only locally-based. The second were NGOs that were Ugandanfunded by individuals or groups in response to a particular social need of the community. The
third were locally-founded NGOs, but with a base of foreign donors. During the recovery, the
NGOs which remained in the region played a significant role in assisting the vulnerable (Whyte.
et al., 2014) and then, during the post-conflict reconstruction period, local NGOs began
providing a more structured, organized form of assistance than they had during the conflict.
Their main areas of concentration during this time included livelihood support through
advocacy, and provision of legal advice to victims especially in land disputes.
From the beginning of the recovery period NGOs, including the ARLPI and local
peace activists, encouraged the Ugandan government to urge the LRA to release abducted
children still held in captivity (Amone & Anenocan, 2014). Children, those currently in
captivity and those released or who had escaped during the conflict, are seen as the future of
the nation. So, the recovery process cannot be deemed successful without their reintegration.
Those who were captured were forced to live in an unfamiliar environment which affected their
socialization process. They were exposed directly to hostilities which may have affected their
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mental growth. The conflict in northern Uganda was thought of as “a war fought by children
on children,” because children account for approximately 90% of the LRA’s forces
(Falkenburg, 2013, p. 2). The captured teenagers, the main targets of the LRA, were subjected
to more atrocities than other abducted persons (Amone-P’Olak et al., 2007).
Local NGOs also focussed on reuniting families and providing psychosocial care in
order to minimize the trauma caused by their dislocation during the conflict. Significantly, with
the government unable to provide basic social services, donor support of local NGOs was
critical during the recovery process. UNICEF-funded NGOs, such as GUSCO, provided basic
needs for women and children, shelter, food and medical assistance in centres which provided
either part- or full-time care depending on need, while World Vision took on the role of tracing
missing people and counselling. NGO social workers also provided counselling services to
those returning from the bush (Compton, 2014). After a few weeks or months rehabilitation,
the returnees were given basic necessities such as a mattress and some clothes and then sent
back to their communities (Blattman & Annan, 2008).
Although the people centred/human security approach emphasizes the participation of
all in matters which affect the community, and despite the suffering of the youth during the
conflict, the recovery process neglected their voices. While NGOs seemed to value the
participation of young people it was unclear if they were involved in decision making
(Robinson, 2007). For younger children, a notable consequence of the conflict was the
increasing exploitation of child labour, a major cause of abuse and exploitation and a
fundamental violation of children’s rights. When peace came it became possible to setup local
NGOs specifically to deal with these issues. Because children were the main target of the LRA,
sensitizing children about their rights formed the basis of a number of NGO programmes,
which were aimed at the better management of government services and at assisting in
implementing, monitoring and supporting programmes that ensured the rights of children. Save
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the Children in Uganda, in particular, carried out a capacity building project which set up
training programmes to improve the technical skills of people working with children.
Local NGOs developed numerous programmes to reintegrate former combatants and
abductees, including children and the youth. In conjunction with traditional leaders, community
reintegration started with a cleansing ceremony. This was followed by receiving amnesty from
the government at a reception centre, and finally receiving a re-insertion package which was
aimed at assisting them to reintegrate into the community (Muldoon et al., 2014). Although
traditional ceremonies had limited success, western/foreign orientated programmes focussing
on dealing with post-traumatic stress disorders were even less successful, possibly because
these were new and untried in Acholi culture or even in non-western cultures more generally
(Betancourt et al., 2009; Ochen, 2015). These western approaches were not culturally sensitive
to the local Acholi traditional practices which led to confusion among those who were supposed
to be assisted. Further, the different interpretations between local and foreign approaches, and
the level of violence and trauma former combatants experienced during captivity, meant that
programmes were doomed to fail. In particular, programmes targeting former child soldiers
isolated them from their communities, the opposite of what was needed at the time. The
widespread local response was that traditional practices were ignored by those advocating the
western approach and that this was ineffective and unethical. As a result, very few returning
child soldiers used the programme (Bilotta, 2011).
The experience of local NGOs was that former child combatants could be integrated
into their communities by addressing their physical and social needs and focusing more widely
on reuniting families (Blattman & Annan, 2008). Other programs initiated by local NGOs to
assist formerly abducted children focused on improving literacy, addressing chronic
unemployment through skills development, treating serious injuries and illnesses (Klasen et al.,
2010).
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Designing programmes with the children’s best interests at their core, was aimed at
protecting the fundamental principles of children’s rights. This served as a guiding framework
and a key reference point for programming and practice and was an approach that helped
policymakers and workers not to lose sight of the individual child’s best interests (Spitzer &
Twikirize, 2013). While this was most likely the intention of all the NGO programmes, not all
had successful outcomes. During the bush war these children were exposed to overt
psychological and physical violence, and many participated directly in aggressive and cruel
acts. The more they did so, the more they became susceptible to the effects of trauma and,
subsequently, to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Weierstall, Schalinski, Crombach, Hecker, &
Elbert, 2012).
Local interventions in the recovery process depended heavily on international donor
support. Withdrawal by INGOs jeopardized many reconstruction activities and also affected
efforts to improve people’s security. The use by local NGOs of the community-based cluster
approach, for example, in line with the emphasis of the human security approach on people’s
collaboration in dealing with various threats as measures aimed at reducing the threats are
designed, was intended to reach vulnerable communities. However, the lack of funding
derailed these activities since many INGOs which were funding such activities had left the
region.
In order to have a meaningful recovery process facilitated by NGOs, the organisations
themselves needed to share information and experiences while interacting with people in
communities. Putting in place solid NGO networks was a key to dealing with security concerns
in the region. However, this collaboration was lacking, and many NGOs were accountable
mainly to their funders, rather than to the people they served. In a way, the relationships
between NGOs and communities came to be essential for both parties. As Angucia, Zeelen and
de Jong suggest, “in a situation where conflict made a once vibrant society mal-functional, the
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[Acholi] community became highly ‘NGOnized’. The needs of an individual’s life were
segmented according to what NGOs could offer” (2010, p. 226).

Challenges to the recovery process
As discussed in previous chapters, when using a human security approach, the main
objective in any recovery process after a violent conflict is to build an institutional framework
which is favourable for development to take place. As Shinoda and Jeong argue as a general
principle, “long term human security will be achieved only when peace-building succeeds in
establishing local good governance and a stable society” (2004, p. 25). This was not the case
in northern Uganda. Rather there was weak governance, corruption, land disputes, a lack of
access to social services, and poor planning and communication. To establish a successful
recovery process, the key would have been to design sustainable poverty reduction initiatives
based on the actual needs of the people, but the lack of consultation, the short-term intervention
policies of many INGOs, poor relations between the government and international donors
meant that this did not happen on an ongoing basis in northern Uganda.
The conflict had prevented people from accessing their agricultural land and also
prevented many from engaging in other income generating activities. As a result, it affected
the fundamental social, micro and macroeconomic institutions in the region (Gelsdorf et al.,
2012). Post conflict, inadequate infrastructure and high levels of insecurity prevented skilled
personnel from wanting to work in the area. The general lack of field-based information, no
statistics on the scale of the problems faced by the people or the proportion of those who faced
specific vulnerabilities, available to help agencies determine what and how many resources
were required, which greatly affected the work of humanitarian agencies and their capacity to
plan effectively (Okello-Obura, Minishi-Majanja, Cloete, & Ikoja-Odongo, 2007).
The key challenges to the recovery process in northern Uganda were resettling IDPs,
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revival of people’s livelihoods, and the restoration of social services. One of the government’s
main challenges was to meet donor demands. However, as noted above, at times, the
government’s priorities were at odds with those of the donors. Donor nations and organisations
subjected the government to critical scrutiny in regard to how funds were used during the
process: perceived government corruption and poor leadership seriously affected the flow of
assistance from donor countries and slowed the recovery process.
The ongoing recovery process held promise for better care of children, but also posed
a number of challenges to the safety, security and well-being of children and families. As
indicated above, in the discussion of the return of child soldiers, children’s roles of being both
victims and perpetrators during the conflict posed a “particular challenge to reintegration
efforts since communities were sometimes reluctant to receive children back who had been
forced to commit atrocities against their own peers, family, and community” (Spitzer &
Twikirize, 2013, p. 70). While Spitzer and Twikirize focus on the need for education and
employment for these unsettled former child soldiers, this was not an easy task, given that the
government was unsuccessful in putting policy into practice and designing appropriate
programmes aimed at assisting these children.
The lack of funding from INGOs, the government and local NGOs particularly
affected young people. The success of schools was hampered, and the number of students
dropping out increased, partly because unprepared schools had to accept large numbers of
children with war experiences that made settling to study difficult (Ager et al., 2011). The lack
of quality education for large numbers of children and adolescents meant that their future in
terms of acquiring skilled employment opportunities was bleak (Vindevogel, De Schryver,
Broekaert, & Derluyn, 2013). In addition, there was a dearth of appropriate programmes for
the youth in practical, vocational areas such as brick laying, carpentry, mechanical engineering,
modern agriculture, poultry and animal husbandry. To many youths, the lack of opportunities
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to find meaningful income generating activities to support themselves and their families, was
too much. This affected greatly those who were the heads of their families (Robinson, 2007).
However, because of traditional cultural practices, it was female child soldiers who had more
problems finding employment and therefore reintegrating than their male counterparts (Annan
et al., 2013).
Because one of the major consequences of the conflict in northern Uganda was youth
unemployment, the successful implementation of these types of courses would have helped
young people/men, especially those who did not have the chance to receive formal education
during the conflict, to rebuild their lives and earn a living. According to Weber (2013), the
recovery process was undermined because these youth related issues were not addressed.
Although important reforms to promote vocational and technical skills [had] been initiated by
government and development partners - reflecting a new and more integrated approach to
education, training and employment - these were still inadequate. Multiple constraints such as
an inability to adapt programmes to the needs of economies and fragmented training among
different agencies still hampered the progress of technical and vocational skills training reforms
(Ayai, 2013).
The withdrawal of skilled personnel at the crucial moment as recovery began directly
affected the health and wellbeing of the most vulnerable groups. The humanitarian agencies’
capacity to deal with the multifaceted issues was hampered by their lack of funds. The few
skilled personnel assisting in the process were overwhelmed by the enormity of the task. In
terms of human resources in the health sector, Namakula and Witter, for example, report that
the decline in the numbers of international humanitarian personnel and diminishing funds
meant that many projects became unsustainable (Namakula & Witter, 2014, p. 7).
As large numbers of people suffered in different ways and faced various health related
issues during the conflict, in the post-conflict situation the pressing demand was to tailor health
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responses and policies as directly as possible to the needs of the people (Muyinda & Mugisha,
2015). The significance of the recognition within the human security approach that people’s
lives can be threatened in different ways by events which are beyond their control (Poku,
Renwick, & Porto, 2007), is exemplified by a health-related challenge which emerged in the
recovery phase as a threat to the human security of the people in the region, especially the
children: the so-called nodding disease. This syndrome started as a result of the conditions
which people faced during the involuntary displacement (Mitchell et al., 2013). The ‘nodding
disease’, which only affects children, refers to a collection of symptoms such as nodding of the
head, emotional withdrawal, and confusion. The causes of this syndrome are unclear, but
explanations range from trauma to poor health services for more than two decades to the idea
that the government had deliberately infected children. In 2009, the Kitgum District Health
Office reported to the Uganda Ministry of Health approximately 2,000 cases suggestive of NS
[nodding syndrome] among persons previously displaced by war (Foltz et al., 2013).
Since this disease mainly affected, and continues to affect, children, the consequences
for the success of the recovery process were high because it undermined children’s health and
prospects for healthy development. The syndrome was a real threat to human security in
northern Uganda because it had the effect of aggravating the sense of helplessness of the people
(Bukuluki et al., 2012). Parents who had a number of children affected with nodding syndrome
were not only grieving because of their children's illness but also because they were faced with
a loss of pride and social value. The problems related to care for the affected children brought
a decrease in economic activities and often affected the entire family. Buchmann described the
disease as a “loss of lineage” and pointed to the need for families to “adjust to the
socioeconomic changes brought by nodding syndrome” (Buchmann, 2014). In addition, the
emergence of the nodding disease raised the problem of safeguarding human security in
situations where health care systems were not in place.
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Nodding syndrome in children was not however the only new manifestation of health
issues in the post conflict period. Problems such as malnutrition continued. These recovery
difficulties were underpinned by economic issues: historical divisions between Uganda's north
and south were a cause of past conflicts, yet continued investment in the north, where poverty
rates were twice the national average (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010), could have addressed
existing inequalities and helped ease the deep-seated hatred many northerners harboured
toward the central government, which had caused their forced displacement and extensive
human rights abuses.
Overall, although many projects were undertaken by both local and international
actors during the recovery process, little has been achieved in improving people’s standards of
living by May 2019 when this thesis was completed. For example, in order to construct
meaningful post-conflict recovery programmes which directly benefit local people, there is
need to promote welfare economics, locally based engagement initiatives and human
development based on the human security principles (Futamura, Newman, & Tadjbak, 2010).
This has not occurred to a necessary extent in post conflict northern Uganda. Further, the
extreme military approach employed by the government during the conflict, inevitably had ongoing negative impacts on people’s participation in the post-conflict reconstruction process
(Oosterom, 2016). These challenges affected the ability of aid workers to reduce the risk of
further disaster, effectively manage information and peace building. And finally, because the
response remained largely uncoordinated, it failed to be effective because it was not
harmonized through an established policy and a strategic institutionalized framework.

Land disputes during the recovery process
Land disputes were one of the biggest threats to the resettlement plans of former
internally displaced people in northern Uganda (Kobusingye, Van Leeuwen, & Van Dijk, 2016;
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Stevens, 2013). These disputes arose as a direct result of past poor land policies (Kobusingye,
van Leeuwen, & van Dijk, 2017). Many people in the region were peasant farmers, depending
on their land for their livelihood: as Mabikke establishes, “ownership and use of land and
importantly land tenure security offer perhaps the only survival alternative to the vast majority
of poor Ugandans especially living in post conflict regions of the country” (2011, p. 1).
However, tensions arising out of land disputes have threatened security in the region during
the recovery period. The government’s counter-insurgency policy of moving people into
protected camps left large pieces of fertile land unoccupied. This resulted in allowing those in
power, for example, politicians, senior army officers, and other elites, to forcibly fence off this
land and set up extensive agricultural farms. The impact of land grabbing by the business
community, civil servants and national investors was to threat[en] the successful resettlement
of the returnees (Onegi, 2012). Increasing conflict over undocumented land had and continues
to have the potential to undermine the peace process, threaten security and increase dependency
(Mabikke, 2011, Weber, 2013).
As a result of long-term displacement in IDP camps, many returnees lost authoritative
knowledge about their actual boundaries, the prospects of new large-scale investments by
outside actors and poor national legislation to protect the returnees have posed further ongoing
threats to the successful recovery process. Yet, the security of all returnees and access to land
for agricultural purposes should have been the core priorities since they provide the basis of
people’s livelihoods and the opportunity of being trained in best agricultural practices. This
could have been a promising venture for the many people who were returning from camps, but
was not (Birner et al., 2010).
The threat to security of this widespread practice of land grabbing led to the “Acholi
Parliamentary Group giving a public warning that any investor who tried to grab land in Acholi
would fail. One Member of Parliament even allegedly threatened that land grabbers would be
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speared” (Sjögren, Nordiska, Conflict, & Transformation, 2013). As Mogensen and Obika
point out access to land is a vital way for people to improve their livelihood (Mogensen &
Obika, 2013), and the lack of secure access to land can lead to a cycle of continued poverty.
Disagreements between returnees over land ownership and many people’s lack of secure access
to land, which infringes on their rights, have the potential to derail the recovery process. Access
to land on a shared basis could be a form of protection to many people returning from camp
life (Branch, 2007a). In northern Uganda “land remains an important factor in shaping the
socio-economic and political relationships between individuals, investors, and the state”
(Okwir, 2015).

The post-conflict recovery process
Many of the problems which were brought out in chapter four, detailing the difficulties
faced by NGOs trying to apply people centred approaches during the years of armed conflict,
continued to exacerbate the problems of post-conflict recovery. To successfully apply such
concepts in the post-conflict recovery process that worked from the ground up in northern
Uganda, it was essential that government and other agencies systematically come to understand
the needs of the people whether baseline surveys, community meetings and consultations,
listening to what the people were actually saying. Community social reintegration as a basis
for development in any post-conflict situation needed to be emphasised (Osborne, D’Exelle, &
Verschoor, 2018).
The human security approach, like the people centred approach, relies on establishing
the wellbeing of the people within their communities. However, some of the INGOs and NGOs
specifically targeted issues which were not a priority for the concerned people, but which rather
represented the concerns and interests of the donors. Planning which involved both the NGOs
and the affected people would have been more in line with the human security approach and
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with what the people wanted. Rather, most interventions concentrated on “reconstructing
physical, educational, political and economic infrastructures, not people’s lives. While
rebuilding infrastructures was crucial, these initiatives needed to occur in tandem with
developing people’s capacity, and enhancing collective human security” (McKay, 2004a).
A human security approach combines development and security perspectives, but,
during the recovery period in northern Uganda, the balance tilted against development because
of the government’s emphasis on the security aspect, which it termed a ‘fight against terrorism’.
This so-called war on terror affected the recovery process and the promotion of human rights
in northern Uganda. Bilateral support (mainly from the US (Branch, 2011), could have been
channelled to poverty reduction in the war-torn region, but the government spent the money on
buying expensive ammunition to fight the Lords’ Resistance Army in Central African Republic
and Democratic Republic of Congo.
In the northern Uganda situation, multifaceted and wide-ranging forms of
collaboration between UN agencies and some NGOs were used to develop people-centred
networks that helped identify and assist those most in need. UN agencies, NGOs, local
organisations and individual actors collaborated with one another to ensure the protection and
the provision of basic services to the people (Compton, 2014). For example, a report by UNDP
Uganda Programme (2012) shows that the Northern Uganda Early Recovery Programme
(NUERP), which was funded by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
(UNTFHS), collaborated with three UN agencies UNDP, WHO and WFP to jointly implement
grassroots programmes. These UN agencies further collaborated with other grassroots
organizations which included FAO, World Vision, International Lifeline Fund and Sasakawa
Global 2000. Activities such as building people’s capacity in agriculture and non-agricultural
production, accessing credit, improving incomes, enhancing health and nutritional status, peace
building and conflict prevention, and increasing access to safe water and sanitation facilities
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were implemented in Lira, Oyam, Alebtong and Otuke districts in the Lango region. These
projects focussed on three areas: resettlement and recovery support, executed by UNDP and
WFP; health, nutrition and HIV/AIDS implemented, by WHO and peace-building and conflict
resolution, undertaken by UNDP.
The organizations’ main aim was to provide swift, self-sustainable recovery in the
conflict-affected areas using an integrated, community-based delivery approach (UNDP, 2012),
in accordance with human security principles. Once this occurred, some positive changes in
people’s lives were realized. These included improved farming methods and food security. In
addition, people acquired skills of saving through the Village Saving and Loan Association
(VSLA) and developed a keen awareness in preserving peace through peace rings which were
community-based structures, set up on a voluntary basis to promote dialogue and mediation
among people affected by the conflict in the region (Kamatsiko, 2015). People gained an
increased consciousness of the necessity to take care of both their health and that of the
environment. But while people centred/human security emphasises interventions aimed at
improving the resilience and wellbeing of people faced with threats (Wood, 2007), this
approach was not always achieved. The need for the promotion of good governance,
accountability mechanisms and the provision of better social services remained unfulfilled.
Thus, the recovery process was problematic.
As part of their activities during the recovery period, AVSI (2013) empowered local
communities through various programmes. These included making farming a business,
supporting persons living with disabilities, improving the quality of life of children, providing
opportunities for education, contributing to national prevention efforts of mother to child
transmission of HIV/AIDS, equipping youth with employment skills, improving health care
systems and strengthening and modernizing agricultural production. According to its 2013
report “AVSI [was] mindful to recognize that within every individual resides the potential to
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surmount challenges, innovate and achieve success” (2013, p. 6). Therefore, people took a
leading role in planning and implementing these programmes although few empowerment
strategies that worked in practice were documented. However, empowerment enabled the
integration of other sectors of society and government into peace building activities. In addition,
programmes were designed to promote learning rather than yielding specific results. One
notable contribution of these programmes was the creation of prospects for participants to seek
out and captivate knowledge critical to good decision making.
During the recovery period, many NGOs designed people centred programs, which
led to a deeper analysis of the root causes and consequences of the conflict. For example, the
Youth Empowerment for the Realization and Promotion of Human Rights in northern Uganda
(GWED-G), used human rights training and empowerment building activities in conjunction
with employment skills training to assist the youth to rebuild their lives , and Caritas Gulu used
the participatory approach idea of working with the affected people to identify their
interests/needs and the subsequent solutions (Wamala, 2015). Such interventions improved the
community’s engagement in the ongoing reconciliation process with former LRA rebels and
enabled former combatants to more fully integrate in community. These actions were taken
with the aim of contributing to lasting peace in the region.
Both people centred and human security approachs put emphasis on empowering
communities in order to strengthen their capacities and improve resilience to present and future
threats (Frerks, 2011). In northern Uganda, initiatives designed by NGOs such as community
meetings and workshops aimed at empowering and improving the livelihoods of the people
during the recovery process led to improved income security and generated pride among the
people through ownership of programs/activities carried out in their community (Hochreiter,
2013). People started to share their success stories among themselves, spreading the word to
neighbouring communities. For example, since people in northern Uganda are subsistence
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farmers, they applied the demand-driven approach, which focused on small-scale interventions.
This system helped develop market linkages which in turn supported the economy of local
communities and motivated people to become more productive (Kelly, 2015).
As a practice, human security advocates for equal treatment of all people irrespective
of race, ethnicity, gender and religion (Richmond, 2012). In northern Uganda, programmes and
policies during the recovery process tried to emphasise the new approach of gender equality.
To put the gender perspective into the recovery process, there was a need to deal with gender
issues by empowering women and at the same time promoting peace and development in the
region. For example, since women were no longer in danger of being abducted, many used
this recovery period to improve their economic base and support their families (Blumberg,
2015). One programme, aimed at gender transformation and empowerment, helped women’s
groups access justice, engage in peace building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, all
of which improved the situation of both men and women (UWONET, 2011). Women’s
increased access to information, especially in rural areas, also had the potential to change the
use of non-discriminative language and encouraged more equal participation.
This is however, an over optimistic description of the situation since a report by
International Alert (2008), shows that even though many programmes were designed to
empower and benefit women, it is hard to identify those benefits for women. Cultural and
traditional practices in northern Uganda to some extent collided with human security principles
of equal treatment of individuals within their communities. This was contrary to traditional
cultural practices which emphasized the supremacy of men over women. Any attempt by the
youth or women specifically those living in urban areas to question any older male idealisation
of pre-war order, was unacceptable (Branch, 2013).
The identification of the underlying causes of conflict is a core concept of the human
security approach. However, during the northern Ugandan recovery process, neither donors,
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nor government nor NGOs endeavoured to identify what really had caused the conflict. They
only dealt with the consequences. Although not specifically referring to the northern Uganda
situation, Cunningham stresses the need to explore the origins of conflict, arguing that
“Understanding the root causes of civil wars and preventing their re-eruption would help
achieve future goals for improving the quality of life for millions” (2013, p. 181). Following
this line of thinking, listening to people’s views on the underlying causes of the conflict could
have provided a starting point for their involvement in the recovery process.
During the recovery period, there was a need to employ people-centred approaches to
help all victims overcome the traumas they sustained in the two decades of conflict. According
to Sonderegger, Rombouts, Ocen, and McKeever:
persons may benefit from an intervention designed to improve
psychosocial functioning and that a universal intervention offered to all
war-affected persons (i.e., not just former LRA abductees) is relevant,
as all war-affected persons may benefit, regardless of the degree of
their direct and indirect experiences of war (2011, p. 235).
The development of participatory initiatives which included all people, in a bottomup approach, was essential to complement top-down justice and reconciliation processes. An
integral part of this would have been the active inclusion of local traditional leaders in the
recovery process as a way of restoring social order among the people. This approach was
discussed but not put into effective practice (Branch, 2014).
Similarly, community-based approaches used by INGOs were intended to develop
programmes and activities which could help people rebuild their livelihoods and alleviate some
of the insecurity. However, these interventions did not instantly yield tangible results.
Accordingly, in order to have a meaningful post-conflict recovery in northern Uganda
– one that employed the principles of the human security approach - basic issues for human
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survival for example catering for people with mental health, disability, and issues related to
youth who have grown up in camps needed to be considered (Barham et al., 2011). In any
peace-building effort, a central focus on the principles of human security which ensures
protecting and promoting social, cultural, political and economic rights of those affected during
and after the conflict, it is essential (Cahill-Ripley, 2016). A people-centred approach based on
human security principles could help the recovery process by putting in place programmes
aimed at responding to the individual differences mentioned above and also to cultural and
ethnic diversity. Moreover, it could help consolidate peace and empower people. However, this
did not occur during the northern Uganda recovery process.
As discussed above (chapter two), scholars such as Cilliers (2004), Kaldor (2007),
Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007) and Newman (2010) (Cilliers, 2004; Kaldor, 2007; Newman,
2010; Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007) who are advocates of the human security approach argue
that it can be a useful tool in reducing human suffering, assisting with development, resolving
conflict and advocating for human rights. In northern Uganda, when humanitarian
organizations applied these principles during the recovery period, they reduced people’s
suffering and helped some re-build their lives. However, the early withdrawal of many INGOs
and the high levels of corruption among government officials tasked with implementing
projects at times led to the failure or near failure of those projects which in turn retarded the
recovery process.
A people cantered/human security approach focuses on addressing issues affecting
vulnerable people and groups within specific communities. Human rights groups in northern
Uganda which were advocating for people’s rights and for their human security sometimes
found themselves at loggerheads with the government because it had little interest in dealing
with those issues. Commenting on the government’s contribution during the recovery period,
Pham and Vinck note that “for social reconstruction to be effective, the government should be

249
perceived as legitimate, should not impose measures on communities without their input, and
should manage expectations of its development programs. Failure to do so may renew tensions
that could undermine the prospect for a lasting peace” (2010, p. 32) and a return to another
devastating conflict in the region.
Extending security to all citizens is a responsibility of the state. People centred/human
security approaches can contribute to the successful achievement of this aim. During the
recovery period, the lack of trained personnel equipped with the skills to put in place recovery
programmes undermined the security of many northern Ugandans. Further, the lack of an
effective rule of law and the accompanying lack of basic social services meant that, in some
areas of northern Uganda, such approaches could not be implemented. a human security
approach could not be applied.
Since Independence, Ugandan political leaders, focused on maintaining their own
power at the expense of the security of their citizens, have stood in the way of people centred
initiatives. Similarly, public institutions such as the police and the army have failed to
guarantee the security of all Ugandans, instead favouring the advancement of their own ethnic
groups’. These conditions opened up avenues for rebel groups, such as the LRA, to destabilise
the country and, as I have shown above, have made moving towards a human security approach
extremely difficult.
The participation of ordinally people in decision making is fundamental to both people
centred and human security approaches. Because funding agencies had specific programmes
into which they had to release their funds, there was often a discrepancy between the priorities
of the funding agencies and those of the concerned communities: very often, the decisions of
local participants were not always adhered to, leading to inappropriate planning based on poor
decision making and unrealistic costings. Yet, both local and international NGOs made
concerted efforts to adhere to the principles of a people centered/human security approach
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when implementing programs during the recovery period. Even so, many INGOs withdrew
early.
The security situation which prevailed during the conflict period disorganized the
social, political and economic setup environment of northern Uganda. Dealing with human
security threats in post-conflict meant that various stakeholders needed to strengthen, reinforce,
and extend their activities to the people in northern Uganda. Nonetheless, in 2008 Maya
suggested that as a result of the extensive socio-economic and political disruption during the
conflict in northern Uganda, NGOs were likely to be needed for a considerable time: “Given
the limited capacity of local government, there is no question that UN agencies and NGOs will
continue to play a significant role in northern Uganda’s recovery and reconstruction” (2008, p.
23). In reality though, in order to have a successful recovery process in northern Uganda, there
is a need to reflect on Uganda’s political volatile history, so as to develop acceptable local
development recovery opportunities which are based on human security principles for the
people of the region, either large programmes at societal level or smaller initiatives at group or
individual levels. As Edomwonyi as he writes of Africa in a post-conflict process more
generally: “[a] successful post-conflict rebuilding project is one which sets effective
foundations for democracy, economic prosperity, peace and justice to take root in societies in
transition” (2003, p. 43).

Conclusion
This chapter examined the challenges which former IDP faced returning to their
former places of residence and the role played by the government of Uganda and humanitarian
organizations in assisting those returning to resettle. After years of social, political and
economic turmoil, this period was one of peace. IDPs returned home to greater stability, and
humanitarian agencies operated without fear of rebel attacks. The discussion has demonstrated
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that applying a people centred/human security approach in a conflict free environment is a basis
for comparative success. However, the task of reconstructing the war-ravaged region has been
enormous and was not without its challenges. Noticeably, there was little effort spent on
identifying the root causes of the conflict at the beginning of the recovery. If this had been done
it may have provided some indication on the priorities as to what issues needed to be dealt with
first in the recovery period.
The northern Ugandan situation shows that in a human security/people centred
recovery process, the emphasis should be on strengthening the capacity of citizens and civil
society. NGOs provided the assistance necessary to restore the rule of law and encouraged
community-based consultations on issues related to justice, truth healing and reconciliation.
NGOs encouraged local governments to create space for dialogue on how to address the
people’s dissatisfaction. In some of the areas where these types of programmes were carried
out, there was a marked improvement in people’s skills development and wellbeing.
The northern Uganda recovery process demonstrates the need for a coordinated
approach when applying the human security concept in a post-conflict situation. However,
there was a need to improve the capacity of local stakeholders, and importantly, the government
of Uganda needed to strengthen its political will to implement its recovery programmes. Such
an approach would, more likely, to have led to a better alignment between planned goals and
on the ground practice, which was not the case in northern Uganda.
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Chapter Eight
Conclusion

This thesis has used the northern Uganda conflict to analyse the usefulness of the
human security approach in assisting people in conflict situations and during the recovery
process. It also assesses the impacts of the crisis on the affected people. This research cannot
claim to have exhaustively addressed all the issues related to the application of the human
security concept when analysing the conflict and the recovery period in northern Uganda.
However, the research does contribute to knowledge about, and adds to the literature on,
whether a human security approach is a productive concept to be applied in both conflict and
post conflict situations. In exploring the relevance of this approach, I have drawn principally
on the work of Christie (2010), Ewan (2007) and the UNDP (1994).
While there is no agreed universal definition of human security (Hataley & Nossal,
2004; Hynek & Chandler, 2013; Paris, 2001; Prezelj, 2008), following Gasper (2013), four
key elements of the concept have been used to structure this investigation of the northern
Ugandan conflict. These are that: a human security framework places the individual as the
primary referent, designs programmes to best protect the people, emphasises individuals’
well-being within their communities, and responds to people’s needs when dealing with
sources of threat (Gasper, 2013).
The background to this study has been the ongoing conflicts in Uganda since it
gained independence in 1962. However, emphasis has been put on the conflict between the
LRA and the government of Uganda between 1986-2006. As discussed in previous chapters,
the northern Ugandan conflict was the most horrific and sustained of Uganda’s conflicts.
Multiple international, regional, national and local actors and organisations were involved,
and many strategies were used in efforts to bring peace and stability to the region. This
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research has discussed Uganda’s post-independence history and analysed the usefulness of
the human security approach by testing the extent to which the concept of human security can
be usefully applied in a conflict situation like the northern Uganda conflict. With a human
security framework in mind, this thesis explored the reasons for the conflicts, their ensuing
consequences, the peace initiatives instigated, and the programs initiated in the post conflict
and recovery period.
The thesis has demonstrated that the conflict was produced in part by the disruptions
caused by the British colonial administrative system and partly by ethnically based socioeconomic divisions within Uganda’s post-colonial political structures. It has shown that
human security principles were more difficult to implement during the conflict than after it.
Using a human security framework, the thesis evaluates the interventions designed by nations,
international bodies, local organisations and the government of Uganda to address the security
threats in northern Uganda both during and after the conflict. This research established that
although people-led initiatives, as emphasised by the human security approach, and as
employed by numerous humanitarian organizations, played a critical role in assisting those
who suffered extensively during the conflict, their efforts were not successful in either fully
alleviating the suffering or stopping the conflict.
The main argument in this research is that human security is a productive concept,
however, its application in the northern Uganda conflict was hampered by political and nonpolitical actors who were opposed to, or who frequently sought to impede, its successful
application. It was of limited value in protecting people during the conflict. However, it was
more effectively implemented in the reconstruction and recovery period following the conflict
in northern Uganda.
Chapter one provides the background and the reasons for this research. It states the
problem under investigation, which was the longevity of the conflict in northern Uganda in
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relation to the application of the concept of human security and presents the diversity of ethnic
groups which make up present day Uganda. The research methodologies used are outlined,
the reasons for choosing them are discussed, and the main question and hypotheses of the
research are stated. The main questions guiding the research were: What impact did the key
stakeholders have in the northern Uganda conflict and how did those differences contribute
to the implementation of human security principles in the period 1988-2016.
Chapter two examines the literature relating to the concept of human security,
discussing the emergence of the term and its various definitions and analysing arguments put
forward by different scholars in favour of, and against, the concept. It explores how human
insecurities such as poverty, fear of violence, inter-ethnic conflict, human rights abuses and
poor governance are common contributors to conflict. All of these conditions were present in
northern Uganda before the beginning of, and indeed throughout, the conflict. Although
human security is a contested concept, its application, as discussed in chapter seven, indicates
that if the principles had been applied more broadly in the recovery phase, the reconstruction
would have been more effective.
Chapter three suggests that the political, social and economic situation in Uganda
during the colonial and post-colonial periods provided fertile ground for the country’s political
instabilities. The chapter argues that the causes of civil wars in post-colonial Uganda could
be attributed to the colonial administration’s system of ‘divide and rule’ (Kisekka-Ntale 2007,
Nannyonjo 2005) which resulted in the absence of a sense of being Ugandan and a lack of a
spirit of national unity. It also suggests that the application of a human security approach could
have linked the nation’s security needs with those of the people. This may have united the
country and identified common goals. That this did not occur is demonstrated through the
discussion of the causes of the northern Uganda conflict which shows that all the leaders since
independence prioritized their stay in power at the expense of the welfare of the civilian
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population. This led to many non-state actors destabilizing the country by waging rebellions,
with catastrophic consequences for the security of the people, specifically those in northern
Uganda. As this thesis shows, the civilian population is most likely to feel secure if the
government understands the importance of institutional, political, economic and ethnic
relationships.
As this research has demonstrated, the use of military intervention by all the regimes
since independence planted the seed of ‘fear’ in many Ugandans. The human security
approach is based on freedom from fear and want (UNDP, 1994). However, in Uganda,
disregard for human life by the military left many people fearful of expressing their views
openly. One of the main reasons for the conflicts in Uganda, and specifically for the
emergence of the LRA, was a lack of good governance, which I argue emanated from the
colonial era. A lack of good governance in any country contributes to a lack of human security.
Chapter four focuses on the context and causes of the conflict in northern Uganda.
The chapter explores the emergence of the LRA and discusses both its backing by the
government of Sudan and the prolonged responses from the government of Uganda, INGOs
and NGOs, analysing the challenges NGOs faced when trying to assist the people affected by
the conflict. The role of NGOs is contrasted with that of the government which failed to
protect its citizens, forcing them into camps which lacked basic services. The chapter argues
that the failure to address the politically-based ethnic and socio-economic divisions was a
major contribution to the causes and longevity of the conflict in northern Uganda. In doing so
it demonstrates that ethnically-based divisions following Independence contributed to the
conflict. In addition, the lack of a meaningful collaboration between the UPDF and NGOs in
the fight against the LRA intensified the conflict and caused great misery to the people. This
lack of cooperation and the non-involvement of the local people in designing appropriate
mechanisms for deterring human threats further threatened their lives. I argue here that more
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effective collaboration between the various stakeholders in the conflict would have helped to
defeat the LRA in a shorter time.
Chapter five discusses the various social, political and economic consequences of the
conflict on both the people and the region, arguing that the different perspectives held by key
stakeholders in the northern Uganda conflict led to catastrophic consequences for the people
of that region. The chapter demonstrates that the government of Uganda’s insistence on using
a military approach to solve the conflict undermined people’s human security and led to a loss
of community organizational structures, a lack of capacity to solve communal and family
disputes, and a weakening of social norms. It also created poverty, led to increased
unemployment, and greatly affected the delivery of basic social services. If the Ugandan
government had applied a human security approach in northern Uganda, it could have
enhanced people’s sense of security as the approach draws on people’s experiences to design
what is best for them in a given context. In addition, the heavy-handed tactics of the UPDF,
which resulted in various human rights abuses of non-combatants, caused much enmity
between the UPDF, the government and civilians. Similarly, if a human security approach had
been used, the government’s main focus would have been to address the root causes of
discontent particularly those of the people in the Acholi region where the LRA caused the
most carnage.
Chapter six discusses the different national, local, regional and international peace
initiatives and how they impacted on the conflict and the human security of northern
Ugandans. The chapter argues that the deep-rooted ethnic and socio-economic divisions
within Uganda contributed to the failure of most of these initiatives and that international
interventions like that of the ICC, which emphasized revengeful justice, also helped prolong
the conflict. The contribution of the Juba peace talks, which marked the end of the conflict in
northern Uganda, is also explored. However, the research identifies an ongoing lack of trust
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between the LRA and the government of Uganda as a cause for the failure of the other peace
negotiations and for stopping the LRA insurgency completely. The conflict showed the
government’s lack of commitment to, and understanding of, how people-centred peacebuilding processes should be handled. As emphasized by the human security approach, the
research demonstrates that there was a need to involve the local people in peace talks and
include them in the security process. Although extensive engagement was proposed by civil
society, religious and cultural leaders, the government’s preference was for a top-down
approach.
Chapter seven analyses the recovery process and explores the consequences of the
withdrawal of some INGOs at the beginning of the process. The chapter discusses conditions
in northern Uganda following the Juba peace process, the decongestion process and the
contribution and challenges of various stakeholders. It also argues that human security, while
a productive concept, was ultimately of limited value in protecting northern Ugandans during
the conflict situation. In addition, the shifting and multiple meanings of security and human
security held by key actors in the northern Ugandan conflict impeded the socio-economic
reconstruction of northern Uganda. This process was affected by the withdrawal of many
INGOs, however, I argue here that if INGOs had not withdrawn their support at the beginning
of the recovery process, local organizations and the Ugandan government would have been
better able to undertake more people-centred development initiatives in keeping with a human
security approach. A human security approach recognizes that the needs of people differ from
community to community and individual to individual and considers the integration of gender
perspectives in the planning process. The research suggests that had INGOs stayed for a
longer time, there could have been more of a focus on these aspects. Local groups and people
lost the expertise of the international aid organisations when many of them left the region.
In this research, the emphasis has been on examining how a human security approach
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could have been used more effectively in addressing issues of insecurity in northern Uganda.
Considering the use, or lack of use, in the conflict in northern Uganda, of the four elements
of human security identified in this research enables us to better understand its relevance and
the problems which those attempting to apply it might encounter. Certainly, as discussed in
detail in previous chapters, those trying to apply it in northern Uganda experienced many
difficulties.
The research has established that it is more difficult to use the human security
approach during conflict situations than when the situation is stable. This was clearly
demonstrated in northern Uganda. During the conflict, many humanitarian organizations tried
to assist but often failed to accomplish what they had hoped to do because of the lack of
security. After the conflict, during the recovery period, because of the improved security
situation, success was partly realised. As demonstrated throughout the thesis, the application
of a human security approach was hampered due to reasons which included corruption, a lack
of respect for human rights, some cultural and traditional practices, the lack of security, the
lack of personnel equipped with the skills needed to employ a human security approach,
ignorance of the rule of law by both the LRA and the UPDF, historical and political
developments since Independence, a lack of nationalism by politicians and a discrepancy
between funding agencies and community needs. A combination of the above reasons created
a situation which greatly contributed to the conflict in northern Uganda and led to prolonged
human insecurity for many civilians.
The usefulness of a human security approach is often contested (Hataley & Nossal,
2004; Hynek & Chandler, 2013; Paris, 2001; Prezelj, 2008) but there is growing agreement
that when INGOs, NGOs, local groups and governments work together, the chance of a more
holistic approach to security and benefits for a greater proportion of vulnerable people can be
realised (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2005). Although the concept addresses various threats to
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humanity, which in theory is attractive to its proponents (Cilliers, 2004; Kaldor, 2007;
Newman, 2010; Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007), the lack of connection between theory and
practice, as demonstrated in northern Uganda, undermines its applicability and makes the
concept tough to apply in a conflict situation. This raises a question as what other approaches
can be used to make the human security approach more practical since it appears that the
concept cannot be successfully applied alone in a conflict situation. This is a research area
which could be explored further.
Despite the shortcomings of the human security concept, this thesis has shown that
its application is more likely to create a space in which human insecurities can be identified,
recognized and addressed. Further, the thesis has identified useful, practical and effective
ways of engaging those affected by humanitarian crises to take part in managing their own
security and livelihood. As progress in northern Uganda’s recovery continues, it is important
that the locals take the lead in that process.
It is hoped that this case study, which uses a qualitative methodological approach
and auto-ethnography to analyse the human security situation in northern Uganda from 1988
to 2006, offers relevant actions and responses which can be applied in similar humanitarian
crises. I have tried to indicate the relevance of a human security approach in responding to
current and emerging threats to people in conflict zones. In order for other developing
countries to prevent human insecurities from occurring as happened in northern Uganda, it is
essential to promote human security approaches, not military strategies, in conflict situations
and during periods of reconstruction.
Despite all that we knew about the LRA and their violence, we
had made a unique but precarious relationship of trust with them, and
they with us. One moment that particularly shows this relationship was
when Vincent Otti (by then second in command) entrusted us with his
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wife to be taken to Nairobi for delivering a baby. We did this and
brought her and her baby back safely. This shows the working of
human security in the conflict zone in practice. The theory of human
security put to work, in practice in the conflict zone.
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